banco central e democracia
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Banco Central e Democracia. Aula 5 Ciencia Politica CGAE EAESP-FGV Kurt von Mettenheim. Estrutura da aula. Introdução: banco central e democracia “Statecrafting Monetary Authority” no Brasil vs ortodoxia - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Banco Central e Democracia
Aula 5Ciencia Politica
CGAE EAESP-FGVKurt von Mettenheim
Estrutura da aula
1) Introdução: banco central e democracia2) “Statecrafting Monetary Authority” no Brasil vs ortodoxia3) Momentos políticos e oportunidades de evitar crises
financeiras em mercados emergentes.4) “de uma economia da política para uma ciência política
da construção da autoridade monetária”Duas anomalias brasileiras: * BACEN avança depois da estabilidade de preços* Bancos públicos lideram processo financeiro...
5) Resultados: a) “depois das tempestades” financeiras Brasil sai bemb) Brasil no topo da lista (do IIF, Institute for International Finance) de relacionamento com o mercado e transparência de informação
“You cannot in a democratic society have an institution which is either fully or partially disassociated from the electoral process, and which has the powers that central banks inherently have.
(Alan Greenspan)
Chapter 6, “On Monetary Authority” Laurence Whitehead, Democratization.
Oxford University Press, 2002
Introdução
Pesquisas Publicação
Unidade TemáticaFAPESP:A Construção de AutoridadeMonetária no Brasil numa Epóca de Globalização
Chapter 10 : From the Economics of Politics to the Politics of Monetary Policy
Kurt von Mettenheim
The Political Dynamics of Financial Crises in
‘Emerging Market’ DemocraciesLaurence Whitehead
Country Peak Crisis Year Nearest Election Dates Argentina 1989 May 1989 India 1991 May/June 1991 Mexico 1995 August 1994 Bulgaria 1996 April 1997 Thailand 1997 November 1996 South Korea 1997 November 1997 Venezuela 1998 December 1998 Russia 1998 December 1999 Brazil 1999 October 1998 South Africa 2001 June 1999 Turkey 2001 November 2002 Argentina 2001 October 1999 /April 2003 Brazil 2002 October 2002
Eight Stage Tree: Political Opportunities to Avert
CrisisPolitical Response Time Line (election=0)-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BindingI Pre-commitment + 1 to 10 years
⁄ \Yes No
II NegotiatedPre-insurance + 3 to 12 months
/ \Yes No
III Campaign Pact + 1 to 4 months/ \Yes No
IV Market-Friendly 0Election/ \Yes No
V Post Electoral Discipline - 1 to 4 weeks/ \Yes No
VI Capitulate to Market - 1 to 12 weeksDemands/ \Yes No
VII International Rescue - 1 to 4 months/ \Yes No
VIII Financial Crisis Overshoot Anytime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crafting Economic Stabilization: Political Discretion and Technical Innovation
in the Implementation of the Real PlanLourdes Sola & Eduardo Kugelmas
19
29
54.27
17
21
48
4745
32
27.04
222323
4140
37
16
21
26
31
36
41
46
51
56
abr/94 mai/94 jun/94 jul/94 ago/94 set/94 out/94 Resultado
Fernando Henrique Lula
Fonte: Datafolha/TSE
Início do Plano Real e do Impacto Redistributivo
Rendimento Médio Real
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
jan/93 jan/94 jan/95 jan/96 jan/97 jan/98 jan/99 jan/00 jan/01 jan/02
Fonte: IBGE-Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego
Ren
dim
ento
Rea
l (ba
se
jul/9
4)
Dez/02
Trends in Stock of State Debt by Category (R$ Billion)
0102030405060708090
100
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
State BanksBondsFluctuatingExternal Rescheduled
Wall Street and Emerging Democracies: Financial Markets and the Brazilian Presidential Elections,
Javier SantisoWall Street Strategists's Recommendations on Brazil Bond Debt 2002
Rating Change Date
ABNAmro Neutral from Overweight May 1st
Goldman Sachs Neutral from Overweight May 1st
Santander Investments Neutral from Overweight May 3rd
Deutsche Bank Neutral from Overweight May 9th
JP Morgan Chase 1st reduction of overweight June 4th2d reduction of overwight July 1st
Overweight to marketweight July 22thMoved to Underweight December 9th
BCP Securities Sell August 8th
Morgan Stanley Downgrade to underperform August 12th
Salomon Smith Barney Changes in marcoeconomic forecast August 20th
UBS Warburg Increased Overweight August 30th
Bear Stearns Cuts to Underweight September 19th
Merrill Lynch Moved to Underweight September 25th
Goldman Sachs Moved to Underweight September 27th
Merrill Lynch Moved back to Marketweight October 4th 2002
Source: Based on JBIC and Wall Street investment banks reports, 2002.
