wikileaks mex 12 hasta dic 2010

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000077

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/25

TAGS:SNARPRELPGOVPHUMKCRMMX

SUBJECT: MEXICO: TAPACHULA ARMS CONFERENCE FOCUSES ON SOUTHERN BORDER

PROBLEMS

REF: 09 MEXICO 2952

CLASSIFIED BY: Gustavo Delgado, Political Minister Counselor; REASON:

1.4(B), (D)

1. (SBU) Summary: Two recent arms trafficking conferences -- one

in September focused on the northern border (reftel) and a

subsequent one in Tapachula, looking at the southern border --

highlighted lax border controls and suggested ways to improve law

enforcement efforts to stem the tide of illegal guns. This cable

reports on the Tapachula discussion, and off-site trips to threedifferent border locations, which offered dramatic evidence of the

porous southern border and serious resource shortfalls, and helped

focus attention on ways to help Mexico, Guatemala and Belize

address shared border security challenges. End Summary.

Follow Up on the Southern Border

--------------------------------------------- --

2. (SBU) Many of the GOM and USG law enforcement officials who
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participated in the Tapachula conference in October had also

attended the earlier Northern Border Conference in Phoenix. This

time, however, Belize's National Police and representatives from

Guatemala's Attorney General's office also participated, adding a

new wrinkle to the discussion by presenting an overview of arms

trafficking laws in their countries and suggesting ways in which

they could improve coordination with Mexico and the U.S. with

regards to illegal arms trafficking.

The Ground Truth: Laws Not Enough

--------------------------------------------- -----

3. (SBU) Each country highlighted internal controls that regulate

the sale, distribution, and transport of weapons and ammunition,

drawing attention to sanctions against the unlawful transport of

weapons across any national boundary. Unfortunately, our visit to

three border crossings between Guatemala and Mexico in Chiapas

revealed neither country presently works seriously to enforce these

laws.

4. (SBU) At the first border crossing in Talisman, Chiapas, the

conference participants witnessed almost as many individuals

crossing the border illegally as legally. Immigration officials

conjectured that individuals crossing illegally under the bridge

were either visiting family members on the other side of border or

engaging in informal commerce. Although the delegation did not

have an opportunity to talk with any of the individuals crossing

under the bridge at the border, it appeared the majority were
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carrying what appeared to be personal belongings rather than items

of commerce.

5. (SBU) The border officials made every attempt to illustrate a

secure border crossing, but their explanations highlighted serious

procedural inconsistencies that undermine effective controls. While

border officials inspect 100 percent of the individuals and cars

crossing the bridge legally, the data collected is stored in a

local database that is not connected to federal or international

criminal databases. Border officials are also hampered by their

lack of access to national registries that would allow them todetermine if the individuals crossing are on any criminal or

terrorist watchlists. Mexican law allows individuals to cross the

border with an "original" identification document but does not

prescribe what constitutes an "original" document. As long as the

individual agrees to confine one's visit to the state of Chiapas

MEXICO 00000077 002 OF 003

and return to Guatemala after an undefined period of time, one is

granted admission to the country. Limited resources also undermine

the effort: while there are 30,000 U.S. CBP officers on the 1,926

mile Mexican/U.S. border, only 125 Mexican immigration officials

monitor the 577 mile border with Guatemala. Mexican immigration

officials repeatedly confirmed that they do not have the manpower

or resources to direct efforts effectively along the southern

border.

6. (SBU) The tour continued to the Ciudad Hidalgo station on the

Pan American highway, the border crossing with highest number of


4/79

legal crossings in Chiapas. Border officials estimated that on a

daily basis 95% of all exports, 350-400 shipments; and 26% of all

imports, flow through these border crossings to and from Central

America. Additionally, 80-100 carloads of visitors pass through

the border on a daily basis. While officials displayed an

impressive array of non-intrusive inspection equipment, e.g.,

hand-held spectrometers for the identification of drugs and

explosives and gamma-ray inspection equipment for large containers,

these devices are not incorporated effectively into border control

protocols. Border officials were inconsistent in using their

inspection equipment to check the cabs of trucks and there is no

revealed coordinated approach between Mexico and Guatemala to share

information that would reduce crossing times and avoid duplicativeinspections, as, for example, is being done at certain places in

the Mexican-U.S. border.

7. (SBU) The final border crossing only served to re-inforce the

concerns that emerged from the first two sites the group visited.

One of the most memorable images of the day was the steady flow of

rafts transporting people and goods across the river illegally

within sight of the legal border crossing.

Family Feuds Prevent Internal Coordination

--------------------------------------------- ---------------

8. (C) The last part of the conference consisted of open and frank


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panel discussions. The most interesting discussion focused on

information and intelligence sharing among Mexican agencies,

including the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA), the Marine

Secretariat (SEMAR), the Office of the Attorney General (PGR), and

the Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN). The

discussion started with many self-congratulatory comments from

panel members on how well their respective organizations collect

and share information. The lack of coordination between federal

and state officials became apparent when a representative from the

Chiapas State Attorney General's Office complained that his state

does not receive any information from the federal authorities and

has no input or visibility in the federal process. While the state

representative acknowledged a common perception of corruption atthe state level, he argued it was counterproductive and illogical

to exclude them from the process. Other participants recognized an

acceptable process for intelligence collection, but complained

about inadequate dissemination of actionable information and

insufficient formal mechanisms for sharing collected information.

Conclusions and Follow Up Actions

--------------------------------------------- -----

9. (SBU) The conference generated a list of eight conclusions,

including few measurable actions. Several of the conclusions

MEXICO 00000077 003 OF 003

focused on the need to explore mechanisms for better

information-sharing with international partners or internally.
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There was consensus on the need to regionalize arms-trafficking

efforts, specifically by including Guatemala in future GC Armas

meetings in Mexico. Guatemalan representation pledged to review

current procedures and incorporate practices that will improve

interagency coordination and information. Mexico and Guatemala

agreed to work on practical measures to facilitate the flow of

information between the two countries on the issue of arms

trafficking. Belize also suggested a formal dialogue with Mexico

on increasing the number of formal border crossings between the two

countries, as a way to improve border controls.

Comment

--------------

10. (C) This conference highlighted weak controls on Mexico's

southern border that are contributing to problems with illegal

migration and guns/drugs smuggling. Much more needs to be done to

improve secure information sharing among federal agencies and

between Federal and State officials in Mexico. Better cooperation

among Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize could also help coordinate

current efforts by each state and ensure that existing laws are

enforced. The conference represented a small first step in that

direction, a follow-up meeting in February 2010 will provide

another opportunity to strengthen joint efforts.

