nasa fmea presentation
TRANSCRIPT
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TOOLS OF RELIABILITYANALYSIS -- Introduction and
FMEAs
(09)
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DEDUCTIVE PROCEDURES(Top-Down Analysis)
INDUCTIVE PROCEDURES(Bottom-Up Analysis)
Pick Upper LevelFailure in Component
Flowdowncauses
Determine Failure Modes of LowerLevel Components.
Summarize
upward
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
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RELIABILITY ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
INDUCTIVE METHODS DEDUCTIVE METHODS
HARDWAREFAILURES
HUMANINTERACTIONERRORS
HARDWARE ANDHUMAN ERRORS
RELIABILITY
ANALYSIS
FAILURE MODE
AND EFFECTSANALYSIS (FMEA)
HUMAN FACTORSANALYSIS
FAULT TREEANALYSIS (FTA)
EVENT TREEANALYSIS (ETA)
PROBABILISTICRISK ASSESSMENT
CRITICAL ITEMSLIST (CIL)
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FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTANALYSIS
(09 cont)
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DEFINITION
A methodology to analyze and discover: (1)all potential failure modes of a system, (2) theeffects these failures have on the system and(3) how to correct and or mitigate the failuresor effects on the system. [The correction andmitigation is usually based on a ranking ofthe severity and probability of the failure]
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Benefits of FMEA
FMEA is one of the most important tools ofreliability analysis. If undertaken early enoughin the design process by senior levelpersonnel it can have a tremendous impacton removing causes for failures or ofdeveloping systems that can mitigate theeffects of failures.
It provides detailed insight into the systems
interrelationships and potentials for failure. FMEA and CIL (Critical Items List) evaluations
also cross check safety hazard analyses forcompleteness.
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BACKGROUND
The failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)is the most widely used analysis procedure inpractice at the initial stages of systemdevelopment.
The FMEA is usually performed during theconceptual and initial design phases of thesystem in order to assure that all possiblefailure modes have been considered and that
proper provisions have been made toeliminate all the potential failures.
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OBJECTIVES: Be able to answer (or perform):
Explain terminology: FMEA, CIL, REDUNDANCY,COMMON MODE FAILURE, etc.
What are the benefits of FMEA and when shouldthey be applied in the design program?
Be able evaluate levels of criticality & redundancy. Be able to perform a components FMEA and a
system FMEA.
Know how to apply the results of a FMEA.
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FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTANALYSIS
PURPOSE/TYPES/USES. PROCEDURE.
DATA REQUIREMENTS & TERMS/TYPES.
WHY AND HOW DO THINGS FAIL?
PERFORMING A FMEA.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
Critical Items List
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System Engineering: FMEA
FMEA;FMEA INITIAL
CONCEPT
FMEAEVALUATE
DESIGN & REV;PREVENTIONS
& DETECTIONS
CoDR PDR CDR
CONCEPTDESIGN
PRELIM.DESIGN
FINAL DESIGNCOMPONENTS/ASSY, TEST &
INSPECTION
PRODUCTIONINSPECTION
ACCEPTANCE
TESTS
FMEA FINAL &MAINT FMEA.
ACTIONSAGREED TO,IMPLEMENT
SYS.TEST
FMEA EVALfor
ADEQUACY,FAULT
DIAGNOSIS
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TYPES
Functional Hardware
FMEA with Criticality Analysis(FMECA)/Critical Items List
Other variations.
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USES--Short Term
Identify critical or hazardous conditions. Identify potential failure modes
Identify need for fault detection.
Identify effects of the failures.
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USES--Long term.
Aids in producing block-diagram reliabilityanalysis
Aids in producing diagnostic charts for repairpurposes.
Aids in producing maintenance handbooks. Design of built-in test (BIT), failure detection
& redundancy.
For analysis of testability. For retention as formal records of the safety
and reliability analysis, to be used asevidence in product safety litigation.
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PROCEDURE Get an overview of the system:
Determine the function of all componentry.
