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1/22

Political Obligation and the Argument from GratitudeAuthor(s): A. D. M. WalkerSource: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 191-211Published by: WileyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265244 .

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2/22

A.D.M.

WALKER

Political

Obligation

and

the Argument

fromGratitude

Political

obligation

s now

an unfashionable

topic,

remarkedJ.

P.

Pla-

menatz

in I968;

and

whathe wrote

thenis still

true.

Nodoubt

the

decline

in interest

in the

topic

s due

in largepart

tothe

increased

popularity

f

the

view

thatwe

do

not in

fact haveany general

obligation

o

comply

with

the

law.Buteven those who areunsympathetic o thisview no longersee the

problem

of

political

obligation

as central

to

political

philosophy

n the

man-

ner of

Hobbes

or Locke. One

reason

is

that the problem

n its

traditional

form

has

been

felt tofocus

in an unnatural

way

on

just

one

aspect

of

a cit-

izen's

relationship

with the state;

it distorts

mattersby inviting

us

to

con-

sider

the issue

of ourcompliance

with the

law in

isolation

fromour

other

political

responsibilities.2

Perhaps

more

significantly,

t has been

argued

thatthe

traditional

roblem

sets

an

impossible

task:

the demand

foran

en-

tirely

general

justification

of the obligation

citizens

have

to comply

with

the law simplycannot be met. The search fora single line of argument

that will

generate,

for

all or at least most

citizens

of most states,

a general

obligation

to comply

with

the

law

is doomed

to failure,

and the problem

of

political

obligation

can

only

be solvedpiecemeal.3

My

concern

in

this

article s

not

with the

reasons

for

the relative ack

of

interest

in

the

question

of

political

obligation,

but with

the question

itself.

I would ike

to thank

Angela

Walker,

T.

S.

Champlin,

and

the Editors

of

Philosophy

&

Pub-

lic

Affairs

for theirhelpful comments

on

earlier

draftsof

this article.

i.

J.

P. Plamenatz,Consent,

Freedom nd PoliticalObligation,

d ed.

(Oxford:

OxfordUni-

versity Press, i968), p. I63.

2. See, e.g., Political Philosophy,

d.

Anthony

Quinton Oxford:

Oxford

UniversityPress,

I967), p. 13.

3. See, e.g., MargaretMacDonald,

The

Language

of Political

Theory,

n

Logic

and

Lan-

guage,

ser.

I,

ed. A.G.N. Flew

(Oxford:Blackwell,

963);

and A.

J.

Simmons,

Moral

Princi-

ples and

PoliticalObligations Princeton:

Princeton

UniversityPress,

1979),

esp. chap.

VIII.


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3/22

192

Philosophy

&

Public Affairs

I want to

addressthis

unfashionable

question,

and answer t in

an unfash-

ionable

way.Political

obligation,

shall

argue,can

be seen as

an obligation

of gratitude:

our obligation

o comply

with

the law is grounded

n consid-

erations

of

gratitude

or

benefits

receivedfrom

the state. This,

I

realize,

is

a claimfew

willbe disposed

to regard

with favor.

The argument

fromgrat-

itude

has neverenjoyed

philosophical

popularity.

First sketched

in

Plato's

Crito,

it does

not

figure

in the writings

of the classical political

philoso-

phers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It appearsto be en-

dorsedby

Mill

in On Liberty,and

in the present

century

has attracted

a

handful

of adherents,

of whom

the bestknown

is probably

Sir

DavidRoss.

But

within the last

decade

it

has

received

detailed critical

scrutiny

on

a

numberof occasions,

and each

time been

pronounced

adically

defective.4

The argument's

widespread

ack of

appeal,

however,probably

wes

less to

a

sober

examination

of

its

supposed

defects

than to a deeperrevulsion

at

the veryidea

of basing political

obligation

on considerations

of gratitude.

Some

perhaps

think

that if

political

obligation

s

a matter of

gratitude

we

are boundto accede tothe demandsof the statein an uncriticaland child-

like way,

and

are led

by

this

thought

to

have no

truck with an

argument

which seems

to

legitimize

so

deplorably

upine

an

attitude

to

authority.

Othersmay

feel

that,

like

the

argument

rom

prescription,

t

requires

spe-

cial

prior

assumptions

of

a

religious

or

metaphysical

kind and

commits its

advocates

to

a

mystical

or

Hegelian

reverence

for the state.5

There is

no

denying

the

melancholy

history

of the

argument

from

grat-

itude.

But

nonetheless

I

wish

to

argue

that the

argument

does

represent

a

defensible response

to the

problem

of

political

obligation.My

basic

point

will be that discussion of the argumenthas been vitiatedby misunder-

standing,

prejudice,

and

an

imperfect

grasp

of the

nature of

gratitude.

As

a

result, only

the less

plausible

versions

of the

argument

have been

con-

sidered,

and while the

objections

advanced

against

them

are often

well

4.

See Plato,

Crito

48b-52d;

J.

S.

Mill,

On Liberty London:

Collins,1979),

chap. IV,

p.

205; W.

D. Ross, The Right

and the Good Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press, 1930),

p.

27;

Plamenatz,

Consent,

Freedom

nd Political Obligation,

p.

24;

A.

C.

Ewing,

The Individual,

the State

and

WorldGovernment

London:

Macmillan,

947), p.

218. Recent

discussions

of

the argument

are

to be foundin

A. D. Woozley,

Law and

Obedience

London:

Duckworth,

1979), chap.

4;

Simmons,

Moral Principles

and Political Obligations,

chap. VII;

M.B.E.

Smith, IsTherea PrimaFacieObligationo Obeythe Law? YaleLawJournal

82

(i973),

esp. pp.953-54.

5. Cf.

Nannerl

0.

Henry

on the

argument

rom prescription

n

Political

Obligation

and

Collective

Goods,

n Political

andLegalObligation,

Nomos

XII,

ed. J. R. Pennock

andJ.

W.

Chapman

New

York:New YorkUniversity

Press,

1970),

p.

265.




4/22

193

Political

Obligation

and the

Argument

from Gratitude

founded, they neglect

the

possibility

of

restating

the

argument

in

a more

powerful

orm

that would

evade

their

force.

I

At

least

two

versions

of the

argument

rom

gratitude

are

to be found

in the

literature. The first has its prototype n

Plato's Crito

and

appeals

to an

analogybetweena citizen's

relationship

o the

state

and a

child's

to

its par-

ents.6

It

compares

the benefits

citizens

receive from

the state

with the

benefits children

receive

from

their

parents

n the course of their

upbring-

ing, and argues

that

as

a

child

owes obedience

to

its parents,

the

citizen

has

an

analogous obligation

of

gratitude

o

comply

with

the law.