FEELEY

0000000000000000000000000000000

R 232312Z JAN 09 ZDS

FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO


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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4721

INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE

DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC

DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

HQ USNORTHCOM

CIA WASHINGTON DC

CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T MEXICO 000193

NOFORNE.O. 12958: DNG: CO 01/22/2019

TAGS:PRELPGOVPHUMPINRSNARKCRMMX

SUBJECT: THE BATTLE JOINED: NARCO VIOLENCE TRENDS IN 2008

REF: A. CIUDAD JUAREZ 22

B. MEXICO 3586

C. MEXICO 2371

D. MEXICO 3498

E. MEXICO 3779

F. MEXICO 1766

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.

Reason: 1.4 (b), (d)

-------

Summary

-------

1. (C) 2008 set a new record for organized crime-related

homicides with more than 6000 killings. Violence in Mexico

suddenly provided fodder for U.S. and international media

with commentators suggesting worse to come. While the death
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toll is already at disturbing levels, and there are no signs

violence will taper off anytime soon, we will continue to

evaluate information or evidence that would suggest the

cartels have decided to up the ante significantly by

undertaking mass-casualty attacks on civilians,

systematically attacking GOM officials or institutions or

targeting USG personnel. Internecine struggles among the

cartels and GOM counter narcotic successes have increased the

costs of doing business and account for most of the up-tick

last year. Frustrated traffickers, seeking to diversify

profit-making activities through kidnappings and extortion,

account for more. End Summary.

----------------------------------

Drug-Related Homicides on the Rise

----------------------------------

2. (C) Few killings in Mexico are thoroughly investigated,

and determining which are truly related to organized crime

remains an inexact science, but Mexico's Attorney General's

office's year-end estimate stands at 6262. Other GOM

authorities put the toll from organized crime slightly

higher. SEDENA reports that drug-related killings

represented roughly 17% of all homicides last year, while the

National System of Public Security (SNSP -- part of the

Public Security Secretariat (SSP)) estimates a total of

approximately 10,700 intentional homicides.

(S/NF) Table I: Organized Crime-Related Killings, By Year*

--------------------------------------------- ----------

2005 1855

2006 2489

2007 3038

2008 6380

----------------------------------------


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*Source: SEDENA

(S/NF) Table II: 2008 OC-Related Killings, By Month*

--------------------------------------------- -----

Jan 282

Feb 283

Mar 417

Apr 320

May 496

Jun 531

Jul 540

Aug 587

Sep 526Oct 847

Nov 843

Dec 708

--------------------------------------------- ------

*Source: SEDENA

--------------------------------------------

Spike in Violence Concentrated at the Border

--------------------------------------------

3. (C) Violence continued to be concentrated in a few key

states, and in 2008 there was a spike in drug-related

killings in the northern border territories. An estimated 41

percent of these homicides took place in Chihuahua and Baja

California states and largely in two urban areas, Ciudad

Juarez and Tijuana. (see MEXICO 3586). Sinaloa continued to

rank among the most violent states with approximately 1048

(or 18%) of these killings. The surge in violence along the

border stems largely from the intensified struggle among

cartels over a few lucrative land crossings to the U.S. In

particular, the January 2008 arrest of cartel leader Alfredo

Beltran Leyva sparked a serious rift among the Gulf, Juarez


10/79

and Sinaloa (Pacific) cartels, which is being played out

viciously in Ciudad Juarez. (See MEXICO 1766) In Tijuana,

rival factions of the weakened Arellano Felix Organization,

one of which is backed by the Sinaloa cartel, are battling

for control.

--------------------------

Changes In Cartel Behavior

--------------------------

4. (SBU) Beyond its broadened scope, the nature of cartel

violence changed in 2008: organized violence was

characterized by significantly increased brutality, a callousdisregard for the potential for collateral damage and more

frequent targeting of soldiers and police. Mexico's drug

trafficking organizations (DTOs) have also more frequently

orchestrated violence to send intimidating messages to

security forces, the Mexican public and the body politic.

5. (SBU) Incidents, such as the August beheadings of 12 in

Yucatan, the execution style killing of 24 on the outskirts

of Mexico City in September, late fall killings of soldiers

in Monterrey and Guerrero in late December contributed to

growing public unease here and garnered media attention

abroad. Several first-time-ever incidents involving grenades

and improvised explosive devices (such as the notorious

Independence Day grenade attack in Morelia, the shooting and

undetonated grenade attack on the US Consulate in Monterrey,

the use of improvised explosive devices in downtown Mexico

City and Sinaloa, and a grenade attack on police cadets in

Jalisco) demonstrate that not only have the cartels

successfully expanded their arsenals, but at least some

elements have developed a tolerance for inflicting civilian

casualties.


11/79

6. (SBU) Cartels have also expanded their use of violence to

intimidate. Beheadings and the prominent placement of

dismembered bodies in public places, relatively rare two

years ago are now common throughout the country. The late

night grenade/shooting attack on our consulate in Monterrey

was obviously designed to send a message, although no

individual or group has ever claimed responsibility. More

explicit was the January assault on the Monterrey offices of

Televisa, accompanied by a message telling the broadcaster to

do a better job reporting on corrupt public officials.

Attacks such as these remain sporadic so far, and we have

insufficient indications whether they mark a new trend or

not.

7. (SBU) Despite these sporadic attacks, Mexico's drug war

continues to primarily impact security forces and those

linked directly or indirectly to the drug trade. The

civilian population in some urban areas along the border

remains bunkered down with some of those who have the money

either sending their children to school in the U.S. or

relocating entirely to minimize risk. In much of the rest of

the country, though, the civilian population not involved in

the drug trade remains essentially insulated from the

violence, though not from its effects.

--------------------------------------------- --------

Police Killings Increase Along With Overall Death Toll

--------------------------------------------- --------

8. (SBU) SEDENA estimates that at least 522 civilian law

enforcement and military personnel were murdered last year,

compared to 315 in 2007.

(S/NF) Table III: Drug-Related Military/Police Homicides:

2007* 2008**

(% of total)
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AFI 22 (6.9) 5 (1.0)

PFP 12 (3.8) 37 (19.7)

State

Police 62 (19.8) 110 (21.1)

Ministerial

Police 63 (20.0) 14 (2.7)

Municipal

Police 120 (38.0) 305 (58.4)

Military 27 (8.6) 51 (9.8)

Other 9 (2.9) Unavailable

--------------------------------------------- -------------

Total 315 522CENAPI (Mexico's Center for Information, Analysis and

Planning) statistics

**SEDENA statistics

9. (C) Increased confrontations between security forces and

criminals is one explanation for the increasing killing of

security forces personnel. GOM authorities argue that

killings are no longer just score-settling among bad cops,

but increasingly the consequence of the government's

aggressive fight against the cartels. Some analysts we have

spoken to agree. However, they also note that with few

exceptions the majority of deaths are not the result of

direct confrontations. They argue that the crackdown on

police corruption has put compromised police officials in the

position of either being prosecuted or breaking their

established agreements/arrangements with the cartels. Hence,

some of those who presumably choose the latter course are

being punished brutally. (See MEXICO 2371, 3498)

10. (SBU) It is worth noting that police victims (at all

levels of government) represented eight percent of all 2008

killings believed to be drug-related, a figure slightly lower


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than the percentage in 2007. The vast majority of victims

continue to be state and municipal law enforcement officers.

