consti support 9

7/28/2019 Consti Support 9

1/23

Ermita-Malate Hotel Operations vs. City of Manila

Facts: On July 5, 1963 the petition for prohibition against OrdinanceNo. 4760 was filed by Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators

Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu,who is "the latters president and general manager" against therespondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacityas such "charged with the general power and duty to enforceordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders forthe faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." It wasalleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to thepromotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members"operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businessesduly licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly payingtaxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 personand representing an investment of more than P3 million." It was thenalleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City ofManila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 bythe then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting asMayor of the City of Manila. There was the assertion of its beingbeyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila toenact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in therevised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law. Sec. 1: It wasa violation of privacy and it was against self-incrimination and that iswhy it is unconstitutional and void. Sec. 2: classifying rooms andprohibiting persons under 18 to be given any room without thecompany of parents. On August 3, 1963 an answer was filedregarding the respondent mayor that the petitioners are licensed toengage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of theprovisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity,whether on statutory or constitutional grounds the petition did fail tostate a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears areasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality,a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only theguests or customers not before the court could complain of thealleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against selfincrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminaryinjunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for,its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.

Issue: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels(increasing license fees, partially restricting the freedom to contract,and restraining the liberty of individuals) is valid and/or constitutional.

Held: Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practiceshurtful to public morals. It was made as there is observed an alarmingincrease in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manilatraceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a

necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit andthus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. Theordinance proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transientsand guests of these establishments by requiring these transients andguests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in alobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several otheramendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy thatcharacterizes the registration of transients and guests. The increasein the license fees was intended to discourage establishments of thekind from operating for purpose other than legal and to increase theincome of the city government. Further, the restriction on the freedom

to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful forthe owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of anyhotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to leaseor rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannotbe viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. Itis neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curbthe opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which suchpremises could be, and, are being devoted. Furthermore, the right ofthe individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by generallaw for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained

in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, orotherwise within the proper scope of the police power. State in orderto promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,with property, and with business and occupations. Persons andproperty may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, inorder to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of thestate.


2/23

CHURCHILL VS. RAFFERTY

FACTS:

Plaintiffs put up a billboard on private land in Rizal Province "quite a distancefrom the road and strongly built". Some residents (German and British Consuls)find it offensive. Act # 2339 allows the defendent, the Collector of InternalRevenue, to collect taxes from such property and to remove it when it is offensive

to sight. Court of first Instance prohibited the defendant to collect or remove thebillboard.

ISSUE:

1.May the courts restrain by injunction the collection of taxes?

2.Is Act # 2339 unconstitutional because it deprives property without due processof law in allowing CIR to remove it if it is offensive?

RULE:

1.an injunction is an extraordinary remedy and not to be used if there is anadequate remedy provided by law; here there is an adequate remedy, thereforecourt may not do so.

2.unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight are not dissociatedfrom the general welfare of the public, therefore can be regulated by policepower, and act is constitutional.

RATIONALE:

1.Writ of injunction by the courts is an extraordinary preventive remedy. Ordinary(adequate) remedies are in the law itself. Sections 139 and 140 of the Act forbidsthe use of injunction and provides a remedy for any wrong. _Plaintiffs say thatthose sections are unconstitutional because by depriving taxpayers remedy, italso deprives them of property without due process of law and it diminishes thepower of the courts_. Taxes, whether legal or illegal, cannot be restrained by thecourts by injunction. There must be a further showing that there are specialcircumstances such as irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits or a cloud upon titleto real estate will result. Practically, if the courts can do so then there will be an

insane number of suits enjoining the collection of taxes by tax avoiders. The statewill not function since taxes are not paid (and judges will become unpaid!). Thereis, of course, no law nor jurisprudence that says it is not allowed to sue afterhaving paid the tax, and such is the usual course in bringing suits againstillegal(?) taxes. Pay it under protest. As to the diminishment of power of thecourts, the Philippine courts never had the power to restrain the collection oftaxes by injunction. It is said par 2 sec 56 Act 136 confers original jurisdictionupon CFI to hear and determine all civil actions but civil actions at that time had awell-defined meaning. The legislature had already defined the only action

previously and that is the payment of the tax under protest then suit. Civil actionslike injunction suits are of a special extraordinary character. Section 139 alsodoes not diminish power of the courts because the power is still there if there isno adequate remedy available but sec 140 gives an adequate remedy.