Create functional and reliability block diagrams.
Document all environments and missions of sys.
ID all potential failure modes of each component.
Establish failure effect on the next level of the sys.
Determine failure detection methods.
Determine if common mode failures exits.
Determine criticality of the failure, ranking & CIL.
Develop CIL
Corrective actions/retention rationale.
Provide suitable follow-up or corrective actions.
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PROCEDURE-FLOWCHART
PERFORM
FMEA,ID FAILUREMODES
DESIGN
GET SYSTEMOVERVIEW
ESTABLISH
FAILUREEFFECT
DETERMINE
CRITICALITY
REVISE DESIGN
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TERMS: FMEA WORKSHEET
Page ___ of ____Date:__________
Title:_________________________________
System:______________________________Analyst:_____________
Description Function Failure Mode Cause of Failure Effect of FailureCorrective Action
DetectionCrit./Rank
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FAILURE TERMS REVIEW:THE PROCESS OF FAILURE
FAILUREMODE
FAILURECAUSE
FAILUREMECHANISM
FAILURESTRESSES
OBSERVED
PROBLEM
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WHY DO THINGS FAIL?(Failure Mechanisms)
fatigue/fracture material removal structural overload radiation
electrical overload ________________
wear (lube failure) ________________
wear (contamination) ________________
wear ________________
seal failure ________________
chemical attack ________________
oxidation ________________
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HOW DO THINGS FAIL?(Failure Mode)
In what ways can they fail?
How probable is this failure?
Do one or more components interact toproduce a failure?
Is this a common failure?
Who is familiar with this particular item?
PROBLEM--VALVE(P)
OPTIONAL PROB: CHEM MICRO EXP
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Review--PURPOSE OF FMEA???
The purpose is to identify the differentfailures and modes of failure that can occur atthe component, subsystem, and systemlevels and to evaluate the consequences ofthese failures.
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CONCLUSION--BENEFITS OFFMEA
Identify critical or hazardous conditions.
Identify potential failure modes
Identify need for fault detection.
Identify effects of the failures. END>MORE
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
Assign critically categories based onredundancy, results of failure, safety etc.
Develop criteria for what failure modes are tobe included in a critical items list (CIL).
Develop screens to evaluate redundancy. Analyze each critical item for ways to remove
it, or develop retention rational to supportthe premise that the risk can be retained.
Cross check critical items with hazardreports.
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CRITICALITY CATEGORIES (TYP.) 1 Single failure point that could result in loss of vehicle or
personnel.
1R Redundant items, where if all failed, the result is loss ofvehicle or personnel.
1S A single failure point of a system component designedto provide safety or protection capability against a potentialhazardous condition or a single point failure in a safetymonitoring system (e.g. fire suppression system).
1SR Redundant components, where if all failed, the result isthe same as 1S above.
1P A single failure point which is protected by a safetydevice, the functioning of which prevents a hazardouscondition from occurring.
2 Single point failure that could result in loss of criticalmission support capability.
3 All other.
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Analyze Critical Items
Redesign item, add redundant unit, etc.
Prepare retention rationale for item.
What current design features minimize theprobability of occurrence.
What tests can detect failure modes duringacceptance tests, cert. tests, prelaunch and/or on-
orbit checkout. What inspections can be performed to prevent the
failure mode from being mfg, into hardware.
What failure history justifies the CIL retention.
How does operational use of the unit mitigate thehardwares failure effect.
How does maintainability prevent the failure mode.
END
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IIIII
1-END VALVE
2-POPPET 3-SPRING4-GUIDE
6-HOUSING
7-O-RING (lg)8-BACK-UP RING
10-O-RING (small)
PROBLEM--VALVE
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RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM of ___________FFF
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Page ___ of ____Date:__________
Title:_________________________________System:______________________________Analyst:_____________
FMEA WORKSHEET
Description Function Failure Mode Cause of Failure Effect of FailureCorrective Action
Detection Crit
FFF