> 2000 bps EMBI Risk and DefaultCountries that Traded North of 2 000 bps
EMBIG Countries which traded above 2 0002 bps spreads and defaulted
Days Above 2000 bps Default Datebefore default
Argentina 38 December 2001Russia 40 October 1998
Ivory Coast 2 March 2000Ecuador 163 September 1999
EMBIG Countries which traded above 2 0002 bps spreads and avoided default Days Above 2000 bps Period
Mexico 8 March 1995Venezuela 94 Spring 95, Aug 98Bulgaria 32 Summer 94, Spring 95Algeria 10 April 1999Nigeria 308 94-95, 2000
Pakistan 5 September 2000Ukraine 97 June 2002, Spring 01Brazil 35 June 2002-October 2002
Source: Own estimations for Brazil; and JP Morgan Chase, Emerging Markets Outlook, August 2, 2002.
View from Wall Street(April 2003)
Brazil Reform Scorecard in April 2003 According to Merrill Lynch
Reform Change Recent Developments Quality Score (1) Progress Score Reform Score
Social Security Neutral Presentation 16-17 April 2.5 2.5 5.0
Tax Reform Neutral Presentation 16-17 April 2.5 2.5 5.0
Central Bank Autnonomy Positive Final vote expected by mid April 4.0 1.5 5.5
Bankrupcy Law Neutral Already in Congress 3.0 3.0 6.0
Reform Agenda 2.7 2.5 5.2Compositve Score (2)
Source: Merrill Lynch, April 2003.
Notes:(1): The scorecard summarizes the Progress Score, which range a higher score in a scale from 0 to 5 to a reform the closer is to being approved, and the Quality Score, also evaluated on a sacle from 0 to 5 and with higher points the closer the reform's current form is to a first best reform.(2) Reform Agenda Composite Score gives the weighted score of the reforms as per the following weights: social security 50%, tax 25%, bankrupcy 15%, and Central Bank Autonomy 10%.
View from Wall Street(December 2003)
Brazil Reform Scorecard in December 2003 According to Merrill Lynch
Reform Change Recent Developments Quality Score Progress Score Reform Score
Social Security Positive Approved by the Senate 2nd round 3,5 5 8,5
Tax Reform Positive Approved by the Sentate 1st round 2 4,8 6,8
Central Bank Autnonomy Neutral Complementary Law expected in 2004 4.0 2 6
Bankrupcy Law Neutral Approved by Lower House (next Senate) 3.0 4 7
Reform Agenda 3,1 4,5 7,6Compositve Score (2)
Source: Merrill Lynch, December 2003.
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150SELIC volatility
Ele ctoralye ar
% m/m
Ele ctor al ye ar
Ele ctoral ye ar
Source : Bloom be rg
-1,5
-1,0-0,5
0,00,5
1,01,5
2,02,53,0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Elector alyear
Ele ctoralye ar
Real/Dollar Volatility
Daily change in %, monthly moving average
Plan Real End Plan Real
Ele ctoralye ar
Source : Bloom be rg
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
-180
-80
20
120
220
320
420
520bp
Vote r intention for Lula in the opinion polls
(left)
Spread Brazil-Emerging Countries and Electoral Polls1994
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Voter intention for Lula in the opinion polls
(left)
bp.Spread Brazil-Emerging Countries and Electoral Polls2002
Source: Datafolha, JP Morgan
0
20
40
60
80
100Domestic Public Debt Composition
Fixed rate
Interest rate indexed
Exchange rate indexed
Others
Source : Banco Centr al do Br azil
From an Economics of Politics tothe Politics of Monetary Policy in Brazil
2 anomalies1 = causal direction between price stability and
independent central banking (assumed by economists and neo-liberal theory) reversed: advances in central banking in Brazil occurred after heterodox policies ended inertial inflation during 1993-1994.
2 = after a decade of price stability and financial liberalisation, the three largest banks in Brazil remain government owned and run financial institutions.
Fuga de capital, 2001-2002
Bank Assets, US$ billion Developing Nations Total --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- World Dev. Total Latin Am. Asia E. Europe Brazil ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2001 I 11 315.5 1 289.9 518.1 388.2 239.3 136.2 II 11 190.9 1 285.6 521.9 375.0 245.9 139.9 III 11 577.2 1 332.4 558.4 375.1 256.0 138.5 IV 11 497.7 1 357.6 562.3 376.6 276.0 142.4 2002 I 11 464.6 1 327.7 528.1 387.7 270.6 134.9 II 12 426.5 1 330.7 487.9 393.6 296.5 123.3 III 12 512.9 1 292.0 449.2 397.8 293.7 105.1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Source: Bank for International Settlements, Consolidated Banking Statistics, 2003
Mas o Brasil evita dolarizar...
