dela lana v. alba

8/8/2019 Dela Lana v. Alba

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11. On t h e morning of t h e h earing of t h is petition on September 8, 1981, petitionerssoug h t to h ave t h e writer of t h is opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and AmeurfinaMelencio-Herrera disqualified because t h e first-named was t h e c h airman and t h e ot h er two, members of t h e Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At t h e h earing, t h e motionwas denied. It was made clear t h en and t h ere t h at not one of t h e t h ree members of t h e

Courth

ad anyh

and in th

e framing or in th

e discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.Th ey were not consulted. Th ey did not testify. Th e c h allenged legislation is entirely t h eproduct of t h e efforts of t h e legislative body. 100 Th eir work was limited, as set fort h in t h eExecutive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. Th at is more in t h enature of sc h olarly studies. Th at t h e undertook. Th ere could be no possible objection tosuc h activity. Ever since 1973, t h is T ribunal h as h ad administrative supervision over interior courts. It h as h ad t h e opportunity to inform itself as to t h e way judicial businessis conducted and h ow it may be improved. Even prior to t h e 1973 Constitution, it is t h erecollection of t h e writer of t h is opinion t h at eit h er t h e t h en C h airman or members of t h eCommittee on Justice of t h e t h en Senate of t h e P h ilippines 101 consulted members of t h eCourt in drafting proposed legislation affecting t h e judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite

th

is excerpt from an article in th

e 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In th

e twentieth

centuryth e C h ief Justice of t h e United States h as played a leading part in judicial reform. Avariety of conditions h ave been responsible for t h e development of t h is role, andforemost among t h em h as been t h e creation of explicit institutional structures designedto facilitate reform." 102 Also: " Th us t h e C h ief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and directinvolvement in judicial reform at t h e federal level and, to t h e extent issues of judicialfederalism arise, at t h e state level as well." 103

12. It is a cardinal article of fait h of our constitutional regime t h at it is t h e people w h o areendowed wit h righ ts, to secure w h ich a government is instituted. Acting as it doesth roug h public officials, it h as to grant t h em eit h er expressly or impliedly certain powers.Th ose t h ey exercise not for t h eir own benefit but for t h e body politic. Th e Constitutiondoes not speak in t h e language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 10 4 Th at ismore t h an a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. Th e law may vest in a public officialcertain rig h ts. It does so to enable t h em to perform h is functions and fulfill h isresponsibilities more efficiently. It is from t h at standpoint t h at t h e security of tenureprovision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee t h at

justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untowardconsequence. Th eir judgments t h en are even more likely to be inspired solely by t h eir knowledge of t h e law and t h e dictates of t h eir conscience, free from t h e corruptinginfluence of base or unwort h y motives. Th e independence of w h ich th ey are assured isimpressed wit h a significance transcending t h at of a purely personal rig h t. As t h usviewed, it is not solely for t h eir welfare. Th e c h allenged legislation Th us subject d to t h emost rigorous scrutiny by t h is T ribunal, lest by lack of due care and circumspection, itallow t h e erosion of t h at Ideal so firmly embedded in t h e national consciousness Th ereis t h is fart h er t h oug h t to consider. independence in t h oug h t and action necessarily isrooted in one's mind and h eart. As emp h asized by former C h ief Justice Paras inO campo v. Secretary of Justice, 105 th ere is no surer guarantee of judicial independenceth an t h e God-given c h aracter and fitness of t h ose appointed to t h e Benc h . Th e judgesmay be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good be h avior, but if t h ey are of suc h


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stuff as allows t h em to be subservient to one administration after anot h er, or to cater toth e wis h es of one litigant after anot h er, t h e independence of t h e judiciary will be not h ingmore t h an a myt h or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of t h e type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of t h e power of Congress we do not say unlimitedbut as h erein exercised to reorganize inferior courts." 10 6 Th at is to recall one of t h e

greatest Common Law jurists, wh

o at th

e cost of h

is office made clear th

ath

e would not just blindly obey t h e King's order but "will do w h at becomes [ h im] as a judge." So it waspointed out in t h e first leading case stressing t h e independence of t h e judiciary,B orromeo v. Mariano, 107 Th e ponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified good judges wit h "men w h o h ave a mastery of t h e principles of law, w h o disc h arge t h eir duties inaccordance wit h law, w h o are permitted to perform t h e duties of t h e office undeterred byoutside influence, and w h o are independent and self-respecting h uman units in a

judicial system equal and coordinate to t h e ot h er two departments of government." 108 Th ere is no reason to assume t h at t h e failure of t h is suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg.129 would be attended wit h deleterious consequences to t h e administration of justice. Itdoes not follow t h at t h e abolition in good fait h of t h e existing inferior courts except t h e

Sandiganbayan and th

e Court of T

ax Appeals and th

e creation of new ones will result ina judiciary unable or unwilling to disc h arge wit h independence its solemn duty or onerecreant to t h e trust reposed in it. Nor s h ould t h ere be any fear t h at less t h an good fait h will attend t h e exercise be of t h e appointing power vested in t h e Executive. It cannot bedenied t h at an independent and efficient judiciary is somet h ing to t h e credit of anyadministration. Well and truly h as it been said t h at t h e fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, t h at t h e t h ree departments are as onein t h eir determination to pursue t h e Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling t h e h opes of th e sovereign people as expressed in t h e Constitution. Th ere is wisdom as well asvalidity to t h is pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. P asay Transportation Company , 109 a decision promulgated almost h alf a century ago: "Just asth e Supreme Court, as t h e guardian of constitutional rig h ts, s h ould not sanctionusurpations by any ot h er department or t h e government, so s h ould it as strictly confineits own sp h ere of influence to t h e powers expressly or by implication conferred on it byth e Organic Act." 110 T o t h at basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, t h isCourt remains committed.

WHEREFORE, t h e unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not h aving beens h own, t h is petition is dismissed. No costs.

Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions


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BARREDO, J., concurring:

I join t h e majority of my bret h ren in voting t h at t h e Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is not unconstitutional as a wh

ole nor in any of its parts. Th e issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section 44 of th e Act w h ich reads as follows:

SEC. 44. Transitory provisions. Th e provisions of t h is Act s h all be immediately carriedout in accordance wit h an Executive Order to be issued by t h e President. Th e Court of

Appeals, t h e Courts of First Instance, t h e Circuit Criminal Courts, t h e Juvenile andDomestic Relations Courts, t h e Courts of Agrarian Relations, t h e City Courts, t h eMunicipal Courts, and t h e Municipal Circuit Courts s h all continue to function as presentlyconstituted and organized, until t h e completion of t h e reorganization provided in t h is Actas declared by t h e President. Upon suc h declaration, t h e said courts s h all be deemedautomatically abolis h ed and t h e incumbents t h ereof s h all cease to h old office. Th e casespending in t h e old Courts s h all e transferred to t h e appropriate Courts constitutedpursuant to t h is Act, toget h er wit h th e pertinent functions, records, equipment,. propertyand t h e necessary personnel.

Th e applicable appropriations s h all likewise be transferred to t h e appropriate courtsconstituted pursuant to t h is Act, to be augmented as may be necessary from t h e funds for organizational c h anges as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said funding s h allth ereafter be included in t h e annual General Appropriations Act.

It is contended by petitioners t h at t h e provision in t h e above section w h ich mandatesth at "upon t h e declaration upon t h e President t h at t h e reorganization contemplated inth e Act h as been completed), t h e said courts (meaning t h e Court of Appeals and alloth er lower courts, except t h e Sandiganbayan and t h e Court of T ax Appeals) s h all bedeemed abolis h ed and t h e incumbents t h ereof s h all cease to h old office" trenc h es on allth e constitutional safeguards and guarantees of t h e independence of t h e judiciary, suc h as t h e security of tenure of its members (Section 7, Article X of t h e P h ilippineConstitution of 1973), t h e prerogatives of t h e Supreme Court to administrativelysupervise all courts and t h e personnel t h ereof (Section 6, I d. ) and principally, t h e power of t h e Supreme Court "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at leasteig h t Members, order t h eir dismissal. " (Section 7, I d. )

On t h e ot h er h and, respondents maintain t h at t h ru t h e above-quoted Section 44. t h eBatasan did not h ing more t h an to exercise t h e aut h ority conferred upon it be Section I of th e same Article of t h e Constitution w h ich provides t h at Th e Judicial power s h all berested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. " In ot h er words, since all inferior courts are, constitutionally speaking, mere creatures of th e law (of t h e legislature it follows t h at it is wit h in t h e legislature's power to abolis h or reorganize t h em even if in so doing, it mig h t result in t h e cessation from office of t h eincumbents t h ereof before t h e expiration of t h eir respective constitutionally fixedtenures. Respondents emp h asize t h at t h e legislative power in t h is respect is broad andindeed plenary.