Senior level, federal police killings were still rare

occurrences in 2008. The most high-profile death remains the

May killing of Edgar Millan Gomez, the country's

highest-ranking federal police officer.

--------------------------------------

Targeting of Soldiers An Ominous Sign

--------------------------------------

11. (S/NF) There have been notable incidents of horrific

violence against soldiers, including a string of slayings of

enlisted men in Monterrey in October and the systematicdecapitation of seven troops in Guerrero (see MEXICO 3779).

The theory that those killed in Guerrero were rogue soldiers

involved in drug trafficking has been discounted, suggesting

the cartels have begun to target soldiers to exact revenge

for successes registered by the military and attempt to

undermine the institution's resolve. The Monterrey and

Guerrero killings immediately followed successful military

operations in the respective regions resulting in seizures

and arrests. Whether such tactics will have a chilling

effect remains to be seen. Sources tell us that while some

soldiers are more fearful, many others are keen to strike

back at the cartels with greater resolve. SEDENA and SEMAR

have instructed regional commanders to implement force

protection counter-measures to reduce the risk of future

incidents.

----------------------------------------

U.S. Personnel and Institutions Targets?

----------------------------------------

12. (C) We have observed a significant up-tick in threats,

as well as incidents of surveillance, against USG personnel


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and properties over the last three months. All threats are

treated seriously and precautions taken; fortunately, none

has come to fruition.

13. (S/NF) On October 12, unknown persons fired gunshots and

tossed an un-detonated grenade at the U.S. Consulate in

Monterrey. The attack occurred after hours, no one was

injured, and little damage occurred. No message was left and

we have uncovered no useful intelligence regarding the

authors or their motives. One unsubstantiated report cited a

source claiming a senior Gulf cartel leader ordered the

attack. However, with little hard evidence, no attempt to

claim credit and no follow on incident to date, thepossibility remains that this was an isolated, possibly even

impulsive, attack not likely undertaken at the behest of

senior cartel leaders.

14. (C) While the cartels have not yet directly targeted USG

law enforcement or other personnel, they have shown little

reticence about going after some of our most reliable

partners in Mexican law enforcement agencies. Ten close DEA

law enforcement liaison officers have been killed since 2007,

seven of whom were members of Special Vetted Units.

Similarly, within the past two years 51 close FBI contacts

have been murdered. More than sixty of Mexico's best law

enforcement officers in whom we have placed our trust and

with whom we have collaborated on sensitive investigations,

shared intelligence and in many cases trained and vetted have

been murdered by the cartels. We do know from sources that

cartel members have at least contemplated the possibility of

doing harm to both our personnel and institutions, but we

frankly don't know enough about how DTO members think and

operate to know what factors might trigger a decision to

mount such an attack, but the potential threat is very real.


15/79

15. (C) We assess that the threat to U.S. personnel could

increase if the violence continues to escalate and more

high-level government officials and political leaders are

targeted. Also, a reaction may be triggered if traffickers

perceive their losses are due to U.S. support to the GOM's

counter-narcotics efforts. We will continue to monitor

potential threats to U.S. personnel from organized criminal

gangs and be alert to information that suggests drug

traffickers increasingly see the U.S. hand as responsible for

their losses.

---------------------

A Measure of Success?---------------------

16. (C) While attributing last year's significant spike in

violence to its own successes marks an effort by the Calderon

administration to put the best face possible on a grim

situation, there is also considerable truth to the assertion.

President Calderon's counter-narcotics team has scored

significant successes, particularly in the last 12 months.

Record numbers of weapons and drugs have been seized, key

members of drug cartels have been arrested and/or extradited,

cartel sources inside government institutions have been

arrested ) including a former Deputy Attorney General and

the head of Interpol in Mexico. The GOM has disrupted cartel

operations in meaningful ways; in year-end reports SEDENA and

SEMAR reported that together they have reduced the maritime

trafficking of illicit drugs by 65 percent and cut direct air

transit of illegal drugs from Colombia by 90 percent.

According to collaborative sensitive reporting, the January

2008 arrest of Alfredo Beltran Leyva split the Pacific

Cartel, and accentuated antagonism between that DTO and the

Gulf organization which caused the spike in violence in

Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Baja California (see also MEXICO


16/79

1766). In addition to these rifts, frustrated traffickers

have turned to kidnappings and extortion to compensate for

the loss in drug-trafficking revenue, expanding their reach

and impacting a greater number of bystanders who have no

involvement in DTO activities. These kinds of impacts bring

home to ordinary Mexicans the nature of the struggle here.

-------

Outlook

-------

17. (C) Mexican authorities and law enforcement analysts

predict that violence will likely get worse before it getsbetter. Recent truce rumors notwithstanding, there is

currently no indication that the violence will soon abate;

CENAPI reports 280 killings for the first 20 days of January.

The cartels have shown themselves to be remarkably

innovative, vicious, and resilient when aggressively

confronted. Given their powerful weaponry and deep

penetration of the country's security institutions, further

attacks against security forces and government officials seem

all but inevitable. However, while violence remains at

unacceptably high levels here, we have no reason to believe

at this point that it will escalate either quantitatively or

qualitatively.

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American

Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /

BASSETT

000000000000000000000000000

VZCZCXYZ0003

RR RUEHWEB


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DE RUEHC #4787 1981819

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

R 171805Z JUL 09

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2799

S E C R E T STATE 074787

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2034

TAGS:PINREFINPINSSNARMX

SUBJECT: (C/NF) MEXICO SECURITY AND ECONOMIC TEAMDYNAMICS (C-AL9-01454)

Classified By: MICHAEL P. OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).

1. (C/NF) PRESIDENT FELIPE CALDERON'S SECURITY AND ECONOMIC

TEAMS CONTINUE TO ATTRACT HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION IN WASHINGTON.

WITH US-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION CONTINUING TO EXPAND,

WASHINGTON POLICYMAKERS REMAIN HIGHLY INTERESTED IN THEIR

MEXICAN COUNTERPARTS. WHILE MOST SENIOR FIGURES IN THE

MEXICAN SECURITY APPARATUS ARE WELL KNOWN, WASHINGTON

ANALYSTS WOULD APPRECIATE CONTINUED REPORTING ON CHANGING

SECURITY TEAM DYNAMICS, AS WELL AS CLARIFICATION ON SOME OF

THE GROUP'S NEWEST MEMBERS WHOSE ROLES REMAIN AMBIGUOUS.

WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ALSO WELCOME REPORTING ON HOW MEXICO'S

TOP ECONOMIC POLICYMAKERS ARE PRIVATELY RESPONDING TO THE

SOURING ECONOMY. AS TIME AND RESOURCES ALLOW AND DURING THE

COURSE OF NORMAL DUTIES, WASHINGTON ANALYSTS WOULD APPRECIATE

POST,S INSIGHT INTO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ON THE EVOLVING

DYNAMICS OF CALDERON'S SECURITY AND ECONOMIC TEAMS.

A. (U) SECURITY TEAM:
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1) (C/NF) WHAT ARE PERSONAL DYNAMICS AMONG THE MEMBERS OF

THE SECURITY TEAM? HOW WELL DO THE PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF THE

TEAM (I.E. GENARO GARCIA LUNA, EDUARDO MEDINA MORA, GEN.

GUILLERMO GALVAN, ADM. FRANCISCO SAYNEZ, FERNANDO GOMEZ MONT,

AND JORGE TELLO PEON) WORK TOGETHER? UPDATED DETAILS OF GROUP

DYNAMICS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL, INCLUDING NOTABLE

FRIENDSHIPS, ALLIANCES, RIVALRIES, AND SUSPICIONS.

2) (C/NF) HOW OFTEN DOES THE TEAM MEET? HAS ANY ONE FIGURE

EMERGED AS A CLEAR LEADER/COORDINATOR? WHO ARE THE PRINCIPAL

ARCHITECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS? IN

PLANNING SECURITY OPERATIONS WHO, OTHER THAN CALDERON, HAS

FINAL SAY?

3) (C/NF) WHAT IS THE CURRENT MOOD AMONG TEAM MEMBERS? ARE

THEY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE COUNTERDRUG EFFORT?

DO THEY THINK THE FIGHT IS WINNABLE? ARE THERE ANY

SIGNIFICANT DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE CURRENT STRATEGY OR FUTURE

PROSPECTS? HOW DOES THE TEAM GO ABOUT CREATING A STRATEGY?

WHEN THE TEAM HAS A SETBACK, HOW DO THEY GO ABOUT RECOVERING?

B. (U) ECONOMIC TEAM:

1) (C/NF) WHAT ARE THE CURRENT DYNAMICS WITHIN THE ECONOMIC

TEAM? WHO ARE THE PRINCIPAL ARCHITECTS OF THE CURRENT

ECONOMIC STRATEGY? ARE ANY PERSONNEL MOVES LIKELY IN THE

NEAR FUTURE? IS ANYONE ON THE ECONOMIC TEAM CONSIDERED

EXPENDABLE? IS ANYONE WAITING IN THE WINGS TO JOIN THE TEAM?

2) (C/NF) HOW HAS THE ECONOMIC TEAM RESPONDED TO THE STRESS

THAT INVARIABLY COMES WITH THE JOB? ARE SOME MEMBERS COPING

BETTER THAN OTHERS? IS ORTIZ,S DEPARTURE HAVING A MAJOR

IMPACT? IS THE NEW DEPUTY SETTLING IN?

2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-AL9-01454 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF
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REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.

CLINTON

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FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8187

INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE

RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC

RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC

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RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC

RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DCC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 002676

SENSITIVE

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NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR RESTREPO; DEPT FOR WHA DAS JACOBSON

AND MEX OFFICE DIRECTOR LEE AND DSTAFF CUE.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019

TAGS:PRELMARRMASSPHUMPGOVPINRMX

SUBJECT: MEXICO: PROMISING FIRST TALKS WITH SEDENA ON HUMAN

RIGHTS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.
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Reason: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (c) Summary: DATT, ODC Chief, DOJ Attache and Pol MinCouns

met with officials from the National Defense Secretariat

(SEDENA) on September 7 to discuss initiating a human rights

dialogue with the Mexican military that would allow us to

understand the legal process in the Mexican system of

military justice and clarify specific questions with regards

to alleged violations. General Lopez Portillo, the Senior

Human Rights official in SEDENA and a veteran military

prosecutor, was the lead official on the Mexican side,

accompanied by a Director General level representative from

the Mexican Foreign Ministry (SRE). They welcomed thebeginning of a dialogue with the Embassy on human rights

matters and proposed regular senior formal meetings (he

suggested 2-3 a year) as well as working level discussions to

clarify specific cases. (A list of all participants is

provided in para 7).

---------------------------------------------

Willing to Talk but a Dialogue Will Take Work

---------------------------------------------

2. (c) Although we previously had provided a list of specific

questions on several cases involving alleged human rights

violations through official SEDENA and SRE channels, and our

meeting had been coordinated a month in advance through the

SEDENA Protocol office (S2), Lopez Portillo did not receive

our questions before the meeting. This was not an indication

of SEDENA's unwillingness to discuss the cases, but rather

reflects a lack of experience in engaging on the human rights

topic and their somewhat rigid rules for transmitting

information to and within the SEDENA bureaucracy.

3. (c) Unaware of the questions we had provided on


21/79

allegations related to the specific cases, General Lopez

Portillo organized a general and open agenda for the meeting,

aimed at facilitating an open and frank discussion on

internal legal and judicial procedures within the Mexican

military. Throughout the meeting, our Mexican interlocutors

were well-disposed to answering our questions and

establishing a collaborative dialogue. We noted our interest

in reviewing the details of some specific cases as part of an

ongoing dialogue on human rights issues that would allow us

to understand better how SEDENA and the Mexican legal system

handled crimes involving military personnel and civilians. We

provided a copy of the questions we had provided prior to the

meeting and suggested a follow-up meeting to go over thecases in more detail.

------------------------------------

SEDENA AND SRE SUGGEST A WAY FORWARD

------------------------------------

4. (c) SRE Director General for Human Rights and Democracy

Alejandro Negrin agreed with Lopez Portillo that we should

establish a formal and regular dialogue to discuss both the

specific cases and larger framework of how the Mexican

judicial system works in response to crimes involving

military personnel and civilians. He noted relevant legal

reforms and the ongoing effort by SEDENA to clarify its

procedures and respond to responsible questions. Lopez

Portillo noted SEDENA's interest in continuing to do more in

this regard and was supportive of establishing a bi-lateral

mechanism that would allow us to work together to help

clarify allegations. He suggested formal senior level

meetings several times a year, with working level meetings in

between.