2.sec 100 of act 2339 gives power to the CIR to remove offensive billboards,signs, signboards after due invstigation. The question becomes is that areasonable exercise of police power affecting the advertising industry? Policepower is reasonable insofar as it properly considers public health, safety,comfort, etc. If nothing can justify a statute, it's void. State may interfere in publicinterest but not final. Court is final. Police power has been expanding.blahblahblah (consti1). The basic idea of civil polity in US is gov't should interferewith individual effort only to the extent necessary to preserve a healthy social andeconomic condition of society. State interferes with private property through,taxation, eminent domain and police power. Only under the last are the benefitsderived from the maintenance of a healthy economic standard of society and akadamnum absque injuria. Once police power was reserved for commonnuisances. Now industry is organized along lines which make it possible forlarge combinations of capital to profit at the expense of socio-economic progressof the nation by controlling prices and dictating to industrial workers wages andconditions of labor. It has increased the toll on life and affects public health,safety and morals, also general social and economic life of the nation, as suchstate must necessarily regulate industries. Various industries have regulated andeven offensive noises and smells coming from those industries. Those noises

and smells though ostensibly regulated for health reason are actually regulatedfor more aesthetic reasons. What is more aesthetic than sight which the adindustry is wooing us with. Ads cover landscapes etc. The success of billboardslie not upon the use of private property but on channels of travel used by thegeneral public. Billboard that cannot be seen by people are useless. Billboardsare legitimate, they are not garbage but can be offensive in certaincircumstances. Other courts in US hold the view that police power cannotinterfere with private property rights for purely aesthetic purposes. But this courtis of the opinion that unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight arenot dissociated from the general welfare of the public.


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Magtajas vs Pryce Properties Corp

Date: July 20, 1994

Petitioners: Mayor Pablo Magtajas and the City of Cagayan de Oro

Respondents: Pryce Properties Corp and Pagcor

Ponente: Cruz

Facts: In 1992, representatives from PPC made representations with thePagcor on the possibility of setting up a casino in Pryce Plaza Hotel inCagayan de Oro City. On November 1992, the parties executed a contractof lease involving the ballroom of the hotel which would be converted into acasino.

Way back in 1950, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO passedResolution 2295 prohibiting the establishment of a gambling casino.Resolution 2673, dated October 19, 1992, reiterated this prohibition. OnDecember 7, 1992, Ordinance No. 3353 was enacted prohibiting the

issuance of business permits for the operation of a casino. On January 4,1993, Ordinance 3375-93 was passed prohibiting the operation of casinos.

PPC filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction againstCDO before the CA. It prayed for the declaration of unconstitutionality ofOrdinance 3353. Pagcor intervened claiming that Ordinance 4475 wasviolative of the non-impairment of contracts and EP clauses. The CAdeclared the ordinances unconstitutional and void.

Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panglungsod has the authority to enact saidordinances

Held: No

Ratio: Petitioners Contention. CDO, like other local politicalsubdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated inthe LGC. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known asthe General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16. In addition,Section 458 declares that the Sangguniang Panglungsod has the power toapprove ordinances and pass resolutions for the efficient and effective citygovernment. The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, theSangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because

they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people.

The adoption of the LGC, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifyingthe charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment thanP.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies betweenthem. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree areexpressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to itsphilosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause. It isalso maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the LocalGovernment Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the

petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberalinterpretation in favor of the local government units.

Morality of Gambling Not Justiciable. The morality of gambling isnot a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generallyconsidered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in theConstitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for thatmatter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activityas it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibitgambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some formsof gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity ofOrdinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the

Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO.

Test of Validity. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established.A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance mustconform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravenethe constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) Itmust not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulatetrade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must notbe unreasonable.

We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the LGC, LGUs areauthorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and otherprohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of

chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. Thepetitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could haveexcluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language ofthe section is clear and unmistakable. We conclude that since the word"gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," theword should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the otherprohibited games of chance, must be prevented.