Domestic Dollarization. 1996 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bolivia 97.9 Peru 80.5 Hungary* 36.9 Mexico 32.1 Poland 24.1 Chile 14.2 Israel 18.2 Brazil 11.6 (1.5 - 7.4**) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Source: Ize. Alain and Eduardo Levy-Yeyati. 1998 Note: Average dollar deposits/domestic and cross-border deposits
Então têm espaço para:Políticas Financeiras
PROER, Programa de Reestruturação e Fortalecimento do Sistema Financeiro (1996);
FGC, Fundo Garantidor de Créditos (1996)
A ampliação do poder de intervenção do Banco Central (Lei 9.447. de 14.3.1997);
PROES, Programa de Incentivo à Redução do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade Bancária (1996);
PROEF, Programa de Fortalecimento das Instituições Financeiras Federais (1999);
FGC acalmou clientes bancários
Federal Government Bank Insurance Payments R$ million Depositors Depositors <20k$ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2001 28.1 8.471 155 2000 5.4 357 205 1999 62.5 7.657 6.480 1998 151.5 35.761 33.428 1997 3.117.4 3.948.696 3.920.794 1996 259.2 146.763 142.941 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total 3.624.3 4.147.705 4.104.003
PROER liquidou bancos quebrados
Bank Interventions Buyer ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Banco Econômico Excel e Caixa EconômicaFederal*Banco Nacional UnibancoBanco Mercantil de Pernb. RuralBanco Banorte BandeirantesBanco Bamerindus HSBC. Caixa** Banco do Brasil
(BB)----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Departamento de Operações
Bancárias(1) Julho/1994 a maio/1997(2) Apenas a carteira imobiliária.
E evitou custo maior de crise bancária
Fiscal Cost of Banking Crisis. percent GDP Year of Crisis Country Estimated Cost --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1982 Argentina 13.0 1985 Chile 19.6 1985 Colombia 6.0 1994 Venezuela 13.0 1991-93 Finland 8.2 1988-92 Norway 4.5 1991-93 Sweden 4.5 1991 United States 5.1 1995-97 Brazil 0.9 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Source: Rojas-Suarez. Liliana e Weisbrod. Steven R. Banking Crises in Latin America: Experience and Issues. IADB (1995) and Brazilian Central Bank similar estimate
“Recentralização”= PROES: O Programa de Incentivo à Redução do Setor
Público Estadual na Atividade Bancária (Proes). Medida Provisória 1.514. de 7.8.1996.
Banacre, Banco do Estado do Acre S.A.Banap, Banco do Estado do Amapá S.A.Bandern, Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte S.A.BDRN, Banco de Desenvolvimento do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte S.A.Bemat, Banco do Estado do Mato Grosso S.ABeron, Banco do Estado de Rondônia S.A.Minascaixa, Caixa Econômica do Estado de Minas GeraisProduban, Banco do Estado de Alagoas S.A.Baner Banco do Estado de Roraima S.A. (liquidated)Bandepe, Banco do Estado de Pernambuco S.A.Baneb, Bancoc do Estado de Bahia S.A.Banerj, Banco do Estado de Rio de Janeiro S.A.Banestado, Banco do Estado de Paraná S.A.Bemge, Banco do Estado de Minas Gerais, S.A.Credireal Banco de Crédito Real de Minas Gerais S.A.Paraiban Banco do Estado da Paraíba S.ABanespa, Banco do Estado de São Paulo S.A.BEA, Banco do Estado de Amazonas S.A.BEC, Banco do Estado de Ceará S.A. BEG, Banco do Estado de Goiás S.A.BEM, Banco do Estado de Maranhão S.A.BEP, Banco do Estado de Piaui S.A.BESC, Banco do Estado de Santa Catarina S.A.
Anomalia: BACEN avança depois da estabilidade de preços, 1994+
BCB antes de 1994 =atender a demandas para acompanhar o cumprimento das medidas estabelecidas pelos diversos planos econômicos
(Plano Cruzado. Plano Bresser. Plano Verão. Plano Collor Ie Plano Collor II).
• deficiências na estrutura operacional.• decorrentes da falta de equipamentos de
informática. • de equipes devidamente treinadas
BACEN medidas
Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision, setembro de 1997.
• Regras de prudência bancária• Limites mínimos de capital para a
constituição de instituições financeiras.• Limites adicionais de acordo com o
grau de risco da estrutura dos ativos• Índice de Basileia, 8, BCB 1999 = 11
BACEN medidas cont.