5. (c) Lopez Portillo promised a timely written response to


22/79

the written questions we had provided earlier. He also

undertook to set up meetings to review military legal

procedure, particularly with regard to crimes involving

military and civilians. He suggested that we work closely

and collaboratively to clarify procedures and outstanding

allegations, many of which he observed, were designed to cast

doubt and dispersion on the Mexican military and not to

establish the truth. Both sides agreed that new questions

MEXICO 00002676 002 OF 002

about additional cases in the future should be providedthrough SRE channels with a courtesy copy given to SEDENA.

The official response to specific cases would be delivered

from SEDENA through the SRE. Lopez Portillo said that he was

eager to work together with us to ensure that there would be

a satisfactory response on all human rights allegations.

-------

COMMENT

-------

6. (c) Establishing a productive human rights dialogue with

the Mexican military will take some work and considerable

fine tuning. This is not an area that the Mexican military

has traditionally discussed with any outsiders. While the

Mexican military has made some progress in establishing

mechanisms to review human rights allegations in response to

internal constitutional reforms and Mexico's international

obligations, it is still a delicate subject and one they are

likely to manage cautiously and not always adroitly. We are

encouraged by our initial meeting but much remains to be

done. We will follow up promptly with SEDENA and SRE to set

up our next meeting. Lopez Portillo provided repeated


23/79

assurances that SEDENA is prepared to respond in writing --

supplemented by working level discussion to clarify any

questions of procedure and translation -- to our questions on

specific cases. We will also expand current training and

subject matter expert exchanges that could help provide

SEDENA with support in their efforts to address human rights

issues in a more comprehensive and transparent way.

------------

PARTICIPANTS

------------

7. (c) The Mexican side was led by MG Jaime Lopez Portilloand included Col. J.J. Juarez, Section 5 DH, Ltc Marcas

Burgos Legorretta, Section 5 DH, Major C.S. Lopez, and Ltc A.

Santos, S-2 as well as Alejandro Negrin, the Director General

of Human Rights and Democracy in the SRE. The U.S. side

included Defense Attache Col. Dan Alabre; ODC Chief Col.

Linwood Ham, Department of Justice Attache Tony Garcia and

Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.




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INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 002882

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2019

TAGS:KCRMPGOVSNARMX

SUBJECT: ELEMENTS OF GOM POLICY TEAM INTERESTED IN FOCUSING

TOGETHER ON IMPROVING SECURITY IN A FEW KEY CITIES

Classified By: NAS Director Keith Mines, reasons 1.5 (b) (d)

1. (C) Summary: At a dinner hosted by PGR for a visiting DOJ

delegation, National Security Coordinator Tello Peon and

Undersecretary for Governance Gutierrez Fernandez told the

delegation they would like to explore seriously focusing our

joint efforts on two or three key cities to reverse the

current wave of violence and instability and show success in

the fight against the DTOs in the next 18 months. They
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suggested starting in Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, and one other

city with a joint planning cell to review what resources we

could collectively bring to bear. They believe the symbolism

of turning several of the most violent cities would be

potent, sending a signal to the rest of the country that the

fight against organized crime can be won, and combating the

current sense of impotence felt by many Mexicans. They

believe it would also go a long way toward stitching up the

country,s damaged international reputation. End Summary.

2. (U) Acting Attorney General Alcantara hosted a dinner for

Deputy Attorney General for the Criminal Division Lanny

Breuer September 21 in Mexico City. Other attendeesincluded:

GOM

National Security System Coordinator Jorge Tello Peon

Undersecretary for Governance (SEGOB) Geronimo Gutierrez

Fernandez

PGR DAG (SIEDO) Marisela Morales

PGR DAG Victor Emilio Corzo Cabanas

PGR Director for Analysis and Strategic Information Oscar

Rocha Dobrowski

US

Deputy Assistant AG Bruce Swartz

Deputy Assistant AG for Criminal Division Kenneth Blanco

Special Assistant to the AG Paul Rosen

DOJ Attache Tony Garcia

NAS Director Keith Mines

GOM WANTS FULL TRANSFER OF INTEL TECHNOLOGY AND TRAINING

--------------------------------------------- -----------

3. (C) Alcantara opened the meeting with two requests from


26/79

Oscar Rocha. First, he said PGR would like to develop a more

general exchange of intelligence information and capacity,

not the case-by-case exchange we now have. Second, they

would like for us to provide a full exchange of technology

for use in intelligence gathering, not just the loan of

equipment for specific cases, but the transfer of the

know-how and training as well. Morales added that the FBI is

helping to create a cyber-unit in Mexico but it would be

beneficial if it were expanded and replicated more broadly.

The SSP, she said, already has a cyber-unit but the real

mandate rests with PGR-SIEDO. The U.S. side offered that

there is great capacity in CCIPS in the Criminal Division and

they would be happy to find ways to offer training andcapacity building to their Mexican counterparts. We would be

pleased, Breuer said, in the effort to press High Value

Targets, to get our Mexican counterparts to the point where

they can do these things themselves. It will take the

development of strong trust through proper vetting and good

training but it would be excellent to get to the point where

there is no longer impunity for a Chapo Guzman because his

operating space has been eliminated.

4. (C) Rocha then spoke of the technological leap about to

take place in the coming years in the intelligence field. He

cited the target-finding equipment used by the USMS with

Mexican counterparts but asked if it would be possible to

acquire not only such equipment for GOM officials, but also

the training and full technology transfer that would go with

it. He suggested we work with vetted units first to provide

such equipment and training, and then move it out more

broadly, both to PGR and CISEN. The U.S. side suggested

getting together in the appropriate working group to see what

could be done. Rocha reiterated that his intent would be to

develop indigenous to the PGR all the capacity they currently

have only in conjunction with the USMS.


27/79

STRATEGIC MISCALCULATIONS IN MERIDA

-----------------------------------

5. (C) Gutierrez Fernandez then turned to the Merida

Initiative, saying that in retrospect he and other GOM

officials realize that not enough strategic thought went into

Merida in the early phase. There was too much emphasis in

the initial planning on equipment, which they now know is

slow to arrive and even slower to be of direct utility in the

fight against the DTOs. Of more immediate importance is

building institutions that can effectively use the equipment.

He was careful to point out that all the equipment is neededand will be put to good use, but wishes that there had been a

more direct focus on institution building, and supported the

current shift in Merida focus to capacity building and

creating more effective institutions.

"WE HAVE EIGHTEEN MONTHS"

-------------------------

6. (C) Gutierrez went on to say, however, that he now

realizes there is not even time for the institution building

to take hold in the remaining years of the Calderon

administration. "We have 18 months," he said, "and if we

do not produce a tangible success that is recognizable to the

Mexican people, it will be difficult to sustain the

confrontation into the next administration." He lamented

the pervasive, debilitating fear that is so much a part of

contemporary Mexican society, where even people in the

Yucatan, with "European levels of security" are afraid

because of the instability in a few distant cities. He

expressed a real concern with "losing" certain regions. It

is damaging Mexico's international reputation, hurting

foreign investment, and leading to a sense of government


28/79

impotence, Gutierrez said.