Contravention of PD 1896. The apparent flaw in the ordinances inquestion is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodiedtherein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the powerconferred on it to operate a casino in CDO. Petitioner deny that theordinance changed the PD, rather the LGC itself changed the PD. It seemsto us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the


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decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it isalready dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because theCode has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos.Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the localgovernment unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary butmandated by Sec 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to begiven its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice butto prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes

both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will haveno more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all beprohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory dutyimposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continueto exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longerbe able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenuethrough the operation of casinos.

It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of therepealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision whichpainstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which arerepealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one ofthem. Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly

presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of suchintention.

Moreover, the petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes themto prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between thesetwo forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of thelegislature. In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arrivingat the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances inquestion are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D.1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the publicpolicy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games ofchance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.

Rationale for the rule that ordinances should not contravene astatute. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should notcontravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents ofthe national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislativepowers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. Thedelegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher thanthose of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government unitscan undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power inthe first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powersand rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life,without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it maydestroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional

limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we cansuppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep fromexistence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporationcould not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to thecorporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the meretenants at will of the legislature.

Relationship between national legislature and local government.This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local

government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in theConstitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning todetract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of thelocal government units although in significantly reduced degree now thanunder our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the powerto destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall.True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the directconferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannotnow be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the nationallegislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannotdefy its will or modify or violate it.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has thestatus of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayande Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings forthe operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting theoperation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances arecontrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and aretherefore ultra vires and void.


5/23

U.S. VS. TORIBIO

FACTS:

Luis Toribio slaughtered for human consumption a Carabao withouta permit from the municipal treasurer violating Act 1147

o Act 1147, Sec. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered orkilled for food at the municipal slaughterhouse exceptupon permit secured from the municipal treasurer

o Act 1147, Sec. 31. No permit to slaughter carabaos shall begranted by the municipal treasurer unless such animals areunfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes

Application of Toribio for a permit was denied sinceanimal was not found to be unfit for agricultural workor draft purposes.

It is contended by Toribio that statute is applicable only to slaughterdone in a municipal slaughterhouse and that the statute isunconstitutional sine it penalizes the slaughter of carabaos without apermit amounting to a taking by the government of the right of the

person over his property amounting to an exercise of eminentdomain without just compensation or an undue exercise of policepower by the State.

ISSUE:

1. W/N the statute is applicable only to slaughter done in a municipalslaughterhouse

The statute seeks to protect the large cattle of the Philippinesfrom theft and to make easy their recovery by providing anelaborate and compulsory system of branding and registration

By limiting the application of the statue to those done only in themunicipal slaughterhouse, the purpose of the article is greatlyimpaired if not totally destroyed since these animals could nowbe slaughtered for human consumption without need of showingproof of ownership.

Statute should be construed so as to give effect to the manifestintent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which thestatue was enacted.

Statute therefore prohibits and penalizes the slaughter oflarge cattle for human consumption anywhere without thepermit provided for in the Act.

2. W/N the statute is unconstitutional

Because of the statue the use and enjoyment of the owners overtheir cattle are in a way impaired therefore it is not a taking but

a just restraint of injurious private use of property policepower of the State.

Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights,are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment asshall prevent them from being injurious (to the equal enjoymentof others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their propertyor to the rights of the community), and to such reasonablerestraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature,under the governing and controlling power vested in them by theconstitution, may thing necessary and expedient.

Disease threatened the total extinction of carabaos in the

Philippines resulting in famine from the insufficiency of workanimals to cultivate the fields.

o Given these circumstances and conditions, the generalwelfare necessitated the enactment of the statute

To justify the exercise of police power of thestate: first, that the interests of those of aparticular class require such interference; andsecond, that the means are reasonablynecessary for the accomplishment of thepurpose and not unduly oppressive uponindividuals.


6/23

HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,petitioners,vs.HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondents.

FACTS:

On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council,

approved Resolution No. 60 which reads:A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THEONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATEDBY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDINGFINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS(P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BETAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDSEXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY.

Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereavedfamilies of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousandpesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of otherrequirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00)cash relief from the Municipality of Makati.

Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, themunicipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of four hundred thousandpesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial AssistanceProgram.

Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA)for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings,respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit thedisbursement of finds for the implementation thereof.

ISSUE: whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No.243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power underthe general welfare clause.

RULING: PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat,this petition is hereby GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's DecisionNo. 1159 is hereby SET ASIDE.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The police power is a governmental function, aninherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government.Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort andconvenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Beforea municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid

delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of theinherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arisefrom express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation ofthe municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations mayexercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creationwhich are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted,and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construedas empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life anddesirable for the safety of the people.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause:pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinancesand issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and dischargethe responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessaryand proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience,maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity andgeneral welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure theprotection of property therein."

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The supportfor the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in thepromotion of the common good.

Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipalityof Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towardssocial justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, thoughnot complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and itis more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death.Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President RamonMagsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law."


7/23

RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

MALCOLM; February 28, 1919

FACTS

- Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro wereordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from

their native habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao inthe Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished byimprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from theresolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares ofland, which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three hundredManguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped fromthe reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed inprison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. TheManguianes sued out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that theyare deprived of their liberty in violation of law.

- The return of the Solicitor-General alleges that on February 1, 1917, theprovincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 signed by the

provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, jr.. The laws primary objective is theadvancement of the welfare of the non-Christian people of Mindoro. In one ofthe Whereas clauses, it was stated that the provincial governor is of theopinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient forthe Mangyanes to live on. Pursuant to the Governors powers under section2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio ofTigbao on Naujan Lake was selected as a site for the permanent settlementof Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretaryof the Interior. Under the resolution of the Provincial Board, any Mangyanwho shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction beimprisoned not exceeding sixty days in accordance with section 2759 of therevised Administrative Code. The resolution of the provincial board of

Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of thesame province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for theprotection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of publicforests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

ISSUES

1. WON the Mangyans were deprived of due process when their liberty tochoose their homes were limited by the law.

2. WON the Legislature exceeded its authority in enacting the law mandatingthe forcible transfer of the Mangyanes.

HELD

1. NO. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by dueprocess of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in theDartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since aclassic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is,that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities underthe protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "dueprocess of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always

necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, arule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of theadministrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee,Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blindsentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion ofthe legislative power in furtherance of the public good which regards andpreserves these principles of liberty and justice must be held to be dueprocess of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due processof law" means simply * * * "first, that there shall be a law prescribed inharmony with the general powers of the legislative department of theGovernment; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third,

that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedureprescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of thestate or to all of a class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104,affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.1) "What is dueprocess of law depends on circumstances it varies with the subject-matterand necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peabody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)

- There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception ofliberty and does not practise liberty in a rightful way. They understand libertyas the right to do anything they will-going from one place to another in themountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiginsthereon. Not knowing what true liberty is and not practicing the samerightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof withoutdue process of law?

- But does the Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of hisliberty without due process of law apply to a class of persons who do nothave a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practice liberty in a rightfulway?

- To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea ofsuch class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar,that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfareand advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that thispeople should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state ofsavagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in

its true and noble sense. In dealing with the backward population, like the


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Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the alternative of eitherletting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The lattermeasure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and withnational conscience.

- The Mangyans will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and onaccount of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations,or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who maywant to abuse them.. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they

will-going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroyingforests and making illegal caigins thereon. To allow them to successfullyinvoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Governmentwithout recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making themuseful citizens. They will thus be left in a permanent state of savagery andbecome a vulnerable point of attack by those who doubt, may challenge theability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.

- Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interferedwith when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. Theyare restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines.Nor can one say that due process of law, has not been followed. To go backto our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, thereexists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to theregular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

2. NO. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, thecourts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightfulauthority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great maladyrequires an equally drastic remedy.

- As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which in caseof doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid, is theattitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the

Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gamble vs.Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice ofthe Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:

We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratiodecidendi. Every really new question that comes before the courts is, inthe last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined bydifferentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by theaid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing conflictingsolutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believeswill best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a generalrule 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of hisliberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equalprotection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in

accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntaryservitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the

Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power,somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Decision Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of theirliberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.