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V iewing t h e problem before Us from t h e above perspectives, it would appear t h at our task is eit h er (1) to reconcile, on t h e one h and, t h e parliament's power of abolition andreorganization wit h , on t h e ot h er, t h e security of tenure of members of t h e judiciary andth e Supreme Court's aut h ority to discipline and remove judges or (2) to declare t h ateit h er t h e power of t h e Supreme Court or of t h e Batasan is more paramount t h an t h at of

th

e oth

er. I believe.h

owever, th

at such

a manner of looking at th

e issue th

at confrontsUs only confuses and compounds t h e task We are called upon to perform. For h ow canth ere be a satisfactory and rational reconciliation of t h e pretended rig h t of a judge tocontinue as suc h , w h en t h e position occupied by h im no longer exists? T o suggest, assome do, t h at t h e solution is for t h e court h e is sitting in not to be deemed abolis h ed or th at h e s h ould in some way be allowed to continue to function as judge until h isconstitutional tenure expires is obviously impractical, if only because we would t h enh ave t h e absurd spectacle of a judiciary wit h old and new courts functioning under distinct set-ups, suc h as a district court continuing as suc h in a region w h ere t h e ot h er

judges are regional judges or of judges exercising powers not purely judicial w h ich isoffensive to t h e Constitution. Th e ot h er suggestion t h at t h e incumbent of t h e abolis h ed

court sh

ould be deemed appointed to th

e corresponding new court is even worse, sinceit would deprive t h e appointing aut h ority, t h e president, of t h e power to make h is ownch oices and would, furt h ermore, amount to an appointment by legislation w h ich is aConstitutional anac h ronism. more on t h is point later .

Inasmuc h as pursuant to t h e analysis of t h e majority of t h e Members of t h is Court, infact and in law, t h e structure of judicial system created by Batas Pambansa 129 issubstantially different from t h at under t h e Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, h ence t h ecourts now existing are actually being abolis h ed, w h y do We h ave to indulge in anyreconciliation or feel bound to determine w h ose power, t h at of t h e Batasang Pambansaor t h at of t h is Court, s h ould be considered more imperious? It being conceded t h at t h epower to create or establis h carries wit h it th e power to abolis h , and it is a legal axiom,or at least a pragmatic reality t h at t h e tenure of t h e h older of an office must of necessityend w h en h is office no longer exists, as I see it, be h ave no alternative t h an to h old t h atpetitioners' invocation of t h e independence of t h e judiciary principle of t h e Constitution isunavailing ill t h e cases at bar. It is as simple as t h at. I mig h t h asten to add, in t h isconnection, t h at to insist t h at w h at Batas Pambansa 129 is doing is just a renaming andnot a substantial and actual modification or alteration of t h e present judicial structure or system assuming a close scrutiny mig h t some h ow support suc h a conclusion, is purewis h ful th inking, it being explicitly and unequivocally provided in t h e section in questionth at said courts are deemed abolis h ed" and furt h er, as if to make it most unmistakablyemp h atic, t h at "t h e incumbents t h ereat s h all cease to h old office." Dura les, sed les. Asa matter of fact, I cannot conceive of a more emp h atic way of manifesting andconveying t h e determined legislative intent about it.

Now, w h y am I yielding to t h e above reasoning and conclusion? W h y don't I insist onch ampioning t h e cause of t h e independence of t h e judiciary by maintaining t h at t h econstitutional safeguards t h ereof I h ave already enumerated earlier must be respectedin any reorganization ordained by t h e parliament My answer is simple. Practically all t h eMembers of t h e Court concede t h at w h at is contemplated is not only general


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reorganization but abolition in ot h er words, not only a rearrangement or remodellingof t h e old structure but a total demolition t h ereof to be followed by t h e building of a newand different one. I am practically alone in contemplating a different view. T rue, even if Is h ould appear as s h outing in t h e wilderness, I would still make myself a h ero in t h eeyes of man justices and judges, members of t h e bar and concerned discerning

citizens, all lovers of th

e judicial independence, but understandably, I sh

ould not be, as Iam not, disposed to play suc h a role virtually at t h e expense not only of mydistinguis h ed colleagues but of t h e Batasang Pambansa t h at framed t h e law and, mostof all, t h e President w h o signed and, t h erefore, sanctioned t h e Act as it is, unless I amabsolutely sure t h at my position is formidable, unassailable and beyond all possiblecontrary ratiocination, w h ich I am not certain of, as I s h all demonstrate anon.

T o start wit h , th e jurisprudence, h ere and abroad, touc h ing on t h e question now beforeUs cannot be said to be clear and consistent, muc h less uns h akeable and indubitablydefinite eit h er way. None of t h e local cases 1 relied upon and discussed by t h e partiesand by t h e Members of t h e Court during t h e deliberations, suc h as Borromeo, 2

Ocampo,3

Zandueta,4

Brillo,5

etc. can, to my mind, really serve as reliable pole starsth at could lead me to certainty of correctness.

Of course, my instinct and passion for an independent judiciary are uncompromisingand beyond diminution. Indeed, my initial reactions, publicly known, about BatasPambansa 129 explaining academically its apparent tendency to invade t h e areas of aut h ority of t h e Supreme Court, not to speak of its dangerously impairing t h eindependence of t h e judiciary, must h ave, I imagine, created t h e impression t h at I wouldvote to declare t h e law unconstitutional. But, during t h e deliberations of t h e Court, t h ecombined wisdom of my learned colleagues was somet h ing I could not discount or justbrus h aside. Pondering and t h inking deeper about all relevant factors, I h ave come to

th

e conviction th

at at least on th

is day andh

our th

ere are justifiable grounds to uph

oldth e Act, if only to try h ow it will operate so t h at t h ereby t h e people may see t h at We areone wit h th e President and t h e Batasan in taking w h at appear to be immediate stepsneeded to relieve t h e people from a fast spreading cancer in t h e judiciary of our country.

Besides, t h e P h ilippines h as some h ow not yet returned to complete normalcy Th eimproved national discipline so evident during t h e earlier days of martial law, h asdeclined at a quite discernible degree. Different sectors of society are demanding urgentreforms in t h eir respective field And about t h e most ve h ement and persistent, loud andclear, among t h eir gripes, w h ich as a matter of fact is common to all of t h em is t h atabout t h e deterioration in t h e quality of performance of t h e judges manning our courtsand t h e slow and dragging pace of pending judicial proceedings. Strictly speaking, t h isis, to be sure, somet h ing t h at may not necessarily be related to lack of independence of th e judiciary. It h as more to do wit h th e ineptness and/or corruption among andcorruptibility of t h e men sitting in t h e courts in some parts of t h e country And w h at isworse, w h ile in t h e communities concerned t h e malady is known to factually exist and isactually graver and widespread, very few, if any individuals or even associations andorganized groups, truly incensed and anxious to be of h elp, h ave t h e courage andpossess t h e requisite legal evidence to come out and file t h e corresponding c h arges


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with th e Supreme Court, And I am not vet referring to similar situations t h at are not quiteopenly known but nevert h eless just as deleterious. On t h e ot h er h and, if all t h eseintolerable instances s h ould actually be formally broug h t to t h e Supreme Court, it wouldbe h umanly impossible for t h e Court to dispose of t h em wit h desirable dispatc h , wh atwith th e t h ousands of ot h er cases it h as to attend to and t h e rat h er cumbersome strict

requirements of procedural due process ith

as to observe in each

and every such

administrative case all of w h ich are time consulting. V erily, under t h e foregoingcircumstances, it may be said t h at t h ere is justification for t h e patience of t h e peopleabout t h e possibility of early eradication of t h is disease or evil in our judiciary picturedabove to be nearing t h e breaking point.

With al, we must bear in mind t h at judicial reorganization becomes urgent and inevitablenot alone because of structural inadequacies of t h e system or of t h e cumbersomenessand tec h nicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force, but also w h en itbecomes evident t h at a good number of t h ose occupying positions in t h e judiciary,make a mockery of justice and take advantage of t h eir office for selfis h personal ends

and yet, as already explained, th

ose in auth

ority cannot expeditiously cope with

th

esituation under existing laws and rules. It is my personal assessment of t h e presentsituation in our judiciary t h at its reorganization h as to be of necessity two-pronged, as Ih ave just indicated, for t h e most Ideal judicial system wit h th e most perfect proceduralrules cannot satisfy t h e people and t h e interests of justice unless t h e men w h o h oldpositions t h erein possess t h e c h aracter, competence and sense of loyalty t h at canguarantee t h eir devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to antemptations of graft and corruption, including t h e usual importunings and t h e fearsomealbeit improper pressures of t h e powers t h at be. I am certain t h at t h e Filipino people feelh appy t h at Batas Pambansa 129 encompasses bot h of th ese objectives, w h ich indeedare aligned wit h th e foundation of t h e principle of independence of t h e judiciary.

Th e above premises considered, I h ave decided to tackle our problem from t h eviewpoint of t h e unusual situation in w h ich our judiciary is presently perilously situated.Needless to say, to all of us, t h e Members of t h e Court, t h e constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and removal only by t h e Supreme Court, among ot h ers, againstimpairment of t h e independence of t h e judiciary, w h ich is one of t h e bedrock's and,th erefore, of t h e essence in any "democracy under a regime of justice, peace, libertyand equality (Preamble of t h e 1973 Constitution), are priceless and s h ould be defended,most of all by t h e Supreme Court, wit h all t h e wisdom and courage God h as individuallyendowed to eac h of Us. Wit h al, we are all conscious of t h e fact t h at t h ose safeguardsh ave never been intended to place t h e person of t h e judge in a singular position of privilege and untouc h ability, but rat h er, t h at t h ey are essentially part and parcel of w h atis required of an independent judiciary w h ere judges can decide cases and do justice toeveryone before t h em ruat caelum. However, We find Ourselves face to face wit h asituation, in our judiciary w h ich is of emergency proportions and to insist on rationalizingh ow t h ose guarantees s h ould be enforced under suc h a circumstance seem to bedifficult, aside from being controversial. And so, in a real sense, We h ave to make ach oice between ad h ering to t h e strictly legalistic reasoning pursued by petitioners, on


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th e one h and, and t h e broader and more practical approac h , w h ich as I h ave said iswith in t h e spirit at least of t h e Constitution.