This ver-

sion

of the

argument

need not detain

us.

Quite apart

rom

the

many points

ofdissimilaritybetweenpoliticaland familial

relationships,

which

weaken

the analogy,a crucial flaw in the

argument s its assumption

that a

child's

obligation

o

obey its parents

s

an

obligationof gratitude.

Even

if

we

con-

cede

that children have

obligations

of

gratitude

o

their

parents

and also

have an obligation o obey them, it is unclear that the

latter s

a

particular

instance of

the former.

And

if a

child's

obligation

o

obey

its

parents s

not

an obligation

of

gratitude,

he

appeal

to the

relationship

between

parents

and

childrendoes

nothing

to

show

that

among any obligations

of

gratitude

a

citizen may

have to the

state,

there

will

be, specifically,

an

obligation

o

obey the

law.

The second version

of the

argument

needs

to be considered at

greater

length.

It

dispenses

with the

analogy

between

political

and familial

rela-

tionshipsand seeks to derivea citizen'sobligation o complywith the law

from

a

general principle

of

gratitude.

The brief remarks n

Ross and Pla-

menatz suggest

that

they

would

have

developed

he

argumentalong these

lines,

and it

is

in

this

form

that

the

argument

has

received careful

scrutiny

in A.

J. Simmons's

recent discussion.7As discussed

by Simmons,

the ar-

gument appears

to

rest

on

the

idea

that

the

receipt

of

a

benefit

puts

one

under

an

obligation

o

requite

one's

benefactor,

o confer on him a

benefit

in return for

the benefit one has received

from him. It

is this

principle

of

requital

or

reciprocation

hat the

argument

applies

to the

relationship

be-

6.

This version

of the

argument

s

discussed

n

Woozley,

Law and Obedience, sp. pp.

64-

70,

and

Simmons,MoralPrinciples

and PoliticalObligations,pp.

I60-62.

7. See Ross,

The Right and the Good,p.

27; Plamenatz,Consent,

Freedomand

Political

Obligation,

p.

24;

Simmons,MoralPrinciples

and PoliticalObligations,

hap. VII.




5/22

194

Philosophy&Public

Affairs

tween citizen and state to establish

the fact of politicalobligation.In out-

line the argumentruns as follows:

(i) The

person

who

receives benefits from

X

has

an

obligation o re-

quite or make a suitable returnto X.

(Let us call this the principleof

requital. )

(2) Everycitizen has received

benefits

from the state.

(3) Every citizen has

an

obligation

to

make

a

suitable

return to

the

state.

(4) Compliance

with the law is a

suitable

return.

(5) Every

citizen

has

an

obligation

to

comply

with the laws of

his

state.

Simmons rightly challenges this version of the argument. First, its

foundation s insecure.

As

it

stands, step i,

which states the

principle

of

requital, s false.

The

mere receipt

of

benefits does

not

put one under an

obligation of requital or reciprocation; he person who receives benefits

from anotherdoes not always havean obligation o requitehis benefactor,

but only in certaincircumstances.

So if

we are

to

defend the argument,we

need to modify step

i

by restrictingthe application

of

the principleof re-

quital

tQ

hose circumstances

in

which beneficiaries genuinely have

an

obligation

o

requite

their

benefactors.

Simmonshimself clarifies ive con-

ditions

which he claims must

be

satisfiedbefore

the

recipient

of a

benefit

has

an

obligation

of

requital-the

chief

of

these

being

(i)

that

the benefit

must be grantedby

means

of

some

special

effort

or sacrifice and

(2)

that

thebenefit must

not

be grantedunintentionally,

nvoluntarily,

r for

dis-

qualifyingreasons such as reasonsofself-interestormalice).But all this

merely shifts

the

difficulty

to

a

different

point

in

the

argument.

For

whether ornot we accept everydetail

of

Simmons's mplicitreformulation

of the

principle

of

requital,

t

looks as

if

the

benefits

citizens receive

from

the state will

not meet all the conditions aid down

by

this new

version of

the principleas necessary

for the existence

of

an

obligation

of

requital. In

other

words,

the

problem

will now be

step

2:

if we

modify step

2

in

line

with

the necessary

modifications

to

step i,

what

step

2

asserts will

be

false.8

Simmons'ssecondobjection ocuseson step4. Evenif, as step3 asserts,

citizens

have an

obligation

of

gratitude

to make

a

suitable return

to

the

state,

it

still

has to be shown

that

compliance

with

the

law

constitutes

a

8. See Simmons,

Moral

Principles

and

Political

Obligations,pp. I69-79,

I87-90. The

quotations ummarizing

Simmons's

irst and second

conditions

are

takenfrom

p.

178.




6/22

195

Political Obligation

and theArgument

from Gratitude

suitable return.

That it

does is

not

self-evident.And even if this could be

shown,

it

would

not be

enough.

For

what seems needed at step 4 to com-

plete the argument is the premise that compliance with the law is not

merely a suitable,

but the

uniquely suitable, return.Withoutthis stronger

premise it may be argued that there is some other, equally suitable return

and that the citizen who has made that return, having dischargedhis ob-

ligation

of

gratitudeto the state, has

no

further obligationof gratitudeto

comply with the law.9

Finally,

to

add

a comment of

my own, this version

of the

argument s

in

fact even

more

seriously defective

than

Simmons supposes. The funda-

mental problem

s

that it

does

not

take sufficient account

of

the

existence

of differentkinds

of

obligations

of

gratitude,

and in

consequence

states the

basic principle

to which

it

appeals

n a

vague

and

confused

way.

The truth

is

that

the principle

of

requital,

however

qualified,

does

not

focus

unam-

biguously on any genuine obligation

of

gratitude.

In

this

connection it

is

worth remembering

that

Simmons

typicallyregards obligations

of

grati-

tude as a matter of compensationorrepayment.He occasionallyrefersto

obligations

hat it would be

strained

o

characterize

n

these

terms,

but

ap-

parently

without

recognizing

the

significance

of the fact.

And he aban-

dons his

discussion

of

the content

of

obligations

of

gratitude

without

reaching any

definite conclusions.

o

He

has,

I

suspect,

little

interest

in

the

matter because

he

thinks

that

whateverkinds

of

obligationmay

be distin-

guished,

none will

provide

a

secure foundation

for the

argument

from

gratitude.

I

shall

argue

that the

gratefulresponse comprises

a

number of

different

obligations

and

that

while we

cannot

base

politicalobligation

on

a beneficiary'sobligationto requiteor compensatehis benefactor,argu-

ments

based

on

other

obligations

of

gratitude

have

a

better

prospect

of

success.

Before

developing

hese

thoughts, though,

Imust dealwith a dif-

ficulty

which seems

to threaten

any

version

of the

argument

from

grati-

tude.