9/23

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers andOverseas Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the AsianRecruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, apetition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the RegionalTrial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g),Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), andSections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining

order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein fromenforcing the assailed provisions of the law.

Peitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies havestopped or suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under theprovisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional.

On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective fora period of only twenty (20) days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their commenton the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consistingin the inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it allegedwere its members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary

restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i),Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10,paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No. 8042.

The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. 5 According to the respondent, Section6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such,violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article II , Section 12 6 and Article XV,Sections 1 7 and 3(3) of the Constitution. 8 As the law encouraged the deployment ofskilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. Therespondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employmentabroad.

According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process isviolated because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a livingabroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses byemployers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointedout that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreignemployers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workersabroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.

According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors andmanning agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is aninvalid classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of theirright to property and due process and to the "equality of the person." It isunderstandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against

licensed and registered recruiters is unconstitutional.

The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) isunconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed onequal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Codedistinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereofin the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. Thepenalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are,therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence,such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It wasalso pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitmentagencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitmentunder Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.

The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16),Sections 8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of theConstitution 10 prohibiting ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder. This is becausethe provisions presume that a licensed and registered recruitment agency is guilty ofillegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed anyof the prohibited acts under the law. Furthermore, officials, employees and theirrelatives are presumed guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage uponsuch finding that they committed any of the said prohibited acts.

The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1)

within which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and coulddeprive licensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process. The periodwithin which the summons and the complaint would be served on foreign employeesand, thereafter, the filing of the answer to the complaint would take more than 90days. This would thereby shift on local licensed and authorized recruiters the burdenof proving the defense of foreign employers.

The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional:SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined

herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where theoffense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of thecommission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is firstfiled shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however,That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that havealready been filed in court at the t ime of the effectivity of this Act.

In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that (a) therespondent has no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition waspremature as the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released asyet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and,(d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of theState.

In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averredthat: As earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit fo rfailure of petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law isunconstitutional, apart from the defect and impropriety of the petition.


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On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision

dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminaryinjunction issued by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied thepetitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said decision.

Issue: The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed graveabuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the

assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of only P50,000; and

Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's order and thewrit of preliminary injunction issued by it.

Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assaileddecision of the appellate court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of theRegional Trial Court dated August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401 and theWrit of Preliminary Injunction issued by it in the said case on August 24, 1995 areNULLIFIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio: The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or not isaddressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, if the court commitsgrave abuse of its discretion in issuing the said writ amounting to excess or lack ofjurisdiction, the same may be nullified via a writ of certiorari and prohibition.

The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify aninjunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of badfaith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitablerelief. The "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestlystrong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and isgenerally disfavored.

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a lawassailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparableharm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely tosucceed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to themerits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor.

Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automaticallyrender them unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from thevery existence of certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibitingthe State from carrying out the important and necessary task of enforcing these lawsagainst socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishableunder its laws and the Constitution.

One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invaliditybeyond reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA

748). All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of astatute (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This presumption of constitutionality is based onthe doctrine of separation of powers which enjoin upon each department a becomingrespect for the acts of the other departments (Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204SCRA 516 [1991]).

In view of petitioner's standing

The petitioners contend that the respondent has no locus standi. It is a non-stock,non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action.Although the respondent filed the petition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf oflicensed and registered recruitment agencies, it failed to adduce in evidence acertified copy of its Articles of Incorporation and the resolutions of the said membersauthorizing it to represent the said agencies in the proceedings. Neither is the suit ofthe respondent a class suit so as to vest in it a personality to assail Rep. Act No.8042; the respondent is service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports torepresent are profit-oriented.

The petition is meritorious. The respondent has locus standi to file the petition inthe RTC in representation of the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agenciesimpleaded in the amended petition. The modern view is that an association has

standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of anassociation with that of its members. 16 An association has standing to file suit for itsworkers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. Anorganization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.

We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized forthe purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development ofthe manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and international levels;providing, creating and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefitof its general membership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare andprotection of Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of any individual,company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitmentindustry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the

purposes embodied therein.