My concept of t h e Constitution is t h at it is not just a cluster of h igh sounding verbiagesspelling purely Idealism and nobility in t h e recognition of h uman dignity, protection of

individual liberties and providing security and promotion of th

e general welfare under agovernment of laws. Wit h all emp h asis and ve h emence, I say t h at t h e fundamental lawof t h e land is a living instrument w h ich translates and adapts itself to t h e demands of obtaining circumstances. It is written for all seasons, except for very unusual instancesth at h uman ratiocination cannot justify to be contemplated by its language even if readin its broadest sense and in t h e most liberal way. V erily, it is paramount and supreme inpeace and in war, but even in peace grave critical situations arise demanding recourseto extraordinary solutions. Parap h rasing t h e Spanis h adage, " Grandes males, grandesremedios " , suc h in ordinary problems justify exceptional remedies. And so, h istoryrecords t h at in t h e face of grave crises and emergencies, t h e most constitutionallyIdealistic countries h ave, at one time or anot h er, under t h e pressure of pragmatic

considerations, adopted corresponding realistic measures, wh

ich

perilously teth

er alongth e perip h ery of t h eir C h arters, to t h e extent of creating impressions, of courseerroneous, t h at t h e same h ad been transgressed, alt h oug h in trut h th eir integrity andimperiousness remained undiminis h ed and unimpaired.

Th e P h ilippines h as but recently h ad its own experience of suc h constitutionalapproac h . W h en martial law was proclaimed h ere in 1972, t h ere were t h ose w h ovociferously s h outed not only t h at t h e President h ad acted arbitrarily and wit h out t h e -required factual bases contemplated in t h e Commander-in-C h ief clause of t h e 1935Constitution, but more, t h at h e h ad gone beyond t h e traditional and universallyrecognized intent of said clause by utilizing h is martial law powers not only to maintain

peace and tranquility and preserve and defend th

e integrity and security of th

e state butto establis h a New Society Th e critics contended t h at martial law is only for nationalsecurity, not for t h e imposition of national discipline under a New Society.

Due to its relevancy to Our present discussion, it is well for everyone to bear in mindth at in t h is jurisdiction, t h is concept of martial law h as already been up h eld severaltimes by t h is Court. 1, for one, accepted suc h a construction because I firmly believeth at to impose martial law for t h e sole end of suppressing an insurrection or rebellionwith out coincidentally taking corresponding measures to eradicate t h e root causes of th e uprising is utter folly, for t h e country would still continue to lay open to itsrecurrence.

I h ave made t h e foregoing discourse, for it is fundamentally in t h e fig h t of t h is Court'sdoctrines about t h e imposition of martial law as I h ave stated t h at I prefer to base t h isconcurrence. T o put it differently, if indeed t h ere could be some doubt as to t h ecorrectness of t h is Court's judgment t h at Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional,particularly its Section 44, I am convinced t h at t h e critical situation of our judiciary todaycalls for solutions t h at may not in t h e eyes of some conform strictly wit h th e letter of t h eConstitution but indubitably justified by its spirit and intent. As 1 h ave earlier indicated,


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th e C h arter is not just a construction of words to w h ose literal iron-clad meanings wemust feel h idebound wit h out regard to every Constitution's desirable in h erent nature of adjustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so t h at t h e spirit and fundamentalintent and objectives of t h e framers may remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one suc h adaptation t h at comes h andy for t h e attainment of t h e transcendental objectives it seeks

to pursue Wh

ile, to be sure, ith

as th

e effect of factually easing out some justices and judges before t h e end of t h eir respective constitutional tenure sans t h e usualadministrative investigation, t h e desirable end is ac h ieved t h ru means t h at, in t h e lig h t of th e prevailing conditions, is constitutionally permissible.

Before closing, it may not be amiss for me to point out t h at Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,aside from w h at h as been discussed about its effect on t h e guarantees of judicialindependence, also preempts, in some of its provisions, t h e primary rule-making power of t h e Supreme Court in respect to procedure, practice and evidence. Wit h th e pardonof my colleagues, I would just like to say t h at t h e Court s h ould not decry t h isdevelopment too muc h . After all, t h e legislature is expressly empowered by t h e C h arter

to do so, (Section 5(5), Article X of th

e Constitution of 1973) so much

so, th

at I doubt if th e Court h as any aut h ority to alter or modify any rule t h e Batasang Pambansaenunciates. T rut h to tell, as C h airman of t h e Committee on t h e Revision of t h e Rules of Court, for one reason or anot h er, principally t h e lack of a clear consensus as to w h atsome of my colleagues consider very radical proposals voiced by me or my committee,We h ave regrettably procrastinated long enoug h in making our procedural rules morepractical and more conducive to speedier disposal and termination of controversies bydealing more wit h substantial justice.

So also h ave We, it must be confessed, failed to come up to expectations of t h e framersof t h e Constitution in our ways of disposing of administrative complaints against erring

and misconducting judges. Of course, We can excuse Ourselves with

th

e explanationth at not only are We overloaded wit h work beyond h uman capability of its beingperformed expeditiously, but t h at t h e strict requisites of due process w h ich are timeconsuming h ave precluded Us from being more expeditious and speedy.

I feel I must say all of t h ese, because if t h e above-discussed circumstances h ave notcombined to create a very critical situation in our judiciary t h at is making t h e people loseits fait h and confidence in t h e administration of justice by t h e existing courts, per h apsth e Court could look wit h more sympat h y at t h e stand of petitioners. I want all t h esundry to know, h owever, t h at notwit h standing t h is decision, t h e independence of t h e

judiciary in t h e P h ilippines is far from being insubstantial, muc h less meaningless anddead. Batas Pambansa 129 h as precisely opened our eyes to h ow, despite doubts andmisgivings, t h e Constitution can be so construed as to make it possible for t h ose inaut h ority to answer t h e clamor of t h e people for an uprig h t judiciary and overcomeconstitutional roadblocks more apparent t h an real.

T o t h ose justices, judges, members of t h e bar and concerned citizens w h ose eyes maybe dimming wit h tears of disappointment and disenc h antment because of t h e stand Ih ave c h osen to adopt in t h ese cases, may I try to assuage t h em by joining t h eir fervent


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prayers t h at some ot h er day, h opefully in t h e near future, Divine Providence may dictateto anot h er constitutional convention to write t h e guarantees of judicial independencewith ink of deeper h ue and words t h at are definite, clear, unambiguous and unequivocal,in drawing t h e line of demarcation between t h e Parliament and t h e Judiciary in t h emanner t h at in His Infinite wisdom would most promote genuine and impartial justice for

our people, free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but evenfrom t h e tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of t h e political powers t h at be.Presently, I am constrained from going along wit h any ot h er view t h an t h at t h eConstitution allows abolition of existing courts even if t h e effect h as to be t h e eliminationof any incumbent judge and t h e consequent cutting of h is constitutional tenure of office.

I cannot close t h is concurrence wit h out referring to t h e appre h ensions in some quartersabout t h e c h oice t h at will ultimately be made of t h ose w h o will be eased out of t h e

judiciary in t h e course of t h e implementation of Batas Pambansa 129. By t h is decision,th e Court h as in factual effect albeit not in constitutional conception yielded generally toth e Batasang Pambansa, and more specifically to t h e President, its own constitutionally

conferred power of removal of judges. Section 44 of th

e Batasan's Act declares th

at allof t h em s h all be deemed to h ave ceased to h old office, leaving it to t h e President toappoint t h ose w h om h e may see fit to occupy t h e new courts. Th us, t h ose w h o will notbe appointed can be considered as "ceasing to h old t h eir respective offices", or, asoth ers would say t h ey would be in fact removed. How t h e President will make h isch oices is beyond Our power to control. But even if some may be eased out evenwith out being duly informed of t h e reason t h erefor, muc h less being given t h eopportunity to be h eard t h e past actuations of t h e President on all matters of deeppublic interest s h outed serve as sufficient assurance t h at w h en lie ultimately acts, h ewill faith fully ad h ere to h is solemn oat h "to do justice to every man h ence, lie will equiph imself first wit h th e fullest reliable information before acts. Th is is not only my individualfaith founded on my personal acquaintance wit h th e c h aracter and sterling qualities of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. I dare say t h is is t h e fait h of t h e nation in a man w h oh as led it successfully t h roug h crises and emergencies, wit h justice to all, wit h malicetowards none. I am certain, t h e President will deal wit h eac h and every individual to beaffected by t h is reorganization wit h th e best lig h t th at God will give h im every momenth e acts in eac h individual case as it comes for h is decision

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur in t h e result. Th e petitioners filed t h is petition for declaratory relief andpro h ibition "to declare t h e Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg.129) unconstitutional".

Th e petition s h ould h ave been dismissed outrig h t because t h is Court h as no jurisdictionto grant declaratory relief and pro h ibition is not t h e proper remedy to test t h econstitutionality of t h e law. t h e petition is premature. No jurisdictional question isinvolved.