II

Since the state

is

the

source

of

the benefits

to which the argument from

gratitudeappeals,and the resultantobligationof gratitudes an obligation

owed

to the

state, proponents

of the

argument

must assume

it

makes

9. See ibid., pp. I85-87;

and cf.

Smith,

Is There

a

Prima Facie

Obligation

to

Obey

the

Law? pp. 953-54.

io. See Simmons, MoralPrinciples

and Political

Obligations,

p. I64-69.




7/22

196

Philosophy

& Public

Affairs

sense to be gratefulnot onlyto individualpersons, but also to institutions.

This assumption is,

I

am sure, the source of much hostility to the argu-

ment,

it

being widely

held

that

gratitude

o

institutions or even groups of

persons is impossibleII-unless perhaps an exotic metaphysics allows us

to conceive of socialentities as superpersons.This difficultyrequires m-

mediate

attention

f

my strategy

s to stand

any

chance of

success.

Like many contemporary

hilosophers,12

I

take the state

to

be

a

kind of

association.I see it as a collectionofindividualsorganized orthe achieve-

ment of certain aims

within a

legal

and

political ramework,

and

I

under-

stand

claims about

the

state as claims

about

ndividualsor

groups

of indi-

viduals nsofar

as

they play

a

part

within

this framework.Thus in

speaking

of

politicalobligation

as

an

obligation

of

gratitude

owed to the

state,

I

mean

that the

obligation

s

owed to

one's

fellow

citizens

collectively.Two aspects

of

this

position

deserve

emphasis. First,

the

state is not

to be

identified

with the

government. Acceptance

of

the

argument

from

gratitude does

not commit us to

viewing politicalobligation,

n

the

manner

of Socrates,

as essentiallya relationshipbetween rulers nd their subjects. The ob-

ligation

is owed

by

citizens to

their fellow

citizens

collectively

rather than

to the

government. Second,

the

conception

of the

state as an

association

of

individuals,

whatever its

problems,manifestly

does

not

depend

on ex-

otic

metaphysicalassumptions.

If

the

argument

rom

gratitude

has a

mys-

tical

flavor,

ts

source

is

not

here.

Now, some may

think that I

have

already

said

enough

to

dispose

of

the

objection

that

gratitude

to

institutions

is

an

impossibility.

For if

the state

is

no more than

an

associationof

individuals,

and

the

obligation

o

comply

with the lawis owed to ourfellow citizenscollectively, s not the objection

irrelevant

to

the

argument

from

gratitude?

Our

fellow

citizens

are

surely

not

an

institution.

I

have

considerable

ympathy

with

this

line

of

thought,

but nonetheless

it

seems unwise

to

dismiss the

objectionquite

so

quickly.

After

all, might

it not

be

counterargued

with

some

plausibility

hat if

our

fellow

citizens viewed

collectively

are the

state,

it

follows,

since the

state

is

an institution,

that our

obligation

o

comply

with

the law is owed to an

institution?

And

in

any case,

as

I

mentioned

earlier,

even

the

possibility

that

gratitudemay

be owed to a

group

of

individuals

collectively

s

some-

times held to be problematic.It will be better,I think, to proceedmore

i

i.

See

ibid., pp.

I

87-89.

i2.

See, e.g.,

the

account

in D. D.

Raphael,

Problems

of

Political

Philosophy London:

Macmillan,

1976),

pp.

39-53.




8/22

197

Political Obligation

and the Argument

from Gratitude

slowly

and

consider

n

its

own

right

the claim that

gratitude

o institutions

is impossible.

I shall offer two arguments against this claim: first,

that ordinary

thought recognizes the possibility

of gratitude o institutions, so gratitude

of this

kind

is

at

least

not as strange

or

exceptionalas some philosophers

would have us believe;

and

second,

that the

reasons

commonly given for

believing that institutions

cannot be a

legitimate focus

of

gratitude are

easilycountered.I shouldalso addthatmy own accountof gratitude,pre-

sented

in the next

section,

has no

difficulty

n

accommodatinggratitude

toinstitutions.

But

naturally

at

this stage

I

cannot

develop

this point.

Let me

begin my

first

ine of

argument

with

some examples:

the patient

who donates

a sum

of

money

to the

hospital

n

which

she received treat-

ment, perhaps many yearsbefore,

and the former

pupil

or former

student

who

gives something

as

a

gift

to his old school

or

university.

These

indi-

vidualswill say

that

they

have been

helped

or benefited

by

the

institution,

and

that the donation

or

gift

is

given

out of

gratitude

or to

express

their

gratitude.Nor,I shouldadd,do they merely eel gratefulto the institution

without thinking

that

they

have

any obligations

o it.

Sometimes this

may

be so. But if, say,

the

institution were

in financial

difficulty

or

threatened

with

closure, they might

well see themselves as

under

an

obligation

to

contribute

o an

appeal:

hey

would

insist,

and

rightly,

that

they

owed it

to

the institution

to do

what

they

could to ensure its

survival.

All

this

is fa-

miliar

enough. Cynics may

attribute

t

to

a

mixture

of

sentimentality

on

the part of the donors

and self-interest

on the

part

of the

recipient

institu-

tions. But why

should the cynics always

be

right?

And even

if

they were,

it would stillbe asignificantfact thatsomeonewho wasnotactually grate-

ful to an

institution

could

at least

represent

himself

or

herself

as being

grateful

to

it.

Certainlyby

themselves

these

examples

do not take us

very

far.

They

merely

invite

the

stock

response

that the

persons

in

question

are

really

grateful

not to

an

institution

but to

particular

ndividuals

within

it, and

that

to

describe

them

as

grateful

to the

institution

s

to

speakloosely

and

improperly.'3

But this

response,

I

believe,

s

inadequate.

Even if

the

grate-

ful

patient

and

gratefulpupil

are

grateful

o

specific persons

within the

rel-

evant institutions, it does not followfrom this that they are grateful to

these persons

and

not to

the institutions.

And

it

is,

after

all,

to

the

insti-

13. See Simmons,MoralPrinciples

and Political

Obligations,

p.

I

88.




9/22

I98

Philosophy

& Public Affairs

tutions,

and

not to particular

persons

within

them,

that the

giftsare

given.

Further,

the suggestion

that

if we

are to

speakaccurately

we

must

always

describe

individuals

as

grateful

to persons,

never

to

institutions,

rides

roughshod

over

a vital

distinction.

Mustwe

not distinguish

between

the

person

who

loathes

his

old

school

and all

it

stands

for

but feels

gratitude

towards

a particular

master

who befriended

him,

and the

very different

person

who,

while having

no recollections

of

special

kindness

from

any

particularmaster,thinksthathis schooldayswerethe happiestdaysofhis

life?