DON,T SHY AWAY FROM THE HARDEST CHALLENGES

------------------------------------------

7. (C) Gutierrez believes what is needed is a clear roadmap

for the remaining years of security cooperation between the

U.S. and Mexico under President Calderon that targets a few

joint projects in a few cities, rather than doing a little of

everything. Tello Peon agreed, suggesting that there is not

time for pilot projects, and certainly not time to work in a

few relatively safe cities such as Nuevo Laredo as has been

suggested, in order to develop the experience to take on thereal challenges.

8. (C) Instead, he believes, we need to confront the cities

with the largest insecurity and fix them. If we could turn

around Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and one other city such as

Culiacan, it would solve 60% of the violence, and send a

signal to the Mexican people that the war can be won.

Politically, he and Gutierrez said, Mexico must succeed in

Juarez because Calderon has staked so much of his reputation

there, with a major show of force that, to date, has not

panned out. Even if it is not completely solved by the time

Calderon leaves office, if they can get things moving in the

right direction, setting the conditions for ultimate success,

it will be enough. There was a brief &chicken and egg8

discussion, with one side suggesting that well-placed and

effective federal forces could push back the DTOs

sufficiently for the state and local forces to function,

while others believed that well-functioning state and local

forces will be a precondition for the federal forces to

produce stability.

MOVING FORWARD TOGETHER


29/79

-----------------------

9. (C) Gutierrez thought that to start we need a good joint

assessment of organized criminal groups that makes explicit

their vulnerabilities. We have, he said, five things to put

into the fight: resources, training, joint operations,

technology, and cooperation, and we need to mobilize

effectively all of them. He especially mentioned the need to

synchronize our joint efforts, citing the recent show of

force the U.S. promised on our side of the border that could

not be matched by anything on the Mexican side, leaving it

hollow. Tello Peon suggested we form a planning cell, a few

experts on each side, who could focus on a few programs in afew places for the next 2 years.

10. (C) In addition to the intelligence and operational

cooperation that would be at the heart of the new approach,

Gutierrez and Tello Peon mentioned the importance of cultural

and political factors. Politically, Mexico may have a

federal system, Gutierrez said, but historically it has been

more centralized like Colombia or France. The federal

government, however, no longer has the ability to manage the

system from top to bottom. He suggested it would be

necessary for success to break through the impasse produced

by Mexico,s currently dysfunctional federal system and

ensure programs can be synchronized with the states. Tello

Peon also said there will be a need to work on the cultural

factors required to produce a &culture of lawfulness8 that

would mobilize the societal support necessary for success.

Culture and politics will be very complex, he said, but can

be made to work. A clearly articulated and strong doctrine

will help get people behind the strategy.

11. (C) Tello Peon ended the discussion by saying he arrived

at the dinner somewhat fatigued but would leave energized.


30/79

He thought it was an excellent mix of people and welcomed the

honest exchange of new ideas. Mexico, he summarized, is

committed to staying the course, which is sustainable with a

few clear successes.

12. (C) Comment: We will follow up with Tello Peon and

Gutierrez in the coming weeks to see how committed the GOM is

to the strategy of selecting a few key cities and working to

turn security. If it is their strategy and they plan to

execute it, we should get behind it, using the new strategic

framework to build a regional program to take on the biggest

challenges in key border cities. A considerable amount could

be done with existing funding and a marginal increase instaffing. We would use the remainder of the calendar year

for planning, and have a new series of programs ready to roll

out in the new year.




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RHMFISS/HQS USNORTHCOM



RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 003061

NOFORN

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019

TAGS:PRELPGOVPINRMX

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DENNIS BLAIR'S

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CALDERON, OCTOBER 19

Classified By: Ambassador Carlos Pascual.

Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).

1. (S/NF) Summary. DNI Dennis Blair met with President

Calderon for about forty minutes at the Presidential Palace

on October 19. The bulk of the discussion focused on

cooperation on intelligence sharing and the integration of

operations by Mexican intelligence and law enforcement

authorities. Calderon also commented extensively on

political developments in Latin American and the role of the

United States. While he said the United States had regained

significant stature in Latin America, he also urged greater

U.S. involvement in the politics of the region. Several

upcoming elections will be critical in shaping the region's

political course. The U.S., he said, needs to be seen as a

critical player. End Summary.
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32/79

2. (S/NF) The issue at the heart of the discussion was that

Mexico must continue to improve its coordination and response

capacity among its own security forces to act effectively on

intelligence leads regardless of the source, including

Mexico's own internal intelligence channels. Mexico's

Federal Police still largely bases its operational capacity

in Mexico City. The Secretary of Defense (SEDENA) is more

decentralized, but has yet to define a cooperative platform

to work with the Federal Police. When operations are

undertaken in rural areas with difficult terrain, the

complexity of moving large security operations in a short

time frame may often result in targeted individuals escaping

from these operations. Calderon said this situation made him"very sad," and that it was a "great mistake" on their part.

Further, Calderon indicated that he would assess the

possibility of creating a joint strike force capability.

(Note: In separate subsequent meetings, a discussion was

launched with GOM officials on the possibility of undertaking

a simulated exercise that would begin to test how multiple

agencies could cooperate together (septel). End note.)

3. (S/NF) Blair underscored that the fight against crime has

to move beyond high-value targets. "Cut the head off this

snake and new heads will grow." Blair said the key

ingredient to success is generating community confidence to

call in tips against drug traffickers. To get that, people

need to feel secure -- they have to believe that the police

can maintain public safety. And it also means that

intelligence has to be used quickly, effectively, and

responsibly. Intelligence, operations, and institutional

capacity have to be interwoven. Calderon agreed. He

responded, "You made it very clear. Without attacking the

body as well, we can't win. And we have to create the

capacity to take on the body."


33/79

4. (S/NF) DNI Blair asked Calderon for his perspective on

political developments in the region and how the United

States could continue to increase its diplomatic

effectiveness. Calderon emphasized that Venezuelan President

Hugo Chavez is active everywhere, including Mexico. He went

out of his way to highlight that he believes Chavez funded

the PRD opposition during the Presidential campaign nearly

four years ago. Chavez uses social programs, including

sending doctors, to curry political influence, and there are

governors in Mexico who may be friendly to him. Calderon

said that Mexico is trying to isolate Venezuela through the

Rio Group. Calderon also commented that he is particularly

concerned about Venezuela's relations with Iran, and that theIranian Embassy in Mexico is very active. Calderon

underscored that Iran's growing influence in Latin American

should be of considerable concern to the United States, and

Chavez is doing all he can to aid and abet it.

5. (S/NF) Calderon exhorted the U.S. to watch Guatemala and

Belize, since their internal weaknesses make them vulnerable.