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Th ere is no justiciable controversy w h erein t h e constitutionality of t h e said law is inissue. It is presumed to be constitutional. Th e lawmaking body before enacting it lookedinto t h e constitutional angle.

Seven of t h e eig h t petitioners are practising lawyers. Th ey h ave no personality to assail

th

e constitutionality of th

e said law even as taxpayers.Th e eig h th petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a city judge (w h o in 1977 filed a petitionfor declaratory relief assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229, w h ich called for areferendum. De la Llana h is Comelec, 80 SCRA 525), h as no cause of action for pro h ibition. He is not being removed from h is position.

Th e Judiciary Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good fait h and not "to cloakan unconstitutional and evil purpose As ably expounded by t h e C h ief Justice, inenacting t h e said law, t h e lawmaking body acted wit h in th e scope of its constitutionalpowers and prerogatives.

GUERRERO, J., concurring:

I concur wit h my distinguis h ed and learned colleagues in up h olding t h e constitutionalityof t h e Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. For t h e record, h owever, I would like tostate my personal convictions and observations on t h is case, a veritable landmark case,for w h atever t h ey may be wort h .

Th e legal basis of t h e Court's opinion rendered by our esteemed C h ief Justice h aving

been exh

austively discussed and decisively justified byh

im, ah

igh

ly-respected expertand aut h ority on constitutional law, it would be an exercise in duplication to reiterate t h esame cases and precedents. I am t h en constrained to approac h th e problem quitedifferently, not t h roug h th e classic met h ods of p h ilosop h y, h istory and tradition, butfollowing w h at t h e well-known jurist, Dean Pound, said t h at "t h e most significantadvance in t h e modern science of law is t h e c h ange from t h e analytical to t h e functionalattitude." 1 And in pursuing t h is direct

ion, I must also reckon wit h and rely on t h e ruling t h at "anot h er guide to t h e meaning of a statute is found in t h e evil w h ich it is designed to remedy, and for t h is t h e courtproperly looks at contemporaneous events, t h e situation as it existed, and as it was

pressed upon th

e attention of th

e legislative body."2

I h ave no doubt in my mind t h at t h e institutional reforms and c h anges envisioned by t h elaw are clearly conducive to t h e promotion of national interests. Th e objectives of t h elegislation namely: (a) An institutional restructuring by t h e creation of an Intermediate

Appellate Court, t h irteen (I 3) Regional T rial Courts, Metropolitan T rial Courts, MunicipalT rial Courts and Municipal Circuit T rial Courts: (b) A reappointment of jurisdictiongeared towards greater efficiency: (c) A simplification of procedures and (d) Th e


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abolition of t h e inferior courts created by t h e Judiciary Act of 1948 and ot h er statutes, asapproved by t h e Congress of t h e P h ilippines 3 are undoubtedly intended to improve t h eregime of justice and t h ereby en h ance public good and order. Indeed, t h e purpose of th e Act as furt h er stated in t h e Explanatory Note, w h ich is "to embody reforms in t h estructure, organization and composition of t h e Judiciary, wit h th e aim of improving t h e

administration of justice, of decongesting judicial dockets, and coping with

th

e morecomplex problems on t h e present and forseeable future cannot but "promote t h e welfareof society, since t h at is t h e final cause of law. 4

Hence, from t h e standpoint of Th e general utility and functional value of t h e JudiciaryReorganization Act, t h ere s h ould be no difficulty, doubt or disbelief in its legality andconstitutionality. Th at t h ere are ills and evils plaguing t h e judicial system is undeniable.Th e notorious and scandalous congestion of court dockets as too well-known to beignored as are t h e causes w h ich create and produce suc h anomaly. Evident is t h e needto look for devices and measures t h at are more practical, workable and economical. 5

From th

e figures alone (301,497 pending cases in 1976; 351, 943 in 1977; 404, 686 in1978; 426, 911 in 1979; 441, 332 in 1980; and 450, 063 as of February 3, 1982) 6 th econgested c h aracter of court dockets rising year after year is staggering and enormous,looming like a legal monster.

But greater t h an t h e need to dispense justice speedily and promptly is t h e necessity toh ave Justices and Judges w h o are fair and impartial, h onest and incorruptible,competent and efficient. Th e general clamor t h at t h e prestige of t h e Judiciary today h asdeteriorated and degenerated to t h e lowest ebb in public estimation is not wit h outfactual basis. Records in t h e Supreme Court attest to t h e unfitness and incompetence,corruption and immorality of many dispensers of justice. According to t h e compiled data,

th

e total number of Justices and Judges against wh

om administrative ch

argesh

avebeen filed for various offenses, misconduct, venalities and ot h er irregularities reac h es322 . Of t h is total, 8 are Justices of t h e Court of Appeals, 119 CFI Judges, 2 CriminalCircuit Judges, 8 CAR Judges, 1 Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court Judge, 38 CityJudges, and 146 Municipal Judges.

Th e Supreme Court h as found 10 2 of th em guilty and punis h ed t h em wit h eit h er suspension, admonition, reprimand or fine. Th e number includes 1 CA Justice, 35 CFIJudges, 1 CCC Judge, 3 CAR Judges, 1 JDRC Judge, 9 City Judges and 53 MunicipalJudges.

Seventeen (17) Judges h ave been ordered dismissed and separated from t h e service. And t h ese are 3 CFI, 1 CAR, 1 City Judge and 12 Municipal Judges.

Going over t h ese administrative proceedings, it took an average of two-year period fromth e filing of t h e c h arge to t h e dismissal of t h e respondent. In one case, t h e proceedingswere terminated after seven years. How long t h e pending administrative cases will bedisposed of, only time will tell as an increasing number of administrative cases arebeing filed by victims of judicial misconduct, abuse and arbitrariness.


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It is conceded t h at t h e abolition of an office is legal if attendant wit h good fait h . 15 Th equestion of good fait h th en is t h e crux of t h e conflict at bar. Good fait h in th e enactmentof t h e law does not refer to t h e wisdom of t h e measure, t h e propriety of t h e Act, or to itsexpediency. Th e questions raised by petitioners and amicus curiae for t h eir cause, viz: Wh y abolis h all t h e courts W h y legislate out t h e judges W h y not amend t h e Rules of

Court only Is abolition of all courts th

e proper remedy to weed out corrupt and misfits inour Judiciary? may not be inquired into by Us. "It is not t h e province of t h e courts tosupervise legislation and keep it wit h in t h e bounds of propriety and common sense.Th at is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." 16 Th e Courts "are not supposedto override legitimate policy and ... never inquire into t h e wisdom of t h e law." 17 Ch ief Justice Fernando w h o penned t h e Morfe decision, writes t h at w h ile "(i)t is t h us settled,to parap h rase C h ief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, th atonly congressional power or competence, not t h e wisdom of t h e action taken, may beth e basis for declaring a statute invalid," 18 h e adds t h at it is "useful to recall w h at was soclearly stated by Laurel t h at 't h e Judiciary in t h e determination of actual cases andcontroversies must reflect t h e wisdom and justice of t h e people as expressed t h roug h

th

eir representatives in th

e executive and legislative departments of th

e government.'"19

In any case, petitioners h ave not s h own an iota of proof of bad fait h . Th ere is no factualfoundation of bad fait h on record. And I do not consider t h e statement in t h esponsors h ip speec h for Cabinet Bill No. 42 of Minister of Justice Ricardo J. Puno t h atth e Bill would be a more efficient ve h icle of "eliminating incompetent and unfit Judges asindicative of impermissible legislative motive. 20

It may be true t h at w h ile t h e remedy or solution formulated by t h e legislation willeradicate h opefully or at least minimize t h e evils and ills t h at infect and pester t h e

judicial body, it will result in t h e actual removal of t h e Justices of t h e Court of Appealsand Judges of t h e lower courts. It is also true t h at w h et h er it is termed abolition of officeor removal from office, t h e end-result is t h e same termination of t h e services of t h eseincumbents. Indeed, t h e law may be h ars h , but t h at is t h e law. Dura lex sed lex .