Against

the background

of these

and

similar

possibilities

he

descrip-

tion of someone

as grateful

to an institution

seems

sometimes

precisely

the

rightdescription

of

him.

But,

our

objector

may persist,

even when

the former

pupil

cannotfix

on

any

particular

master

or masters

to whom

he is

grateful

(so

that we

are

inclined

to

say

that he is

grateful

o the

school),

he must still

be primarily

or basically

grateful

oindividualpersons.

His

gratitude

o the

school

rests

on-that

is,

has arisen by

association,

ransference,

or

some

other process

out of-gratitude to certainindividuals(whom perhapshe can no longer

identify).

Gratitude

o institutions

must always

be derivative

n

this

way

fromgratitude

o individuals.

This

claim

too,

however,

neednot disturbus.

For one thing,

it

implicitly

acknowledges

the

genuineness

of

gratitude

to

institutions.

In

insisting

that

gratitude

o

institutions

s derivative,

t con-

cedes

that

gratitude

o

institutions

is

a

genuine

possibility.

So

even if the

claim

were

true,

it would

pose

no threat

to the

argument

from

gratitude.

But

the claim

is

not

obviously

rue. While

gratitude

o an institutionmay

sometimes

be

derivative

rom

gratitude

o

persons

within the institution-

as when the patient who appreciatesthe dedication of the staff who

nursed

her

in the

intensive

care

unit is

grateful

to the

hospital

when

she

is,

basically,

grateful

to

these

particular

members

of its staff-the

reverse

process

also appears

to be

a

possibility.

What of the

person

who

has

been

in

hospital

many

times, perhaps

without ever

encountering

conspicuous

concern

or kindness

from the

hospital

staff,

but

who one

day

happens

to

reflect

on

the extent

to which she

has

benefited

fromher treatment over

the

years?

Couldshe

not feel

grateful

o the

hospital

or the

totality

of

these

benefits,

and

grateful

derivatively

to

particular

doctors and

nurses

as

membersof this beneficentinstitution?What does seem to be trueis that

if one is

grateful

to

an

institution,

one's

gratitude

presupposes

activity

by

some

person

or

persons

associated

with

the

institution.(This

would

be

a

simple

consequence

of the truth

that

an

institution

cannot

benefit

or

help




10/22

199

Political

Obligation

and the

Argument

from

Gratitude

us except through the activities

of

its members.) It would be easy to con-

fuse this point with the ratherdifferentone that gratitude o an institution

presupposesgratitude to

a

person or persons associated with the institu-

tion, and to take the

truth of

the former or the truth of the latter.Needless

to say, the fact

that

gratitude

o an

institutionpresupposesactivityon the

part

of

its

members raises

no

difficulty

or

the argumentfrom gratitude.

Ordinary hought, then, recognizes

the

possibility

of

gratitudeto insti-

tutions, and philosophically nspired attempts to disposeof orreinterpret

familiar

examples

of

this

possibility

do

not

succeed. Further-to

turn

now,

more

briefly,

to

my

second line of

argument-the objections commonly

advanced against

the

possibility

of

gratitude

o

institutions are easily met.

Take the objectionthat we cannot be gratefulto an institution because

gratitude s appropriate nlywhen benefits are conferred rom

a

particular

motive,

and

institutions

cannot have motives.'4

Well, certainly

an

institu-

tion cannot have

motives;

but

institutions

do

have

something analogous

to motives. We

can

speak

of

the purpose

or

function

of an

institution,

of

the policieswhich guideits operations,and of the reasonswhyit produces

whatever benefits

it

produces.

We can

distinguish

between

the

intended

and the

unintended benefits

that

result

from

the

operations

of an

institu-

tion, and

draw

distinctions,

similar

o

those we

draw n

the case

of

benefits

conferred by individuals,

between someone's

benefiting

from an

institu-

tion which exists

to

benefit him, his benefiting incidentally

from

the op-

erations

of an

institution,

his

receiving

benefits

which

are intended ulti-

mately

to furtherthe interests

of

the

institution,

and

so

on.

Gratitude o institutions is

a

fascinating topic

in

its

own

right,

and de-

serves more attentionthan I can giveit here. I donot pretendto have ex-

hausted the topic,

but

I

do

think

that

I

have established

a

prima

acie

case

for the

possibility

of

gratitude

to

institutions

that

permits

us

to

proceed

with our

exploration

of the

argument

rom

gratitude.

III

Since previous

discussions

of the

argument

from

gratitude

have

been

flawed

by

an

imperfect grasp

of

the nature

of

gratitude,

shall

preface my

own attemptto find a satisfactory ersionof the argumentwith some gen-

eral remarks

about the

notion.

I

shall

not offer

much

by way

of

defending

14.

See

ibid., pp.

189-go.




11/22

200

Philosophy

&

Public

Affairs

this account of

gratitude:I hope its constituent elements will seem per-

suasive

without

argument.'5

The core of the gratefulresponse is a set of

attitudes.'6 We cannot un-

derstand

what

gratitude

requires

n

the

sphere

of action without

firstun-

derstanding

he attitudes

grateful

ndividualsare

presumed

to have.

Grat-

itude,

as

the

appropriate esponse

to

benefits received

through

the

agency

of

a

benefactor,

nvolves attitudes

both

towards

the

benefit and

towards

the benefactor:we mustproperly ppreciate he benefit and havegoodwill

and respect forour

benefactor.

The

notions of appreciation,goodwill,and

respect

are

themselvesvague

and

could

do

with further

scrutiny-I shall

say

more

below about

goodwill-but

our

first

priority

must

be

to

consider

how

these

attitudes are related

to

the

requirements

of

gratitude

in

the

sphere

of action. The fundamental

point

here is

that

the attitudes which

form the basis

of

the

gratefulresponse generateconstraints

on action

in

two

different

ways.

The

grateful person must,

on

the

one

hand, demon-

strate

or make clear to his benefactor hat he has the

appropriate

ttitudes

and, on the other, not act in ways incompatiblewith his possession of

these attitudes.

It

is

vital

to

keep

these different

types

of

obligation dis-

tinct.

What

gratitude

requires

on

the

first

count

is

essentially

declarative.

In discharging

an

obligation

of this

type the gratefulperson seeks

to

com-

municate

to

his benefactor

that

he

has

certain

attitudes:he acts not

just

because

he

is grateful

but

to

show his

benefactor hat

he is.