In view of standing in behalf of unskilled workers

However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf ofunskilled workers. We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in itspetition. Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the eleven licensedand registered recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed tocomply with Section 2 of Rule 63 20 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since theeleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which the respondent filedthe suit are specifically named in the petition, the amended petition is deemedamended to avoid multiplicity of suits.


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In view of retroactivity

In People v. Diaz, 24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an amendment of theLabor Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not appliedretroactively.

In view of equal protection clause

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, thepermissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend thatlicensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignorethe settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to thepractice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad arerequired to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit topractice their trade.

Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairmentclause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enactthe assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.

The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor andindividual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited tothe object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does notrequire absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under likeconditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.

In view of the VALIDITY of Sec. 6 of RA 8042

The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which provides that employees ofrecruitment agencies may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment has been upheldin People v. Chowdury: An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal

recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shownthat he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.

By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed penal andprocedural provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042, including the imposable penaltiestherefor. Until the Court, by final judgment, declares that the said provisions areunconstitutional, the enforcement of the said provisions cannot be enjoined.

Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers andemployees and their relatives employed in government agencies charged with theenforcement of the law for illegal recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for thosewho commit large scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the Constitution. The

accused may be convicted of illegal recruitment and large scale illegal recruitmentonly if, after trial, the prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime

charged.

The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registeredrecruitment agencies would close shop and stop business operations because of theassailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin theenforcement of penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. Therespondent even failed to adduce any evidence to prove irreparable injury because ofthe enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehensionthat, because of time constraints, its members would have to defend foreignemployees in cases before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true,such inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.

Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying oninnocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the primaryconsiderations that led to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and OverseasFilipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording greater protection to overseas Filipinoworkers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws in the recruitment andplacement of workers for overseas employment.

By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans anyevidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegalrecruiters and allowed them to continue victimizing hapless and innocent people

desiring to obtain employment abroad as overseas workers, and blocked theattainment of the salutary policies 52 embedded in Rep. Act No. 8042.

The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess orlack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It isfor this reason that the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining theenforcement of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.


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Ynot vs. IAC

G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: (1)notice; (2) hearing; exceptions

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: (1) public interest requires governmentinterference; (2) reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the

purpose

FACTS:

Petitioners 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transportedfrom Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin,challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained the confiscationof the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that itlacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition forreview.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaos amounted to arbitraryconfiscation of property without due process of law

RULING:

Minimum Requirements of Due Process: Notice and Hearing

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generallyspeaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguardagainst official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that

the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof ofour fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We haveconsistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, isentitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundredyears ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before itcondemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It hasto be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officialswho, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clauseinto a worn and empty catchword.

Exceptions to Notice and Hearing

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure,there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example,

bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based onhuman experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and thefact ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances when the need forexpeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summaryabatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed onsight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people.Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherentlypernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for acriminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the countryhe has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of thepublic health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. In such instances,previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view ofthe nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the generalwelfare from a clear and present danger.

Due Process is a Restraint on Police Power

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police powerwhich both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simplydefined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for thepromotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the greatpublic needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most

demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation andeminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the policepower, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is deadfrom the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Itsreach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so,as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, itsregulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And thejustification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex andSic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individualinterests to the benefit of the greater number.

First Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Interests of the Public GenerallyRequire Interference

xxx we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so tospeak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject ofExecutive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is alsoreasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not undulyoppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is nodoubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at leastseven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of thenecessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work orbreeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2009/11/ynot-vs-iac.htmlhttp://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2009/11/ynot-vs-iac.html


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Second Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Reasonable Means Necessaryfor the Accomplishment of Purpose, not Unduly Oppressive Upon Individuals

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as theoriginal executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with thesecond requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthenthe original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabaoregardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall betransported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us.The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought tobe achieved by the questioned measure is missing. We do not see how theprohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent theirindiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no lessdifficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in oneprovince will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to anotherprovince will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition ismade to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easilycircumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement ofthe live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, itshould follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to beflippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed,we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violationof the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeefbeing transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the policeonly. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribedwas fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of theaccused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, andthe property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared,by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