Th e Justices and Judges directly affected by t h e law, being lawyers, s h ould know or areexpected to know t h e nature and concept of a public office. It is created for t h e purposeof effecting t h e ends for w h ich government h as been instituted, w h ich are for t h ecommon good, and not t h e profit, h onor or private interest of any one man, family or class of men. In our form of government, it is fundamental t h at public offices are publictrust, and t h at t h e person to be appointed s h ould be selected solely wit h a view to t h epublic welfare. 21 In th e last analysis, a public office is a privilege in t h e gift of t h e State.22

Th ere is no suc h th ing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absoluterigh t to h old office. Excepting constitutional offices w h ich provide for special immunity asregards salary and tenure, no one can be said to h ave any vested rig h t in an office or itssalary. W h en an office is created by t h e Constitution, it cannot be abolis h ed by t h elegislature, but w h en created by t h e State under t h e aut h ority of t h e Constitution, it maybe abolis h ed by statute and t h e incumbent deprived of h is office. 23 Acceptance of a

judicial appointment must be deemed as ad h erence to t h e rule t h at "w h en t h e court isabolis h ed, any unexpired term is abolis h ed also. Th e Judge of suc h a court takes office


26/91

with th at encumbrance and knowledge." 24 "Th e Judge's rig h t to h is full term and h is fullsalary are not dependent alone upon h is good conduct, but also upon t h e contingencyth at t h e legislature may for t h e public good, in ordaining and establis h ing t h e courts,from time to time consider h is office unnecessary and abolis h it." 25

The removal from office of t

he incumbent t

hen is merely incidental to t

he valid act of abolition of t h e office as demanded by t h e superior and paramount interest of t h e

people. Th e bad and t h e crooked Judges must be removed. Th e good and t h e straig h t,sober Judges s h ould be reappointed but t h at is t h e sole power and prerogative of t h ePresident w h o, I am certain, will act according to t h e best interest of t h e nation and inaccordance wit h h is solemn oat h of office "to preserve and defend its Constitution,execute its laws, do justice to everyone ... " Th ere and t h en t h e proper balance betweenth e desire to preserve private interest and t h e desideratum of promoting t h e public goods h all h ave been struck. 26

Th e Supreme Court h as been called t h e conscience of t h e Constitution. It may be t h e

last bulwark of constitutional government.27

It Must,h

owever, be remembered "th

atlegislatures are ultimate guardians of t h e liberties and welfare of t h e people in quite asgreat a degree as courts." 28 Th e responsibility of up h olding t h e Constitution rests not onth e courts alone but on t h e legislatures as well. It ad h eres, t h erefore, to t h e well-settledprinciple t h at "all reasonable doubts s h ould be resolved in favor of t h e constitutionalityof a statute" for w h ich reason it will not set aside a law as violative of t h e Constitution"except in a clear case." 29

Finally, I view t h e controversy presented to Us as a conflict of opinions on judicialindependence, w h et h er impaired or strengt h ened by t h e law; on reorganization of t h ecourts, w h et h er abolition of office or removal t h erefrom, and on delegation of legislative

power, wh

eth

er auth

orized or unauth

orized. With

out detracting from th

e merits, th

eforce and brilliance of t h eir advocacies based on logic, h istory and precedents, I c h ooseto stand on t h e social justification and t h e functional utility of t h e law to up h old itsconstitutionality. In t h e lig h t of contemporaneous events from w h ich th e New Republicemerged and evolved new Ideals of national growt h and development, particularly inlaw and government, a kind or form of judicial activism, per h aps similar to it, isnecessary to justify as t h e ratio decidendi of Our judgment.

Th is is t h e time and t h e moment to perform a constitutional duty to affix my imprimatur and affirmance to t h e law, h opefully an act of proper judicial statesmans h ip.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I agree wit h th e learned C h ief Justice of t h e P h ilippines t h at Batas Pambansa Blg. 129is not unconstitutional. Unlike Oscar Wilde, I c h oose not to yield to temptation byembellis h ing my concurrence lest I be accrued of bringing coal to Newcastle.

Accordingly, I will simply vote to dismiss t h e petition


27/91

However, I cannot agree wit h th e C h ief Justice w h en h e says:

... In t h e implementation of t h e assailed legislation, t h erefore it s h ould be in accordancewith accepted principles of constitutional construction t h at as far as incumbent justicesand judges are concerned, t h is Court be consulted and t h at its view be accorded t h efullest consideration. Th ere would be no plausibility t h en to t h e allegation t h at t h ere is an

unconstitutional taint to t h e c h allenged Act. Moreover, suc h a construction would be inaccordance wit h th e basic principle t h at in t h e c h oice of alternatives between one w h ich would save and anot h er w h ich would invalidate a statute, t h e former is to be preferred.

It h as already been ruled t h at t h e statute does not suffer from any constitutional infirmitybecause t h e abolition of certain judicial offices was done in good fait h . Th is being t h ecase, I believe t h at t h e Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power to fill t h enewly created judicial positions wit h out any obligation to consult wit h th is Court and toaccord its views t h e fullest consideration. T o require consultation will constitute aninvasion of executive territory w h ich can be resented and even repelled. Th e implicitsuggestion t h at t h ere could be an unconstitutional implementation of t h e questionedlegislation is not congruent wit h th e basic conclusion t h at it is not unconstitutional.

DE CASTRO, J., concurring:

I concur in t h e declaration t h at t h e law is not unconstitutional.

May I, h owever, submit t h is separate opinion more to avoid being misunderstood by mybret h ren in t h e judiciary as not feeling for t h em as muc h concern as I s h ould for t h eir security of tenure w h ich is raised as t h e main argument against t h e constitutionality of th e law, t h an by way of giving added force or support to t h e main opinion so well-writtenby Our learned C h ief Justice in h is usual sc h olarly fas h ion. I, t h erefore, limit myself to adiscussion t h at t h e assailed statue is not unconstitutional wit h out h aving to suggest h owit may be implemented in order t h at it could stand t h e most rigid test of constitutionality,for in t h at area, w h at is involved is purely an executive act of t h e President in w h osewisdom, patriotism and sense of justice We s h ould trust in h ow h e would fulfill h is swornduties to see t h at t h e laws are fait h fully executed and to do justice to every man.

Moreover, w h ile I also concur in t h e dismissal of t h e petition, I do so on t h e additionalground t h at petitioners h ave not fulfilled all t h e requisites for t h e exercise by t h is Courtof its power of judicial inquiry t h e power to declare a law unconstitutional.

I

Th e creation and organization of courts inferior to t h e Supreme Court is a constitutionalprerogative of t h e legislature. Th is prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies t h epower to reorganize said courts, and in t h e process, abolis h th em to give way to new or substantially different ones. T o contend ot h erwise would be to forget a basic doctrine of constitutional law t h at no irrepealable laws s h all be passed. 1


28/91

Th e power to create courts and organize t h em is necessarily t h e primary aut h ority fromwh ich would t h ereafter arise t h e security of tenure of t h ose appointed to perform t h efunctions of said courts. in t h e natural order of t h ings, t h erefore, since t h e occasion tospeak of security of tenure of judges arises only after t h e courts h ave first been broug h tinto being, t h e rig h t to security of tenure takes a secondary position to t h e basic and

primary power of creating th

e courts to provide for a fair and strong judicial system. If th e legislature, in t h e exercise of its aut h ority, deems it wise and urgent to provide for anew set of courts, and in doing so, it feels t h e abolition of t h e old courts would conducemore to its objective of improving t h e judiciary and raising its standard, t h e matter involved is one of policy and wisdom into w h ich th e courts, not even t h e Supreme Court,cannot inquire, muc h less interfere wit h . By t h is secondary position it h as to t h e primarypower of t h e legislature to create courts, t h e security of tenure given to t h e incumbentss h ould not be a legal impediment to t h e exercise of t h at basic power of creating t h estatutory courts w h ich , by necessary implication, includes t h e power to abolis h th em inorder to create new ones. Th is primary legislative power is a continuing one, and t h eresultant rig h t of security of tenure of t h ose appointed to said courts could not bring

about th

e exh

austion of th

at power. Unquestionably, th

e legislature can repeal its ownlaws, and t h at power can never be ex h austed wit h out, as a consequence, violating afundamental precept of constitutional and representative government t h at noirrepealable laws s h all be passed.

If th e creation of courts is a legislative prerogative t h eir abolition is, t h erefore, a matter of legislative intent. it involves t h e exercise of legislative power, an act of legislationwh ich generally concerns policy in t h e formation of w h ich th e courts h ave no sayInitially, w h en t h e legislature creates t h e courts, it suffers from no limitation arising fromth e necessity or respecting t h e security of tenure of judges w h o are not yea t h ere. Th isinh erent c h aracter of fullness and plenitude of t h e power to create and abolis h courtsdoes not c h ange w h en t h at same power is once more exercised t h ereafter, as t h e needth erefor is felt. W h ich only goes to s h ow t h at w h en done in good fait h and motivatedsolely by t h e good and t h e well-being of t h e people, t h e exercise of t h e power is notmeant to be restricted, curtailed, muc h less ex h austed by t h e so-called judicial securityof tenure.

Th e passage of t h e Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is no more t h an t h e exerciseof t h e power vested by t h e Constitution on t h e legislative body of t h e Republic asdescribed above. Th at power carries wit h it th e duty and responsibility of providing t h epeople wit h th e most effective and efficient system of administration of justice. Th is is byfar of more imperative and transcedental importance t h an t h e security of tenure of

judges w h ich , admittedly, is one of t h e factors t h at would conduce to independence of th e judiciary but first of all, a good, efficient and effective judiciary. A judiciary wantingin t h ese basic qualities does not deserve t h e independence t h at is meant only for a

judiciary t h at can serve best t h e interest and welfare of t h e people w h ich is t h e mostprimordial and paramount consideration, not a judiciary in w h ich th e people's fait h h asbeen eroded, a condition w h ich th e security of tenure, in some instances, may even becontributory.


29/91

In enacting t h e Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, t h e legislature is presumed toh ave been motivated by no ot h er objective t h an to provide t h e people t h e kind of judicialmac h inery t h at would best serve t h eir interest and welfare, in its belief t h at t h e presentmac h inery is falling s h ort of t h at measure of public service. It s h ould, likewise, bepresumed t h at it h as been led to t h is low estimate of t h e utility and effectiveness of t h e

present set-up of th

e judiciary after informing itself, with

th

e facilities at its command,suc h as t h e power of legislative investigation, of t h e actual condition of t h e courts,particularly as to w h et h er t h ey continue to enjoy t h e trust, fait h and confidence of t h epublic, and w h at t h e cause or causes are of t h eir erosion, if not loss, as is t h e keenlyperceptible feeling of t h e people in general. Responsibility for t h is more or lessextensive slowdown of t h e delivery of judicial service can be laid on no ot h er t h an eit h er of t h e two components of a court t h e procedural laws or rules t h at govern t h eworkings of t h e courts, or t h e persons executing or applying t h em or bot h .