Hence what

he does may

have

a

largely symbolicsignificance,

and his

purpose s typi-

cally

achieved

once

and

for all

by

a

single expression

of

thanks

or

token or

gesture

of

appreciation.By contrast,

what

gratitude

requires

on

the

sec-

ond countis notessentiallydeclarative.When,forexample,a gratefulper-

son hears

that

his

benefactorhas fallen on hard

times and

is moved

by

goodwill

to

come

to

his

aid,

he acts

not

because

he

wishes

to

show

that

he

has goodwill,

but

because

he has

goodwill-he

may

even act in

secret

and

conceal

his

identity

from

his benefactor.The benefit he

confers s

substan-

tial rather than

symbolic,

and

is

not

naturallydescribedas

a

token or

ges-

ture of

gratitude.Further,

the

requirements

of

gratitude

on

this

second

count cannot be met once

and

for all. For

example,

what

the

gratefulper-

son is

committed

to

by

the

goodwill

he has

for

his benefactor

depends

I

5. The best

account

of

gratitudewith

which I amfamiliar

s

Aquinas,Summa

Theologiae

IIaIIae,

qq.

I06-7. I have

discussed some of

thepointsI make n

this section n

Gratefulness

and

Gratitude, roceedings

f

the

Aristotelian

Society

8i

(i980-8i).

I6. This point

s

well

argued

n

Fred Berger,

Gratitude, thics

85

(I974-75).




12/22

201

Political

Obligation

and the Argument

from Gratitude

upon the circumstances: having helped his benefactor

on

one occasion,

he is not then free

of

obligation, because circumstances may arise in

which goodwillrequires

him to

give help again.

All this is only

a

sketch,

but it will

suffice. The

main

point

I

wish to draw

from it seems uncontentious: there

are

different kinds of obligations of

gratitude.

We have

distinguished obligations

o

demonstrate

our

gratitude

from

obligations

not to act in

ways incompatible

with the

attitudeswhich

makeup the core of the gratefulresponse.But we can alsodistinguishob-

ligationsof gratitude

n

terms

of

the differentattitudesunderlying them:

some arise

out

of

goodwill,

others

out of

respect,

and so on. A

proper

awareness

of this

variety

s essential

if

we are to

develop

a

satisfactoryver-

sion

of

the

argument

from

gratitude.

It is

equally clear,

I

think,

that

gratitude

s

not a

species

of

fairness.

Quite apart

rom

the point

that a

grasp

of

the appropriate ttitudes s fun-

damental

for an

understanding

of

gratitude

n a

way

that it

is not for fair-

ness,

it

is plain

that the content

of

obligations

of

gratitude s

often

such

that they cannot plausiblybe thoughtof as obligationsof fairness. What

gratituderequires

cannot

always

be seen

as, say,

a

matter

of

reciprocity

or

of

conformity

to

a

practice

in which

both

beneficiary

and benefactor

are

participants.Further,

even when the

content

of an

obligation

of

gratitude

might

allow us

to

view

it

as

an

obligation

of

fairness,

the

grateful person

cannot

be motivated

to

fulfill the

obligationby

considerations

of

fairness.

If he acts

well

towards

his benefactor

only

because he

thinks

that

fairness

requires this,

or because he wishes

to

reward

or

compensate

his

benefac-

tor,

we shall be

inclined to

say

that

despite

first

appearances

we do not

after all have a case of gratitude.Appealsto gratitude,then, are not ap-

peals

to

fairness,

and the

argument

from

gratitude

s

not

a

species

of the

argument

from

fairness.

All this

puts

us

in a

better

position

to

appreciatemy point

that

discus-

sions

of the

argument

rom

gratitude

have been

hamperedby

an

imperfect

grasp

of the nature of

gratitude.

f

(with Simmons)

we base

the

argument

on

an

obligation

of

requital,

we leave

it

obscure what

obligation

of

grati-

tude this is

meant

to

be.

And

f

we then

clarify

he

obligation as

Simmons

does)

in

terms

of

compensation

or

repayment,

t

seems

no

longer

to

be

an

obligationof gratitudeatall.True,at least one recent discussion does fare

better

than

Simmons's

in

this

respect.

The

version

of the

argument

dis-

cussed by

M.B.E. Smith

appeals unequivocally

o

the

obligation

to

show

or

display

our

gratitude

o

a

benefactor.But even

Smith

does

not

recognize




13/22

202

Philosophy

&

Public

Affairs

the

varietyof obligations

of gratitude,and

in

dismissing

this version

of the

argument

he overlooks

he possibility

of a

version

which appeals

not to an

obligation

to demonstrate

our gratitude,

but

to an

obligation

not

to act in

ways incompatible

with the attitudes

which constitute

the core

of

the

gratefulresponse.

It is this

possibility

I

shall

explore

n

what follows.

IV

Gratitude

requires

appreciation

of the

benefits

we receive

together

with

goodwill

and

respect

for our benefactors.

Now,

it may

well

be

possible

to

base

a persuasive

version

of the

argumentfrom

gratitude

on the

require-

ments

of appreciation

r

respect,

but

our best

chance

of success,

I believe,

lies

with

an

argument

based

on

the

requirements

of goodwill-an

argu-

ment

that

appeals

to

our

obligation

not

to act in ways

that betray

ack

of

goodwill

or

a benefactor.

Letme

first

indicate,

very

roughly,

the

content

of this

obligation.

Good-

will fora benefactormayinvolveother constraintson our actionsbesides

those

I

list;

some

of

the constraints

I list

maybe

as much requirements

of

respect

as

requirements

of goodwill;

and

a longer

account

would have

to

offer

more

detailed

formulations

f the

several

constraints.

But

forthe

mo-

ment

none

of this

matters.

My

immediate

purpose

s

simply

to

give

a

pre-

liminary

view

of the different

ways

of

developing

the

argument

from

grat-

itude

in terms

of the requirement

of goodwill.

With

these provisos,

it

seems

safe

to

say

that

goodwill

or

a

benefactor

requires

one

(a)

to help

him if he

is

in need or distress

andone

cando so

atno

great

cost

to

oneself;

(b)

tocomply

with

his reasonable

requests;

(c)

to

avoidharming

him

or

acting

contrary

o his

interests;

and

(d)

to respect

his

rights.

Violation

of any

of these

requirements

would

seem prima

facie to

license

a charge

of

ingratitude.

Clearly,

however,

an

adequate

version

of the

argument

from

gratitude

must

be based

on

a

principle

which

is

not

only

true or

acceptable,

but

meets certainothercriteriaaswell.First,theprinciplemust satisfythe cri-

terion

of relevance.

t

must be

relevant

o,

or

bear

on,

the

issue

of a

citizen's

compliance

with

the

law. We must

be able

to

see

compliance

with

the

law

as

an instance

of

the

kind of

actionwhich

the

principle

asserts

to be

re-




14/22

203

Political

Obligation

and

the Argument

from

Gratitude

quired

by

considerations

of

gratitude.