EO 626-A is unconstitutional

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police stationcommander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint forrecovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was orderedconfiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court.The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediatelyimposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at onceand pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thusdenying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. It has already beenremarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensedwith notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of dueprocess. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken inadministrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only.In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission of

the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to becorrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for thepetitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical perse as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why theoffense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a courtof justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him underthe Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive OrderNo. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced notby the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authorityto impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of theconfiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is thereauthorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions andother similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal asthe Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasissupplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerouscondition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality andabuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and thereasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observewhen they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparentlyboundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by whatcriteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they

and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusivediscretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweepingauthority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, aclearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of thepolice power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is notreasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied theright to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. Theconferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of thesupposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates againstthe doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of

legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimiteddiscretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, wehereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.


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BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO VS. PALANCA

FACTS:

This action was instituted by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgageupon property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage was executed by theoriginal defendant herein, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, as security for a debtowing by him to the bank.

After the execution of this instrument by Tanquinyeng, he returned to China andhe there died.

As Tanquinyeng was a nonresident at the time, it was necessary for the bank inthe foreclosure proceeding to give notice to Tanquinyeng by publication pursuantto sec 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Publication was made in a newspaperof Manila. The court also directed the clerk of court to deposit in the post office acopy of the summons and complaint directed to Tanquinyeng at his last place ofresidence, the city of Amoy, China pursuant to the same provision.

Sec. 399,Code of Civil Procedure:

In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absentdefendant is known, the judge must direct a copy of the summons andcomplaint to be forthwith deposited by the clerk in the post-office,postage prepaid, directed to the person to be served, at his place ofresidence

Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear.

The case proceeded in the CFI, and the defendant not having appeared,judgment was taken against him by default.

July 3, 1908, decision was rendered in favor of the bank.

It was ordered that the Tnaquinyeng should deliver amount owed to the clerk ofthe court, and it was declared that in case of failure to satisfy the judgment, themortgage property should be exposed to public sale. The payment contmeplatedin said order was never made.

Court ordered the sale of the property which was bought in by the bank.

7 years after confirmation of sale, motion was made by Vicente Palanca, asadministrator of Tanquinyeng, requesting the court to set aside the order ofdefault and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all theproceedings subsequent thereto.

Basis of motion: that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereonwere void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendantor over the subject of the action.

The motion was denied.

ISSUES:

Assume that the clerk of court failed to mail the papers which he was directed tosend to the defendant in Amoy

1) WON the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to proceedwith the foreclosure of the mortgage. YES

2) WON those proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitutedue process of law. YES

RATIO:

1. (note: not in Bernas)

"jurisdiction," may have reference

(1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or toadminister a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the

court over the parties, or

(2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party incourt and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power oflegal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may resulteither from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is broughtinto the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal


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proceedings wherein the power of the court over the property is recognized andmade effective.

In this Case:

Tanquinyeng is a nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the personalprocess of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never acquiresjurisdiction over the person at all. This, however, is not essential.

The property itself is the sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsibleobject which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows that thejurisdiction of the court is based exclusively on the power which it possessesover the property.

The jurisdiction over the property based upon the following:

(1) that the property is located within the district;

(2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to anobligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and

(3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the propertyinto custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose ofsatisfying the mortgage debt.

Given that jurisdiction is exlusively over property, the relief granted by the courtmust be limited to such as can be enforced against the property itself.

2. (this is the only issue included in Bernas)

Requirement of due process is satisfied if;

(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear anddetermine the matter before it;

(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant orover the property which is the subject of the proceeding;

(3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and

(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

Issue in this case concerns (3).

Opportunity to be heard:

In a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresidentowner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made is essential.

To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for:

1) publication

2) personal notice thru mail, if his residence is known

Personal Notice

(aka constructive or substituted service)

Such notification does not constitute a service of process in any true sense.

It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may beadmonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that itis incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it.

This mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that theabsent owner shall thereby receive actual notice.

The provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutelyrequire the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only inthe case where the defendant's residence is known.

In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant incases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.

Assumption in recognizing the effectiveness of a means of notification which mayfall short of actual notice is:

Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or byagent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected withknowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

Right to due process has not been infringed.