He is concerned about Mexico's southern border, and said the

GOM is starting a strategic planning process to better treat

the topic. (Note: Calderon is scheduled to visit Guatemala

next week. End note.) Calderon later in the meeting raised

the southern border again as an area for U.S.-Mexico

cooperation. Ambassador Pascual noted that the U.S. and

Mexico were to hold the next day a joint conference on the

Guatemala border to combat arms trafficking from the south.

MEXICO 00003061 002 OF 002

6. (S/NF) Circling back to Venezuela, Calderon said that

Chavez has no qualms about involving himself in Latin


34/79

American elections, and that he tried to do so in Mexico's

own 2006 presidential contest. The region needs a visible

U.S. presence, he noted. Chavez, said Calderon, will also

have the opportunity to do so in a number of upcoming votes,

especially Honduras. Most importantly, said Calderon, the

United States must be ready to engage the next Brazilian

president. Brazil, he said, is key to restraining Chavez,

but he lamented that President Lula has been reluctant to do

so. The U.S. needs to engage Brazil more and influence its

outlook. In closing, Calderon said that there is a link

among Iran, Venezuela, drugs, narcotics trafficking, and rule

of law issues. The U.S. should look at Latin America from an

interconnected perspective.




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NOFORN

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019

TAGS:PRELPGOVPINRMX

SUBJECT: MEXICO: ARTICLE 29 'STATE OF EXCEPTION' --

UNCERTAIN RESULTS, FEW BENEFITS

REF: A. MEXICO 3076

B. MEXICO 2154

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires John Feeley.


1. (S/NF) Summary. Defense Secretary Galvan raised recently

the possibility of invoking Article 29 of the constitution to

declare a state of exception in certain areas of the country

that would provide more solid legal grounds for the

military's role in the domestic counternarcotics (CN) fight.

Secretary of Government Gomez Mont has alternately provided a

different view, citing a Supreme Court decision as sufficient

precedent for providing the military the legal basis for its

domestic CN activities. Our analysis suggests that the legal

benefits to invoking a state of exception are uncertain at

best, and the political costs appear high. While the

possibility of such a declaration cannot be discounted at

some future date, the GOM seems far from settled on the

efficacy or need for such an immediate move. End Summary.
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Background and Context

----------------------

2. (S/NF) In an October 19 meeting with Director for

National Intelligence Dennis Blair (ref a), Secretary of

Defense (SEDENA) General Guillermo Galvan Galvan lamented the

lack of legal basis for the military's domestic

counternarcotics deployment as key to shaping the public's

perception that the Armed Forces lack the appropriate

authorities to conduct such operations. He noted that SEDENA

is working to pass the National Security law (ref b),

proposed by President Calderon in the final days of the last

congressional session, to help shore up these legalfoundations. Additionally, he mentioned that Article 29 of

the Mexican constitution would permit the President to

declare a state of exception in specific areas of crisis and

give the military greater juridical scope to maneuver. In a

later meeting, Secretary of Government Fernando Francisco

Gomez Mont responded to questions by U.S. officials on the

Article 29 issue. He contradicted Galvan's view that the

military does not have legal basis for its domestic CN

activities and cited a Supreme Court decision as having

already set precedent (Note: Gomez Mont is almost certainly

referring to a 1996 Supreme Court decision that ruled the

military has the authority to operate at the request of local

authorities in support of policing operations. End note.) He

implied that the invocation of Article 29 does not have the

legal urgency or necessity Galvan suggested, but did admit

that the state of exception in places such as Ciudad Juarez

"had been discussed." He said that no decision had been

reached.

Article 29 Text

---------------


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3. (S/NF) The translated text of Article 29 of the

constitution reads: "In the event of invasion, serious

disturbance, or any other event which may place society in

great danger or conflict, only the President of the Mexican

Republic, with the consent of the Council of Ministers and

with the approval of the Federal Congress, and during

adjournments of the latter, of the Permanent Committee, may

suspend throughout the country or in a determined place the

guarantees which present an obstacle to a rapid and ready

combating of the situation; but he must do so for a limited

time, by means of general preventive measures without such

suspensions being limited to a specified individual. If the

suspension should occur while the Congress is in session, thelatter shall grant such authorizations that it deems

necessary to enable the Executive to meet the situation. If

the suspension occurs during a period of adjournment, the

Congress shall be convoked without delay in order to grant

them."

What Would Article 29 Look Like?

--------------------------------

4. (S/NF) The terms of the state of exception detailed in

Article 29 are vague and offer little insight into how its

MEXICO 00003101 002 OF 003

invocation would play out on the ground. There appears to be

a great deal of leeway for the President -- with the approval

of Congress -- to determine what kinds of guarantees to

suspend given the nature of the emergency at hand. To paint

a scenario: the GOM could elect to apply the article in a

zone of perceived crisis, such as Ciudad Juarez, for the

period of one year. The decree could potentially suspend


38/79

rights guaranteed in the first chapter of the constitution,

including freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom of

assembly, freedom of passage, or some tenets of legal due

process. The military, for example, might be granted broader

detention authorities. The law does not explicitly call for

greater military involvement, and Gomez Mont told US

officials that it is not martial law "in the way that you

know it." Galvan's interest in the state of exception

suggests two possibilities: that he envisions a potentially

broader role for the military (at the expense, perhaps, of

cooperation with other insitutions), or that he is seeking a

stronger legal framework and additional legal protections to

back up the military's current domestic operations. Calderonhas already put the military in charge of municipal police in

Ciudad Juarez and other areas in Chihuahua State.

5. (S/NF) The discussion of Article 29's application is

highly theoretical. Gomez Mont, when asked whether a state

of exception would imply the federalization of municipal

authorities, acknowledged a "constitutional gray area." He

admitted that municipal governments could "be limited," but

said that Mexico's signature to the UN Human Rights Charter

limits how far the GOM could go in suspending rights.

The Limits

----------

6. (SBU) The GOM does not take lightly its use of Article 29.

The GOM has not, in fact, invoked it since when it declared

war on Italy, Germany, and Japan during World War II. The

GOM has even abstained from employing the measure during

times of cataclysmic internal strife such as the 1968 student

protests, the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, the 1990s fight

against armed uprisings in Chiapas, or the 2006 Oaxaca

protests.


39/79

7. (C) The GOM's hesitation so far to invoke the article is

due to a number of factors, which are particularly relevant

given the democratic context in which Mexico now operates.

Perhaps most critical, the article clearly stipulates that

Congress -- meaning both Chambers -- must approve the measure

and its various permissions, circumvention of rights,

geographic application, and time frame, suggesting that the

President's ability to achieve a state of exception under his

terms would be uncertain, at best. Such a move would not be

seen solely as a law enforcement procedure but as a carefully

calculated move with significant political implications.