Second,

as

a

response

to

the

tradi-

tionalproblem

of

political

obligation,

he argument

rom gratitude

must

be

an independent

argument.

If it can persuade

us

thatwe

have an

obligation

to comply

with

the law only

by

presupposing

anotherargument

which

can

already

persuade

us

of

this,

we

would do

better

to

jettison

the argument

from

gratitude

n favor

of this other,

more

fundamental

argument.

Anad-

equate

version

of

the

argument

must therefore

appeal

to a

principle

which

meets the criterionof independence.The actions requiredbythe principle

must be

actions

whose obligatoriness

n the name

of gratitude

does

not

de-

pend

on

their

being

already

obligatory

or someother

reason.

Judged

by

these criteria,principles

(a),

(b), and (d) appearunlikely

to

yield

adequate

versions

of the

argument.

Principles

(a)

and (b)

do

not

seem

to

meet

the criterion

of

relevance.

It seems intolerably

strained

to

represent

the

citizen

who

complies

with

the law eitheras helping

a

bene-

factor

in need

or

as

meeting

a benefactor's

reasonable

request:

his com-

pliance

with

the law does

not rescue

the state from

anykind

of

grave

mis-

fortune, and the state does not request but demands his compliance.

Principle(d),

on the

other

hand,

runs

foul

of

the criterion

of

independ-

ence.

We

have

a

general

obligation

o

respect

the

rights

of

others,

even if

the

violation

of

a benefactor's ights

is peculiarly

reprehensible.

An

argu-

ment

based

on

(d)

will

not count as

an

independent

argument,

since the

appeal

to

(d) presupposes

that the

state

already

has

a

right

to its

citizens'

compliance

with the

law,

in which case

the

problem

of

political

obligation

has

already

been solved.

Principle

c),

that one has

an

obligation

o

avoidharming

one's

benefac-

tororacting contrary o his interests,maylookat firstas unpromisingas

principles

(a), (b),

and

(d).

But

a

little reflection shows

that this is

not

so.

Admittedly,

ome

of the actionsproscribed

by (c)

(for

example,

the

inflic-

tion

of

physical

harm on

a benefactor)

may

owe

their

proscription

on

grounds

of ingratitude

o their being

alreadyproscribed

by

some

other ob-

ligation.

But this is

not true

of

all the actions

that

come

within the scope

of

the

principle.

It is

not

true, conspicuously,

of

some

of the actions

that

involve

damage

to

a

benefactor's

nterests

rather

than

physical

harm to

him.

We do

have a

particular

obligation

of

gratitude

o

be

mindful

of our

benefactors' nterests, to takecarenot to damagethem, and to give them

a

special

weight

in our deliberations.

Most

of

us,

for

example,

do not scru-

ple

in casual

conversation

o

pass

on

gossip

about mutual

acquaintances;

nor do

we,

I

believe,

have

any general

obligation

o abstain

from

gossip.

If,




15/22

204

Philosophy

&

Public

Affairs

however,the

gossip

concerns

someone who

has

given

me a

great

deal of

help, I

dofeel

myself

under

an

obligationnot

to

retail

t: I

have an

obliga-

tionto

protect

my

benefactor's

eputation,

and

passing on

the

gossip is in-

compatible with

the

regard I

should

have

for

his

interests.

Again,

as a

member of a

committee,

I

may

feel an

obligationnot

to

vote

for

a

proposal

which

would

significantly

damage

my

benefactor's

nterests.

Doubtless

this

obligationwill

almost

always be

outweighed

by

my

duty, as

a

member

of the committee,to somewidergood;buteven so, I shallapologizetomy

benefactor or

having

acted

in

a

way

that

adversely

affectshis

interests-

a

fact which

surely

suggests the

existence of an

obligation hat

has

been

overridden.

Rather

differently,

I

may

feel an

obligationnot

to

put

myself

in

competition

with a

benefactor,

and

take

care to

avoid

situations in

which

I

can

succeed

only

at

his

expense. We do

indeed,

it

seems, have an

obligation

of

gratitude

not

to

damage

our

benefactors'

nterests, and

the

obligatorinessof

the

actions

requiredunder

this rubric

does

not,

in

gen-

eral,

depend

on

their

being

already

obligatory

or

another

reason.

Thus

a

version of the argumentfrom gratitude hat appealsto principle(c) can

meet

the criterion

of

independence.

But what

of

the

criterionof

relevance?

Is

principle

(c)

relevant

to

the

problem of

political

obligation?

Does

a

citizen's

compliance

with

the law

fall within

the

scope

of

principle

(c), so that

noncompliancewith

the

law

can

be

argued

on

this

ground

to

be

in

violation

of an

obligation

of

grati-

tude?

If

citizens are

beneficiaries of

the

state-a

matter to

which I

shall

return

below-it

seems that

this

question

must be

answered

affirmatively.

In

general,

noncompliance

with

the law

damages

the

interests of

the

state.

It is manifestly n the state's nterests thatits citizens shouldbe law-abid-

ing; indeed

without a fair

measure of

compliance

with

the law

no

state

could function

or

survive.

This

does

not

mean

that it

is

in

the

state's

inter-

ests

that

its

citizens should

comply

with

every

aw,

however

pointless,

mis-

conceived,

or

unjust,

or that

their

complianceshould

ever be

slavish or

un-

critical. On

the

contrary,

the

interests of the

state

may

sometimes be

advanced f

bad

egislation

s

opposed

or

disregarded,

nd in

these

circum-

stances the

argument

from

gratitude

will

demand not

compliance,

but

noncompliance

with

the law.

Once

we

have

allowed or

these

points,

how-

ever,we can hardlydeny that it is in the state's nterests forits citizens to

respect

the

law and that

this

respect

will

involve

general

compliance

with

the law.

Ignoring

for

the

moment,

then,

the

ways

in

which

its

various

premises




16/22

205

Political

Obligation

and the

Argument

from

Gratitude

stand

in

need

of

qualification,

we can

summarize

the new

version

of

the

argument

from

gratitude

as

follows:

(i)

The

person

who

benefits fromX

has

an

obligation

of

gratitude

not

to

act

contrary

o

X's

nterests.

(2)

Every

citizen

has received

benefits from

the

state.

(3)

Every

citizen

has

an

obligationof

gratitude

not to

act

in

ways that

arecontrary othe state's nterests.

(4)

Noncompliancewith

the law

is

contrary

o

the

state's

nterests.