Wh en two interests conflict as w h at h ad given rise to t h e present controversy t h e duty of th e legislature to provide society wit h a fair, efficient and effective judicial system, on

oneh

and, and th

e righ

t of judges to security of tenure, on th

e oth

er, th

e latter must of necessity yield to t h e former. One involves public welfare and interest more directly andon a greater magnitude t h an t h e rig h t of security of tenure of t h e judges w h ich is, as iseasily discernible, more of a personal benefit to just a few, as indeed only t h e judgeaffected could seek judicial redress of w h at h e conceives to be its violation.

Herein lies t h e propriety of t h e exercise of "police power" of t h e State, if t h is conceptwh ich underlies even t h e Constitution, h as to be invoked as a constitutional justificationof t h e passage of t h e Act in question. Th at is, if a conflict between t h e primary power of th e legislature to create courts, and mere consequential benefit accorded to judges and

justices after t h e creation of t h e courts is indeed perceivable, w h ich th e writer fails to

see, or, at least, would disappear upon a reconciliation of th

e two apparently conflictinginterests w h ich , from t h e above disquisition is not h ard to find. It is, wit h out doubt, in t h eessence of t h e exercise of police power t h at a rig h t assertable by individuals may beinfringed in t h e greater interest of t h e public good and general welfare. Th is isdemonstrated in h ow t h e rig h ts and freedoms enumerated in t h e Bill of Rig h ts enjoyableby Th e entire people, not just by a h andful in comparison, are made subject to t h e lawfulexercise of t h e police power of t h e State.

V iewed, t h erefore, from t h e above-mentioned perspective, t h e general revamp of t h e judiciary involving bot h its components t h e court as an office or institution, and t h e judges and justices t h at man t h em s h ould not find any legal obstacle in t h e securityof tenure of judges. Th is security, after all, is no more t h an as provided for all ot h er officials and employees in t h e civil service of t h e government in Section 3, Article XII-Bof t h e Constitution w h ich provides:

No officer or employees in t h e civil service s h all be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law.

Th e provision of Article X V II, Section 10 of t h e Constitution gives to judicial officials nomore t h an a guarantee t h at t h eir retirement age as fixed in t h e Constitution s h all not be


30/91

alterable at mere legislative pleasure. Th e equivalent provision in t h e 1935 Constitutionwas inserted for t h e first time because t h e retirement age before t h en was providedmerely by statute not by t h e Constitution. If it comes to t h eir removal or suspension,wh at gives t h em constitutional protection is t h e aforequoted provision w h ich does notcontemplate abolition of office w h en done in good fait h , for removal implies t h e

existence of th

e office, not wh

en it is abolish

ed. Admittedly, ash

as beenh

eld, abolitionof office for no reason related to public welfare or for t h e good of t h e service, let alonewh en done in bad fait h , amounts to an unlawful removal. 2 Th e abolition of t h e courts asdeclared in t h e Act as a result of a reorganization of t h e judiciary, as t h e T itle of t h e lawcurtly but announces, can by no means, from any viewpoint, be so branded. Andwh et h er by said reorganization, t h e present would be deemed abolis h ed, as t h e lawexpresses suc h an unmistakable intent, t h e matter is one for t h e sole and exclusivedetermination of t h e legislature. It rests entirely on its discretion w h et h er by t h e natureand extent of t h e c h anges it h as introduced, it h as done enoug h to consider t h emabolis h ed. T o give t h e Supreme Court t h e power to determine t h e extent or nature of th e c h anges as to t h eir structure, distribution and jurisdiction, before t h e clear intent to

abolish

th

em, or to declare th

em so abolish

ed, is given effect, would be to allow undueinterference in t h e function of legislation. Th is would be contrary to t h e primary duty of courts precisely to give effect to t h e legislative intent as expressed in t h e law or as mybe discovered t h erefrom.

From t h e above observation, it would be futile to insist t h at t h e present courts would noteffectively be abolis h ed by t h e Act in question. it mig h t be to arrogate power for Us tosay t h at t h e c h anges t h e law brings to t h e present judicial system, do not suffice for t h isCourt to give effect to t h e clear intent of t h e legislative body. W h ere would t h e agrariancourts, t h e circuit criminal courts, t h e JDRC's be in t h e judicial structure as envisionedby t h e law? Are t h ey not abolis h ed by merger wit h th e regional trial courts, w h ich bysuc h merger, and by t h e ot h er c h anges introduced by t h e law, would make said courtsdifferent from t h e present Courts of First Instance w h ich , as a consequence, may t h enbe considered abolis h ed Integrated as t h e present courts are supposed to be, c h angessomew h ere in t h e judicial mac h inery would necessarily affect t h e entire system.

Th e fact t h at t h e Supreme Court may specially assign courts to function as t h e specialcourts just mentioned, does not mean t h at t h e c h anges wroug h t are only superficial or "cosmetic" as t h is term h as been used so often in t h e oral argument. Wit h out t h e newlaw, t h ese courts will remain fixed and permanent w h ere t h ey are at present. Yet in t h ecourse of time, t h e need for t h eir independent existence may disappear, or t h at bych anged conditions, w h ere t h ey are needed at present at a certain place, t h e need for th em may be somew h ere else in later years, if maximum benefit at t h e least expense isto be ac h ieved, as always s h ould be a most desirable goal and objective of government.

Demonstrably t h en, t h e abolition of t h e courts is a matter of legislative intent into w h ich no judicial inquiry is proper, except per h aps if t h ey intent is so palpably tainted wit h constitutional repugnancy, w h ich is not so in t h e instant case. We h ave, t h erefore, nooccasion, as earlier intimated, to speak of removal of judges w h en t h e reorganization of th e judiciary would result in t h e abolition of t h e courts ot h er t h an t h e Supreme Court and


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th e Court of T ax Appeals. Hence, t h e provision of t h e Constitution giving to t h eSupreme Court power to dismiss a judge by a vote of eig h t justices does not come intoth e vortex of t h e instant controversy. Its possible violation by t h e assailed statute cannoth appen, and may, t h erefore, not constitute an argument against t h e constitutionality of th e law.

Former Justice Barrera, in a speec h before t h e P h ilippine Bar Association, 3 impliedlyindorsed t h e judicial revamp w h en h e enumerated t h e qualities of a good judge t h at t h eappointing power s h ould consider in making new appointments to t h e judiciary upon itsreorganization pursuant to t h e questioned Act. Th e words of t h e eminent jurist may wellreflect t h e favorable reaction of t h e public in general to w h at t h e Act aim to ac h ieve inth e name of good and clean government. Th e present judicial incumbents, w h o h avenot in any way, by t h eir acts and be h avior w h ile in office, tarnis h ed t h e good image t h atth e judiciary s h ould h ave, t h erefore, h ave no cause for appre h ension t h at w h at t h ey areentitled to under t h e Constitution by way of security of tenure wig be denied t h em,considering t h e publicly known aim and purpose of t h e massive judicial revamp,

specially as ch

erish

ed with

deep concern by th

e President wh

o initiated th

e move wh

enh e created t h e Judiciary Reorganization Committee to recommend needed andappropriate judicial reforms.

If th e only obstacle to a verdict in favor of constitutionality of t h e law is its possible effectof impairing t h e security of tenure of t h e incumbents, We may h ave t h e following facts toconsider:

1. Under t h e 1973 Constitution all incumbent judges and justices may continue in officeuntil replaced or reappointed by t h e President. As to t h ose judicial officials, no securityof tenure, in t h e traditional concept, attac h es to t h eir incumbency w h ich is, in a real

sense, only ah

oldover tenure. How th

e Presidenth

as exercised th

is immense power with admirable restraint s h ould serve as t h e strongest guarantee of h ow justice andfairness will be h is sole guide in implementing t h e law.

2. As to t h e rest of t h e incumbents, t h ey are all appointees of Our present President,and h e s h ould feel concerned more t h an anyone else to protect w h atever rig h ts t h eymay rig h tfully claim to maintain t h eir official standing and integrity. Th ey need h ave nofear of being ignored for no reason at all, muc h less for mere spirit of vindictiveness or lack of nobility of h eart.

From t h e foregoing, it would become apparent t h at only in t h e implementation of t h e lawmay t h ere possibly be a taint of constitutional repugnancy as w h en a judge of acknowledged h onesty, industry and competence is separated, because an act of arbitrariness would t h ereby be committed, but t h e abolition of t h e courts as decreed byth e law is not by itself or per se unconstitutional.

Consequently, t h e law, t h e result of serious and concerned study by a h igh ly competentcommittee, deserves to be given a c h ance to prove its wort h in th e way of improving t h e

judiciary. If in its implementation, any one, if at all, feels aggrieved, h e can always seek


32/91

judicial redress, if h e can make out a case of violation of h is rig h t of security of tenurewith uncontrovertible clarity, as w h en t h e separation is very arbitrary in t h e peculiar circumstances of h is case, for an act of arbitrariness, under any constitution, isunpardonable.