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Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca

G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property whichis the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of theproperty under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actualcustody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal

proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of thecourt over the property is recognized and made effective.

The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi inrem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speakingan action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.

DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property isalways assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or byagent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to beaffected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for itscondemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of realproperty in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned toChina and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to thePhilippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but sincedefendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. TheClerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendantslast known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerkcomplied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper ofthe City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered.

The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction washeld with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale wasconfirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of thissale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate ofthe original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside theorder of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequentthereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and thejudgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquiredjurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the

defendant and the subject matter of the action

Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since itmay have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kindof action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power ofthe court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to thelitigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature andextent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction withreference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party incourt and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power oflegal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may resulteither from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is broughtinto the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legalproceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court overthe property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property,though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be takeninto actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actualseizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at thebeginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held toabide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potentialjurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of landunder our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actualphysical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some personclaiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and toadjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said tobe a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is notstrictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantiallysuch. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with

reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property aloneis treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings
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are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in thecircumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and thepurpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lienburdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale orother disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment,foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. Thejudgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

xxx

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whompublication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action andis conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that wherethe defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore beconsidered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.

On Due Process

xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down withcertainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the followingconditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with

judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must belawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which isthe subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity tobe heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity tobe heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of theproceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within whichappearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answerthis necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually inaddition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence isknown. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process

in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner maybe admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that itis incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it.

It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absoluteassurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. Theperiodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, andthe chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Evenwhere notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though muchincreased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it isforwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will benoted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of noticedoes not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in everyevent, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light

of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of thiskind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.

The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means ofnotification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property isalways assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; andhe may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledgethat proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendants last knownaddress constitute denial of due process?

The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that thefailure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not suchan irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in ouropinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case.Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of noticewhich the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that wasabsolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.

It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes adifference whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as aquestion involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can beno distinction between the much and the little. The court either has jurisdiction orit has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be consideredas a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escapefrom the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of thejudgment. In the appl ication of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand,it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being onceestablished, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity forthe defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, itwould seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal.

We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissibleto reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have beenviolated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in theseproceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provisionof Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his propertywithout due process of law has not been infringed.


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ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

FACTS: A motion for reconsideration was filed by the Sol-Gen in behalf of therespondent Court of Industrial Relations on the case of National Labor Union Inc.praying that their labor case be remanded to the CIR for a new trial.

Petitioner, Ang Tibay has filed an opposition for both the motion for reconsiderationof CIR and the motion for a new trial by the National Labor Union.

The National Labor Unions case:

they alleged that Toribio Teodoro, who dominated the National WorkersBrotherhood of Ang Tibay, made a false claim that there was a shortage ofleather soles in ANg Tibay that made it necessary for him to lay off workers,however, claim was unsupported by records of the Bureau of Customs & theaccounts of native dealers of leather. Such was just a scheme adopted tosystematically discharge all the members of the NLU, inc., from work.

unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc.,and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents

that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected tohave obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of IndustrialRelations.

That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reachingimportance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean themodification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

HELD: motion for reconsideration denied, motion for new trial granted.

Discussion of the Nature of the CIR to emphasize certain guiding principles whichshould be observed in the trial of cases brought before it.

Court of Industrial Relations an administrative court

- exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes

between employers and employees

- has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide,and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/oraffecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations betweenthem, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.103 (section 1).

There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is adeparture from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

In the case ofGoseco vs. Court of Industrial

Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules ofprocedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and

substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal formsand shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound

by any technical rules of legal evidencebut may inform its mind in such manner asit may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)

requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrativecharacter.

1. right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected topresent his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

2. tribunal must considerthe evidence presented.

3. have something to support the decision4. evidence must be "substantial." - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mindaccepts as adequate to support a conclusion." The statute provides that "the rulesof evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' Theobvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards fromthe compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which wouldbe deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate theadministrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrativeprocedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence havingrational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitutesubstantial evidence

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or atleast contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only byconfining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, canthe latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. Itshould not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced,and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence andinforming itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy.

Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determiningthe facts in any given case, but their report and decision

consti support 9

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