(5)

Every

citizen

has

an

obligationof

gratitude o

comply

with

the law.

v

This version of

the

argument from

gratitudemay

still

not

seem

especially

attractive,

but in

this section

I

shall tryto

improve

ts

chances of

accept-

ance by

showing

that

the

objectionsmost

likely

to

be

brought

against

it

do

not succeed. I shall begin with twoobjectionswhich applyspecificallyto

this version of the

argument, and then

consider some

other

objections

which have a

wider

application.

The

firstobjection

concedes

that

it

is

in

the

state's

interests

that

its cit-

izens should

comply

with

the law but

holds

that

typically

noncompliance

does

not fall within

the

scope

of

principle

(c)

because

it

is

not

motivated

by ill

will

towards he state. If

the law

is broken

n

the

course of

revolution-

aryor

seditious

activity

or

because

an

individual

wishes

to

revenge himself

on

the

authorities,

noncompliance

may

have this

kind of

motivation.

But

these cases are atypical:usually the lawbreakeracts out of self-interest

and harborsno

particular

ll will

towardsthe

state.

Hence

in

the

typical

case

noncompliance

with

the law

cannot

be said to

contravene

principle

(c)

or violate

the associated

obligation

of

gratitude

which a

citizen

may

owe to the

state.

The

facts to which

this

objection

appealscannot be

disputed;what

is

open

to

disputeis whether

they

justify

the

objection.

I

have

claimed

that

gratitude

requires

a

measure of

goodwill

towardsa

benefactor,and

that

the

person who

acts

in

a

way

that

is

contrary o

his

benefactor's

nterests

lacks thatgoodwill.But lackof goodwilldoesnotentailpositive ll will.The

possession of

ill

will

is

but

one

way

of

lacking goodwill:

ndifference,

ab-

sence

of

concern,

and want of

consideration

may all,

as

much

as

ill

will,

betray

ack

of

goodwill

or

a

person.

So

actions can

show

a

lack of

goodwill




17/22

206 Philosophy

&

Public

Affairs

without being motivatedby ill will; andthe fact that lawbreakers ypically

act from motives of self-interestdoes not

mean that their contraventionof

the law cannot betraya lack of goodwill

owards he state and violate

prin-

ciple (c).

The second objection challenges

what

the first concedes. It maintains

that while general noncompliance with the law may be contraryto the

state's interests,

it

does

not follow

that

individualacts of

noncompliance

are. Particularbreaches of the law, it insists, are not contrary o the inter-

ests

of the

state.

The idea

is

not

that

sometimes,

in

the

case

of

bad laws,

the state's interests may positivelyrequirenoncompliance,but that most

particular ailures to comply

with

the

law have no

effect

on

the state's in-

terests. As

a

rule,

it

is wildly implausible

to attribute

disastrous conse-

quences to individual acts

of

noncompliance:

few individual

acts

of

this

kind are even remotely likely

to

destroy

the

state

or the

legal system,

whether

by setting

an

example

to

others, by causing

a

loss

of

confidence

in

the rule

of

law,

or

in

some other way.'7 Most breaches

of

the law thus

makeno difference o the state and cannot violateany obligationciti-

zens may

have

to avoid

actionscontrary

o

the state's nterests.

This objection, too,

is

easily

answered. First

of

all, just

as

damage

to a

person's

nterests

need not involve

a

threat

to

his existence-his

interests

may

be harmed

without his life

being

even

remotely

n

danger-so

what

poses

no threat

to

the state's existence

may

still

in

some other

way

be

con-

trary

o

its

interests-and

in

this

connectionwe

should

not

forget

that

typ-

ically

a breach

of the

law

is

at

least

likely

to

have

some

undesirable con-

sequences

for the state.

Of

course,

this

point

does

not take

us

very far;

it

merely exposes the coreof the objection,which is that these undesirable

consequences

of

particular

breaches

of the law either are too trivial to

qualify

as

damage

to

the state's nterests

or,

f

they

do so

qualify,

constitute

damage

so

slight

as

to be

negligible.

But

clearly,

f

this is the

objection,

t

assumes

that

when

we

consider

the

bearing

of

acts

of

noncompliance

with

the

law

on

the state's

nterests we must take

into account

only

the effects

of each

particular

act

in

isolation.

It

is therefore

an

adequatereply

to

point

out

that this

assumption

is

at

least

dubious.

Many philosophers,

and

among

them

many consequentialists,

have denied

that

the moral

signifi-

cance of an action is determinedby its effects alonein isolationfromthe

effects

of other similar

actions.

In

particular,

Derek

Parfit

has

recently

I7. See, e. g.,

Woozley,Law and

Obedience, p. I I 2ff.




18/22

207

Political

Obligation

and

the Argument

from

Gratitude

shown

that

when acts have

very

small or

imperceptibleeffects, we can

sometimes

reach

strongly

counterintuitive

conclusions

if

we look

only

at

the consequences of each act on its own: in these circumstances, he ar-

gues, we must

look at the

consequences

of what

we collectivelydo.

8

Thus

in considering

whether

acts

of

noncompliance

with

the law

damage

the

state's interests

we are

certainly

not

obliged,as

the

present objection as-

sumes,

to confine our attention

to

the

consequences

of

each act in

isola-

tion. There is no denyingthatcollectively he activitiesof lawbreakersn-

flict

severe damage

on vital

interests

of

the state.

In

the

light

of

Parfit's

argumentswe might appeal

o

this fact

and

claim that each act of

noncom-

pliance with the

law

contravenes

principle (c)

because

all of

them

taken

together

cause

significant

damage

to

the state's nterests.

So

far

we

have focused

on

the distinctive features of

my

version

of

the

argument

from

gratitude,

and

have

neglected those features

which

it

shares

with

all

versions

of

the

argument.

In

particular,

we have not con-

sidered

its

assumption

that

citizens receive benefits

from

the

state,

and

are as a result underan obligationof gratitude o it. This assumptionwe

must

now examine.

That

citizens under

all

but the

most ineffectual

or

barbarous

of

govern-

ments receive

significant

benefits

from

the states

to which

they belong

seems

undeniable. This is

not to

say

that

the state is the source of all or

even most

of

the

goods

we

enjoy:

that

would be

a

grotesqueexaggeration.

Nor do we

all receive the same benefits

from

the state or

benefit

to

the

same

degree: especially

between citizens

of

differentstates there

may

be

great

variations

n the nature

and

extent of

these benefits.

Such

variations

within and between states would imply that the resultant obligationof

gratitude

does

not

always

have the same

weight

or

stringency.

But

this is

a

consequence

I am

happy

to

accept. (By

the same

token,

citizens

who

re-

ceive

no

significant

benefits

from

the state

will fall

outside the

scope

of

the

argument.