This petition s

hould also be dismissed for being premature, as is t

he stand of Justice Aquino. Th e petition asks t h is Court to exercise its power of judicial inquiry, t h e power to

declare a law unconstitutional w h en it conflicts wit h th e fundamental law (People vs.V era, 65 P h il. 56). Th is power h as well-defined limits, for it can be exercised only w h enth e following requisites are present, to wit: (1) Th ere must be an actual case or controversy; (2) Th e question of constitutionality must be raised by t h e proper party; (3)He s h ould do so at t h e earliest opportunity, and (4) Th e determination of t h econstitutionality of t h e statute must be necessary to a final determination of t h e case.

I am of t h e opinion t h at t h e petition does not present an actual controversy nor was itfiled by t h e proper parties.

Th e main ground for w h ich th e constitutionality of t h e Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is assailed is t h at it is violative of t h e security of tenure of justices and judges. Th eonly persons w h o could raise t h e question of constitutionality of t h e law are, t h erefore,th e actual incumbents of t h e courts w h o would be separated from t h e service upon t h eabolition of t h e courts affected by t h e law, on t h e t h eory as advanced by petitioners t h atth eir judicial security of tenure would be violated. Olongapo City Judge de la Llana, t h eonly judge among t h e petitioners, h as not been separated from t h e service. Nor is h isseparation already a certainty, for h e may be appointed to t h e court equivalent to h ispresent court, or even promoted to a h igh er court. Only w h en it h as become certain t h ath is tenure h as been terminated will an actual controversy arise on h is allegation of a

fact th

ath

as become actual, not merely probable or h

ypoth

etical.Th e present petition may neit h er be allowed as a taxpayer suit. A taxpayer may bring anaction to raise t h e question of constitutionality of a statute only w h en no one else canmore appropriately bring t h e suit to defend a rig h t exclusively belonging to h im, and.th erefore, would localize t h e actual injury to h is person, and to no ot h er. For a "proper party" to invoke t h e power of judicial inquiry, as one of t h e requisites in t h e exercise of suc h power, does not mean one h aving no better rig h t, one more personalized, t h anwh at h e h as as a member of t h e public in general. Wit h th e incumbent judgesundoubtedly being t h e ones under petitioners' t h eory, w h o would suffer direct and actualinjury, t h ey s h ould exclude mere taxpayers w h o cannot be said to suffer as "direct" and"actual" an injury as t h e judges and justices by t h e enforcement of t h e assailed statute,from t h e rig h t to bring t h e suit.

Th e validity of t h e foregoing observation becomes more evident w h en We consider t h atonly after t h e fate of t h e present incumbents is known, w h et h er t h ey h ave been actuallyseparated or not, would t h e present courts be declared abolis h ed. For t h e law clearlycontinues t h eir existence until all t h e new courts h ave been filled up wit h newappointments, or at least suc h number as would be equal to t h e number of actual


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incumbents, and t h ey are t h e very courts to w h ich th ey may lay claim to t h e rig h t tocontinue t h erein, so t h at t h e status of eac h and everyone of t h em h as t h ereby beenmade certain. Only t h en, upon t h e actual abolition of t h e courts, may t h ere possibly be aviolation of t h e security of tenure, as contented, t h at would give rise to an "actualcontroversy" in w h ich th e 6 improper party" can be no ot h er t h an t h e judges w h o feel

aggrieved by th

eir non- appointment to th

e new courts.It would, t h erefore, not be proper to declare t h e law void at t h is stage, before it h as evenbeen given a c h ance to prove its wort h , as t h e legislature itself and an t h ose w h oh elped by t h eir ex h austive and sc h olarly study, felt it to be an urgent necessity, andbefore any of t h e proper parties w h o could assail its constitutionality would know for afact, certain and actual, not merely probable or h ypot h etical, t h at t h ey h ave a rig h tviolated by w h at t h ey could possibly contend to be an unconstitutional enforcement of th e law, not by a law t h at is unconstitutional unto itself.

I am, t h erefore, for giving t h e law a c h ance to be put into application so as not to douse

great popular expectations for th

e courts to regain th

eir h

igh

est level of efficiencyh

adreputation for probity. Inevitably, t h is is to be so since only w h en t h e law is fullyimplemented will all t h e courts affected be declared abolis h ed, undoubtedly to avoid aninterregnum w h en t h e country is wit h out any court, except t h e Supreme Court, t h e Courtof T ax Appeals and t h e Sandigan. Only t h en will it be known w h et h er an actualcontroversy would arise because any of t h e incumbents h ave been left out in t h erestructured judiciary.

Th ere would t h en be also a proper party to assail t h e constitutionality of t h e law,conformably to t h e conditions requisite for t h e exercise of t h e power of judicial inquirywh ich by t h eir stringent c h aracter, toget h er wit h th e constitutional prescription of a

comparativelyh

igh

er vote to declare a law unconstitutional, reveal a salutary principle of government t h at a law s h ould, by all reasonable intendment and feasible means, besaved from t h e doom of unconstitutionality, t h e rule corollary t h ereto being t h at if a lawis susceptible to two interpretations, one of w h ich would make it constitutional, t h atinterpretation s h ould be adopted t h at will not kill t h e law.

It is to ad h ere to t h e above principles t h at t h e submission is made h erein, t h at w h ile inth e implementation of t h e law, constitutional repugnancy may not entirely be ruled out, acategorical ruling h ereon not being necessary or desirable at t h e moment, t h e law itself is definitely not unconstitutional. 4 Any of t h e incumbent judges w h o feel injured after t h elaw s h all h ave been implemented h as adequate remedy in law, wit h full relief as wouldbe proper. But surely, t h e benefits envisioned by t h e law in t h e disc h arge of one of t h ebasic duties of government to t h e people t h e administration of justice s h ould notbe sacrificed, as it would be, if t h e law is, as soug h t in t h e present petition, declaredvoid rig h t now, on t h e claim of a few of being allegedly denied a rig h t, at best of doubtfulch aracter, for t h e claim would seem to rest on an unsupportable t h eory t h at t h ey h ave avested rig h t to a public office.


34/91

Just one more point. Th e law in question is not self-executing in t h e sense t h at upon itseffectivity, certain judges and justices cease to be so by direct action of t h e law. Th is iswh at distinguis h es t h e Act in question from R.A. No. 1186 involved in t h e Ocampo case,5 wh ich by its direct action, no act of implementation being necessary, all t h e judgeswh ose positions were abolis h ed, automatically ceased as suc h . Th e Act in question,

th

erefore, is not as exposed to th

e same vulnerability to constitutional attack as R.A. No.1186 was. Yet by t h e operation of t h e Constitution wit h its wise provision on h ow a lawmay be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No. 1186 stood t h e test for it to be enforced toth e fullness of its intent, w h ich was, as in t h e law under consideration, Identified wit h public interest and general welfare, t h roug h a more efficient and effective judicialsystem as t h e Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 seeks to establis h .

Hence, t h e constitutionality of t h e law s h ould not be assailed, and t h e law itself, strikendown, on t h e ground t h at some judges or justices may be removed or separated inviolation of t h eir security of tenure. Th e law does not directly operate wit h Ch at effect. Itis in h ow t h e law would be implemented t h at t h is feared eventuality may or may not

occur. We would th

en be killing th

e law on a mere speculation if We do so at th

is stage.Th is would be an injudicious act done in reckless disregard of t h e safeguards builtaround a law to defend it w h en its constitutionality is attacked; first th e presumption t h ata law is constitutional; second wh en a law is susceptible to two interpretations one t h atwould make it constitutional, t h e ot h er, unconstitutional, t h e former s h ould be adopted;and third , th e Constitution itself w h ich ordains t h at a law may not be declaredunconstitutional except on t h e vote of at least ten (10) members of t h e Supreme Court,more t h an w h at is required for an ordinary decision of t h e Court en banc . Th is is not tomention t h e stringent requisites for t h e exercise of t h e power of judicial inquiry asalready adverted to, all designed to save t h e law from t h e dire fate of unconstitutionality.

To t

he writer, t

he question before t

his Court is a simple matter of c

hoosing betweenprotecting some judges from possible separation, as t h e implementation of t h e law to

ac h ieve its primary purpose of improving t h e judiciary may h ave to result in, or servingth e interest of t h e entire society t h roug h an h onest, efficient and effective judiciary. For,it is unt h inkable t h at w h at is for t h e good of t h e people as a w h ole could h ave beenmeant by t h e Constitution to be sacrificed for t h e sake of only t h e few. Th e greatestgood for t h e greatest number is an unwritten rule, more firm and enduring t h an any of th e postulates spread in our written Constitution. Th is, I mig h t say, is t h e main t h eme of th is separate opinion, ot h erwise expressed in t h e well-known and time- h onored maxim"Salus populi establis h suprema lex."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Th ere is unqualified ad h erence on my part to t h e dismissal of t h e Petition filed in t h iscase. If I am writing t h is separate concurrence, it is merely to state certain views Ientertain in regards to t h e constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.


35/91

Th e controversy in t h is case involves two constitutional provisions. Article X, Section 1,of t h e Organic law provides t h at t h e legislative h as t h e power to establis h inferior Courtsby law. Section 7 of t h e same Article reads:

SEC, 7. Th e Members of t h e Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts s h all h old officeduring good be h avior until t h ey reac h th e age of seventy years or become incapacitatedto disc h arge t h e duties of t h eir office. Th e Supreme Court s h all h ave t h e power todiscipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eig h t Members order t h eir dismissal.