President Calderon lacks an absolute majority in either theChamber of Deputies or the Senate, and it is unlikely that

his opponents would approve carte blanche significantly

expanded authorities for the military or federal government.

Indeed, Calderon instead might run the risk of having his

hands tied by Congress, depending on the vote and final

details of how Article 29 would be invoked. For example, the

legislature might vote to allow the federal government to

declare a limited state of exception in a crisis zone for a

short period of time, asking that Calderon then return to

Congress to renew the mandate. This would give Congress at

least nominal oversight over the military's counternarcotics

operations, a role it has sought but not had up to this

point. Congress could also reject wholesale the article's

invocation, which would be an embarrassing public blow to the

GOM.

8. (C) Moreover, Calderon is negotiating with Congress on

other legislation that will better serve his counternarcotics

goals. Proposed in late April, reforms to the National

Security Act would provide a firmer legal framework for the

military's domestic counterdrug fight, give the President the

power to declare a threat to domestic security and deploy the


40/79

military without congressional approval. It would also

provide the military with greater intelligence authorities

and powers over the state and local forces in the area.

MEXICO 00003101 003 OF 003

Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) contacts have

indicated that they would prefer to limit presidential

authority than expand it, and PRD Senator and member of the

Justice Committee, Tomas Torres, has told Poloff that the

reform as written is unlikely to pass. Nevertheless, such

legislation permanently codifying the military's role and thePresident's authority to deploy it would certainly be of

greater use to Calderon than would be a watered down state of

exception.

9. (S/NF) Gomez Mont told U.S. officials during the October

19 exchange that the invocation of Article 29 would be

"highly controversial," and downplayed its immediate

necessity. The public relations cost of declaring a state of

exception in places like Ciudad Juarez would likely be high,

and almost certainly would draw increased scrutiny from the

international and domestic human rights community. Moreover,

a defeat by Congress of an Article 29 proposal would be seen

as a public rejection of Calderon's counternarcotics strategy.

Comment

-------

10. (C) Benefits to an Article 29 strategy would be limited.

If written correctly and approved by Congress, it could give

the military a temporary legal cover for its activities and

perhaps allow it to focus more on operations and less on its

critics. Notable Mexico legal experts have envisioned the


41/79

employment of Article 29 only in the case of a "firestorm,"

such as local or state governments rejecting military

assistance in areas where the GOM sees it as badly needed.

Galvan's views are more reflective of the military's desire

for legal protections on human rights and other grounds, than

of any imminent legal or political challenges to the

military's current domestic counternarcotics role. Clearly,

Calderon is looking for new tools with which to fight

increased levels of violence in places like Ciudad Juarez,

but any benefits he would gain with an Article 29 state of

exception would be undermined by the high political costs of

such an approach. With questionable support in Congress and

limited political capital, he would put at risk popular andcongressional support that has given the military broad room

to maneuver in the current legal framework. While the

possibility of the declaration of a state of exception cannot

be discounted at some future date, the GOM seems far from

settled on the efficacy or need for such an immediate move.




FEELEY

000000000000000000

VZCZCXRO3884


DE RUEHME #3195/01 3140013

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

R 100013Z NOV 09

FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO





42/79










NOFORN

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DAN RESTREPO; DEPT FOR WHA DAS JACOBSON, MEX

DIRECTOR LEE, D STAFF CUE, AND INR HOHMAN.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019

TAGS:PRELPGOVPINRMX

SUBJECT: MEXICO: MORE INTERAGENCY COOPERATION NEEDED ON

INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.


1. (S/NF) Summary. President Calderon's security strategy

lacks an effective intelligence apparatus to produce high

quality information and targeted operations. Embassy

officers working with the GOM report that Mexico's use of

strategic and tactical intelligence is fractured, ad hoc, and

reliant on U.S. support. Despite their myriad inefficiencies

and deficiencies, Mexican security services broadly recognize

the need for improvement. Sustained U.S. assistance can help

shape and fortify the technical capacity of institutions and

can also create a more reliable, collegial inter-agency

environment. End Summary.
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GOM Intel Strategy Criticized

-----------------------------

2. (C) Recent criticism of President Calderon's security

strategy cites a poorly utilized and underdeveloped

intelligence apparatus as a key obstacle to greater

improvements in the country's security environment.

Calderon's political opponents from both the Institutional

Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Revolutionary Democratic

Party (PRD) have told Poloff that large-scale joint

military-police counterdrug deployments, notably Joint

Operation Chihuahua, have failed to make real gains in thewar against organized crime due to a reliance on overwhelming

numerical superiority of troops absent the strategic and

operational use of intelligence. Critics argue that the more

effective use of intelligence would help the security

services better cooperate on counterdrug issues, wrap-up more

high-level traffickers, and, eventually, curb the country's

escalating rates of narco-related violence. Emboffs working

with the GOM in counter-narcotics and intelligence matters

similarly note that Mexico's use of strategic and tactical

intelligence is often fractured, ad hoc, and heavily reliant

on the United States for leads and operations.

The Players

-----------

3. (S/NF) A myriad of GOM agencies have a stake in

counternarcotics intel issues, including the Secretariats of

Defense (SEDENA) and Marines (SEMAR), the Mexican National

Intelligence Center (CISEN), the Public Security Secretariat

(SSP), which includes the federal police, and the Attorney

General's Office (PGR). Each has a different intelligence

mission and varying levels of development and


44/79

professionalism. As Mexico's primary intelligence agency,

CISEN is the natural choice to be the GOM's coordinator of

intelligence and analytic efforts. Indeed, it technically

has the lead on encouraging interagency coordination and is

developing mechanisms to facilitate such endeavors. For the

most part, however, CISEN lacks the capacity to effectively

direct the inter-agency process, particularly when it

includes such institutional giants as SSP, which

bureaucratically overshadows CISEN in budget, personnel, and

other resource issues. CISEN's inability thus far to serve

as a real leader on intelligence operations and analysis has

effectively left Mexico without an effective interagency

coordinator.

4. (S/NF) SSP is increasingly becoming a major player on the

intel block. It is exploring ways to take advantage of new

authorities granted under the Federal Police reform

legislation passed last year to develop its intelligence

capabilities. SSP can now directly solicit telephonic

information from phone companies with a judicial order,

bypassing the PGR entirely. It is also interested in

building its own complete telecommunications intercept

capability, the implementation of which has stalled over the

past two years because of turf disputes between SSP and the

Attorney General's Office. Moreover, as the keeper of

Plataforma Mexico -- the massive new criminal database -- the

SSP oversees one of the GOM's cornerstone and resource-heavy

information-sharing projects.

MEXICO 00003195 002 OF 005

The Challenges

--------------
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