But

again

this is

no

objection:

do we

really

want to

say

that

any-

one

in

this unfortunatesituationhas

a

general obligation

o

comply

with

the

law?) Moreover,

he fact that

citizens receive

significant

benefits

from

the state

does

not

mean

that

they

cannot

suffer harm or

injustice

at

its

hands,

or

that, overall,

they might

not fare

better as citizens

of

another

state or outside the jurisdictionof any state. These considerations,the

truth

of which

will

sometimes

be

very

difficult to

assess,

are

undoubtedly

i

8. See DerekParfit,Reasonsand Persons Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,I984), chap.

3, esp. pp. 75-82.




19/22

208

Philosophy

&

PublicAffairs

relevant to the issue of our obligation o complywith the law. But they are

best handled as possible grounds or distinct ines of argumentwhose con-

clusions we must then weigh against that of the argumentfrom gratitude

in orderto settle whether, all things considered, n a particular ase a cit-

izen should comply

with

the

law.

If the argument from gratitude s to succeed, however, we must estab-

lish not only that citizens receive benefits

from

the state but that these

benefits place them under an obligationof gratitude.Recent discussions

tend to take much

too

restrictive

a

view

of

the circumstances

in

which a

grateful response

is

appropriate.Simmons,

for

example, as

I

have said,

lays down five

conditionswhich must be met beforethe

receipt

of a

benefit

can

give

rise

to an

obligation

of

gratitude,

he chief

of

these

being (I)

that

the benefit

must be

grantedby

means

of

some

special

effortor

sacrifice

and

(2)

that thebenefit must

not

be

grantedunintentionally,

nvoluntar-

ily,

or

for disqualifying

reasons.

He then

argues

that

the

benefits

citizens

receivefromthe state

do not

meet these conditions

and

that,

f

onlyforthis

reason, the argument from gratitudemust

fail.'9

But should we accept

Simmons's

account? Is

he not

simply

mistaken

to hold that

benefits call

for

gratitudeonly

if

they

involve

special

effort or

sacrifice

on the

part

of a

benefactor?

If I am about to drownwhen

a

strong

swimmer

already

n

the

water

notices

my plight,

swims

over,

and rescues

me,

without

any special

effort

or sacrifice

on his

part,

do I

owe

him no

gratitude?

Would

gratitude

in these circumstances

be

inappropriate?Again,

so

far

as

motivation

s

concerned,

while

I

may

be under

no

obligation

o

the

person

who

benefits

me

inadvertently

or

entirely

out of

self-interest,

we

must

not

inflate

this

point and claim that only benefits motivatedpurely by goodwill require

gratitude.

We

should

allow that

obligations

of

gratitude

are

generated

when

benefits are

the

result

of

mixed motives

and

conferred

rom a mix-

ture

of

self-interest

and

goodwill.

If

so,

we can

accept

that

there is

some

truth even

in

a

Thrasymachean

view

of the

state,

while still

holding

that

the

benefits citizens

receive from the

state

give

rise

to

obligations

of

grat-

itude.

Only

if

these benefits

were

provided olely by way

of

advancing

the

interests

of

the

authoritiesor

a

particular

lass would the

argument

from

gratitude collapse. (But

then

if

we

thought Thrasymachus's

view

repre-

sented the whole truth about the state, we wouldhardlywant to say that

citizens

have

any obligation

o

comply

with the

law.)

In

sum, provided

we

i9.

See

note 8 above.




20/22

209

PoliticalObligation

and

the

Argument

from

Gratitude

take a

tolerably

realisticview

of the way the state operates

and

bear in

mindwhat was

said in Section

II

in response

to the claimthat gratitude

o

institutions

is impossible,

we appear

to

have

no goodreason for

denying

that the benefits

citizens receive

from the

state

can

generate

obligations

of gratitude.

This

may

be

challenged,

finally,

by

those

who

believe

that

gratitude

to

the state is ruled

out by the fact

of taxation.Taxes,

it will be said,

are the

pricecitizens payfor the benefitstheyreceive fromthe state:the relation-

ship

between citizen and state resembles

a commercial

relationship,

and

no more

in the one case

than in the other

is there a

place

for gratitude.

This objection

can be quicklydisposed

of. First,

we

may challenge

its easy

assumption

that gratitudenever

has

a

place

in

commercial

relationships.

Second,

we must surelyreject

the idea that the

relationship

of citizen

to

state is

akin to

a commercial

relationship.

For one

thing,

the

state,

unlike

a

commercial

nstitution,

s

a

redistributive gency.

There is

no

direct re-

lationship

between

the taxes one pays

andthe benefits

one receives,many

of the benefits providedbythe statebeingavailableeven tothose who pay

no taxes at all. Third,

the

objection

seems

to

equate

the

state

with

the au-

thorities

or

the

government:

t

represents

taxation

as

the

price paid

collec-

tivelyby citizens

for

the benefits

suppliedby

the government.

Hence what

it

would

exclude,

if

successful,

is the

possibility

of an

obligation

of

grati-

tude

owed by citizens to

the

government.

But this is

not what

I

have

sought

to establish.

In

my

view

politicalobligation

as

an

obligation

of

grat-

itude

to the state is

an

obligation

which each citizen owes

to his

fellow cit-

izens collectively.

VI

Sections IV

and V present

what

I

believe

is a strongcase

for my

version of

the argument

from

gratitude.

More

can be saidin its defense,

but I prefer

to conclude

with a number of

more general

pointswhich

I hope will place

my enterprise

n

a

favorable

ight and supply

a motive for tackling

what-

ever other

difficulties

are

thought

still

to lie

in

its

way.

First,

the claim

made by my

versionof the

argumentis

a

limited

one.

Although t seeks in the spiritof traditional nswersto the problemof po-

litical

obligation

to

establish

a general

obligation

o

comply

with the law,

thisobligation

s only,

in

Ross's

phrase,

a

prima

acie obligation,

and I

have

said nothing

about

ts

weight

or

stringency,

save to remark

hatit will vary




21/22

210 Philosophy

&

Public Affairs

with the nature

and

extent

of the

benefits

a

citizen receives.

My version of

the argument, then, unlike the Socraticversion

in

the Crito, allows that

our obligation

of

gratitude

to

comply

with

the

law

may

sometimes be

overriddenby other, weightier obligations

and

does

not involve us in any

extravagant

commitments.

Second,considerations

of

gratitude

can

provide

a

congenialframework

for reflection

on

other issues

in

politicalphilosophy.As we have seen, the

considerationsto which my version of the argumentfrom gratitude ap-

peals

would

justify noncompliance

with

the

law in

certain

circumstances.

Itlooksthereforeas

if

they

could

supply

the foundation or a

theory

of civil

disobedience.20Further,

since

the motivationof the

benefits

we

receive

bearson the appropriateness

f a

gratefulresponse

fp walker unidad 2

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