Th ere s h ould be no conflict Between t h e two provisions. Bot h s h ould be h armonized.

1. a) It is a fundamental proposition t h at t h e legislative power to create Courts ordinarilyincludes t h e power to organize and to reorganize t h em, and t h at t h e power to abolis h Courts is generally coextensive wit h th e power to create t h em. Th e power to abolis h was not intended to be qualified by t h e permanence of tenure (Opinion of C h ief JusticeRicardo Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147 [1955], citing McCulley

vs. State, 53 SW 134; Halsey vs. Gaines 2 Lea 316). Th e rig h t of Judges to h old officeduring good be h avior until t h ey reac h th e age of 70 years, or become incapacitated todisc h arge t h e duties of t h eir office, does not deprive Congress of its power to abolis h ,organize or reorganize inferior Courts (Brillo vs. Enage, 94 P h il. 732, 735, citingZandueta vs. de la Costa, 66 P h il. 615; 42 Am. Jur., Pub. Officer, 904-5). Judges of th ose Courts take office wit h th at encumbrance and knowledge.

Th e legislative power to create a court carries wit h it th e power to abolis h it. W h en t h ecourt is abolis h ed any unexpired term is abolis h ed also. Th e judge of suc h court takesoffice wit h th at encumbrance and knowledge. P erkins v. Corbin , 45 Ala 103, 6 Am. Rep.698; State, ex rel. Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165, 54 So 283, et al."

Th e importance and t h e imperative of maintaining t h e independence of t h e Judiciary isundisputed. At t h e same time, t h e power of Congress under t h e Constitution cannot beabridged. For, in t h e last analysis, it is not t h e security of tenure per se th at is t h e onlysafeguard to t h e independence of t h e Judiciary. It is t h e c h aracter and t h e mettle of t h eJudges w h o sit on t h e Benc h . Has not t h e impression been created in t h e public andth at t h ere are t h ose w h o h ave abused t h e prerogatives of t h eir judicial position knowingth at t h ey are untouc h ables by virtue of t h e permanence of t h eir tenure

b) A distinction s h ould be made between tenure of Judges and tenure of Courts.Section 1 h eretofore mentioned refers to t h e "Judiciary" as a fundamental department of Government. Section 7 quoted above refers to t h e tenure of office of "individual" Judges

(inclusive of Justices of inferior Courts t h at is to say, tenure of office is a matter concerning t h e individual Judge. Th is "individuality" c h aracter of Section 7 is supportedby t h e clause t h at t h e Supreme Court h as t h e power to discipline individual judges of inferior Courts.

A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolis h ed.In fact, t h e entire judicial system can be c h anged. If t h at system can no longer admit of ch ange, woe to t h e w h eels of progress and t h e imperatives of growt h in th e


36/91

development of t h e Judiciary. T o h old t h at tenure of Judges is superior to t h e legislativepower to reorganize is to render impotent t h e exercise of t h at power.

It may even be stated t h at, under Section 7, supra , Judges are entailed to t h eir Courts,from w h ich th ey cannot be separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary

action for bad beh

avior. Under Section 1, Courts are not entailed to th

eir Judges,because t h e power of t h e legislative to establis h inferior Courts presupposes t h e power to abolis h th ose Courts. If an inferior Court is abolis h ed, t h e Judge presiding t h at Courtwill necessarily h ave to lose h is position because t h e abolis h ed Court is not entailed toh im.

c) Th e constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges applies only as t h eir Courts exist. Aslong as t h ose Courts exist, t h e Judges cannot be ousted wit h out just cause; t h at is t h eextent of t h e constitutional provision relative to security of tenure of Judges. Upondeclaration of t h e completion of t h e reorganization as provided for in t h e Reorganization

Act, t h e affected Courts "s h all be deemed automatically abolis h ed Th ere being no

Courts, th

ere are no offices for wh

ich

tenure of Judges may be claimed. By th

e abolitionof t h ose offices, t h e rig h ts to t h em are necessarily extinguis h ed (Manalang vs.Quitoriano, 94 P h il. 903 [1954]).

2. I am satisfied t h at t h e c h allenged law was enacted by t h e Batasang Pambansa inresponse to an urgent and pressing public need and not for t h e purpose of affectingadversely t h e security of tenure of all Judges or legislating t h em out to t h e detriment of

judicial independence. It s h ould riot be said of t h e Batasang Pambansa t h at its power of abolition of Courts h as been used to disguise an unconstitutional and evil purpose todefeat t h e security of tenure of Judges. Th e Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981sufficiently complies wit h th e bona fide rule in t h e abolition of public office, as clearly

explained in th

e main opinion. Besides, every presumption of good faith

in its actuationsmust be accorded a coordinate and coequal branc h of government, supreme wit h in t h elimits of its own sp h ere, until t h at presumption is clearly overcome. Th ere is no s h owingth at t h e Reorganization Act was motivated for personal or political reasons as to justifyth e interference by t h e Court (Garvey vs. Lowell, 199 Mass, 47, 85 N.E. 182, 127 A.S.R.468; State vs. Eduards, 40 Mont. 287; 106 Pac. 695, 19 R.C.L. 236; Llanto vs.Dimaporo, 16 SCRA 599 [1966]). Public interest and public good, as t h e legislative bodyviews it, must be balanced wit h tenure of Judges, w h ich is an individual rig h t. Revertingto Section 1 and Section 7, supra, th e former is t h e weig h tier, because t h e "Judiciary" isof more importance to t h e welfare of t h e country t h an t h e tenure of office of an individualJudge. If a Judge is removed wit h out cause t h ere can be damage to t h e public welfareto some extent, but maintenance of a Court t h at does not meet t h e requirements of progressive Government, can cause incalculable prejudice to t h e people.

3. Nor does a conflict exist wit h th e power of discipline vested in t h e Supreme Court byth e present Constitution reading: t h e Supreme Court s h all h ave t h e power "to disciplineJudges of inferior Courts, and, by a vote of at least 8 members, order t h eir dismissal

Absent t h e Court, it would be futile to speak of t h e Supreme Court's power to discipline.Th us, w h ere t h e legislature h as willed t h at t h e Courts be abolis h ed, t h e power to


37/91

discipline cannot pose an obstacle to t h e abolition. Th e power to discipline can comeinto play only w h en t h ere is removal from an existing judicial office but not w h en t h at itoffice is abolis h ed. Th e reorganization of t h e judicial system wit h th e abolition of certainCourts is not an exercise of t h e power to discipline t h e Judges of t h e abolis h ed Courts.

It is of significance to note th

at th

e power to dismissal vested in th

e Supreme Court byth e 1973 Constitution is delimited by its power to discipline. Absent any need for discipline and t h e power to dismiss does not exist. Being circumscribed in scope, it maywell be asked: does t h e grant of t h e power of discipline and dismissal in t h e SupremeCourt deprive t h e executive of t h e power of removal? Is it not more in keeping wit h th eallocation of powers in our government to state t h at t h e Supreme Court s h ares its power to dismiss wit h th e executive power of removal? For is not t h e power of removalbasically executive in nature, as an incident to t h e power of appointment, w h ich is t h eprerogative of t h e C h ief Executive alone As in t h e case of appointments, Section 5 (6),

Article X of t h e Constitution provides t h at t h e Supreme Court s h all appoint its officialsand employees. However, is not t h is power s h ared wit h th e power of appointment of t h e

executive wh

o appoints some of th

e Court officialsTh

ese questions could lendth emselves to an in-dept h study in t h e proper case.

4. Th e abolition would be no deprivation eit h er of due process of law. A public officecannot be regarded as t h e "property " of t h e incumbent. A public office is not a contract(Segovia vs. Noel, 47 P h il. 543 [1925]). A public office is a public trust (Section 1, ArticleXIII. 1973 Constitution). It is a privilege in t h e gift of t h e State (Brown vs. Russell, 166Mass. 14, 43 NE 1005, 32 LRA, 253 cited also in T aada & Carreon, Political Law of t h eP h ilippines, V ol. 2, p. 537). Th e officers are t h e servants of t h e people and not t h eir rulers (22 R.C.L. 378-379, cited in Martin, Administrative Law, Law on Public Officersand Election Law, p. 112, 1970 ed.). Besides, it bears stressing t h at t h ere is no removal

from office but abolition of th

e office itself.5. Th e questioned statute is in keeping wit h major reforms in ot h er departments of government. " Th e t h rust is on development." It is "t h e first major reorganization after four generations." It does not provide for a piecemeal c h ange, w h ich could beineffective. It goes to t h e roots and does not just scratc h th e surface of our judicialsystem. Its main objectives are an improved administration of justice, t h e "attainment of more efficiency in t h e disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures w h ich do not tend to t h e proper meting out of justice." Th ese aims are policymatters of necessity in t h e pursuit of developmental goals wit h in t h e Judiciary.

6. Th e Reorganization Act reorganizing t h e entire judicial system excluding t h eSupreme Court, w h ich is t h e only constitutional Court, and t h e Sandiganbayan. Itenvisages institutional reforms in t h e P h ilippine judiciary. It does not simply c h ange t h enames of t h e Courts. Th e facts h erein are dissimilar from t h ose in B rillo vs. Enage (94P h il. 732 [1954]) w h ere t h e position of Justice of t h e Peace, alt h oug h ostensiblyabolis h ed, was merely c h anged to

dela lana v. alba

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