• Inspeção Global Consolidada (IGC).• A Central de Risco de Crédito. 22.5.1997. = banco
de dados com base em informações prestadas pelas instituições financeiras sobre obrigações
• E de seus clientes de valores atualmente superiores a R$ 5.000.00.
• Rating Resolução 2.12.1999. cada instituição financeira passou a informar a classificação de cada operação de crédito. numa lista de 9 níveis de risco. que vai de AA (melhor classificação) até H (pior classificação).
• SBP = 2002 online realtime balance supervision
1/2001 2/2001 1/2002 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Risk Centre Use 874.706 1.480.486 4.965.589 Risk Centre Consultation 1.337 7.524 24.663
Bank Fines 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 336 1.288 767 363 353 154 626 991 651*9m
Multas aplicadas a bancos pelo Banco Central do Brasil
Consultas de bancos ao Centro de Risco do Banco Central do Brasil
Estrutura do Banco Central
Workforce 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Decad 82 75 71 55 - - - - - Decif - - - - - 163 217 212 208 Defin - - - - - - - - 128 Defis(2) 1.198 1.095 1.144 827 809 672 - - - Depad(3) 76 70 68 58 109 6 - - - Desin - - - - - - 111 100 97 Desup - - - - - - 601 562 528 Difis 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 3 4 Supervision Total 1.360 1.243 1.286 944 922 846 933 877 965 Central Bank Total 6.401 6.130 5.849 4.733 4.811 4.437 4.650 4.571 4.693 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Source: (2) - Entre 1994 e 1999 inclui as divisões ou núcleos regionais de fiscalização. (3) - Em 1998 inclui uma divisão regional de processos administrativos.
Nomes...
• Decad, Departamento de Cadastro e Informações
• Decif, Departamento de Combate Ilícitos Cambiais e Financeiros
• Defin Departamento de Gestão de Informações do Sistema Financeiro
• Defis Departamento de Fiscalização• Depad Departamento de Controle de
Processos• Desin Departamento de Supervisão Indireta• Desup Departamento de Supervisão Direta• Difis Diretoria de Fiscalização
Longo caminho...Credit to Private Sector (% GDP)
1 Simple average of country data. 2 Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 3 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Moving average of current and previous year private credit levels to current year GDP.
After the Financial Storms: BOVESPA Interest Rate Futures
Market, 1996-2007
Asia Russia
Brazil
Lula9-11
Progress in Brazil 2004-2007
Inflation Expectations &
1) Credit % GDP 2) Average Loan Term (days)
“Cohabitation” Bank Credit and Stock Market Growth: IPOs 2000-
2006
Data Dissemination Practices
1) Central Government Operations (CGO). Timeliness: 1 month after the end of the reference period, Periodicity: Monthly MGFS 1986: Identifies countries that use classification of fiscal statistics according to the IMF's A Manual of Government Finance Statistic 1986 (MGFS 1986) MGFS 2001: Identifies if government accounting follows the definicion and classification of the IMF's Government Finance Statistics Manual, 2001 (MGFS 2001).
2) Central Government Debt (CGD). Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period Periodicity: Quarterly
3) Amortization Schedule for CGD. Preferably, dissemination of government debt service presented at least annually for a period of at least five years from the effective date of the debt data. It is desirable that the annual data should be supplemented with quarterly data at least for the year immediately ahead. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference periodPeriodicity: Quarterly
4) External Debt. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period Periodicity: Quarterly
5) Amortization Schedule for External Debt. It is important that data cover both public and private sector debt. Preferably, amortization payments presented at least annually for a period of at least five years from the effective date of the debt data. It is desirable that the annual data should be supplemented with quarterly data at least for the year immediately ahead. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period Periodicity: Quarterly
March 8, 2007 IIF Report on Central Bank of Brazil
The investor relations office, Gerin, at the Central Bank of Brazil has enhanced the content of its website to make information important to investors more easily accessible.
With these improvements, Gerin has become the first individual office to score 38 out of 38 in prioritized terms. Brazil has been a market leader in investor relations practices for many years. In 2006, Brazil became the first sovereign to score 38 out of 38 in prioritized terms.
Brazil operates two investor relations programs. Gerin is operated by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) and a second National Treasury Investor Relations Unit (IRU) is operated by the Debt Management Office at the National Treasury. The existence of the two offices has evolved out of organizational changes.
BEST = Brazil: Excellence in Securities Transactions (BEST Brazil) activities. The BEST Brazil initiative is aimed at promoting the Brazilian capital markets to the international investor community involving various official agencies including, in addition to the Treasury and the BCB, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil.
With the inclusion of links to regulatory information, archives, and information regarding roadshows, Gerin now satisfies three additional criteria for a total of 20. The prioritized score moved from a total of 34 to a score of 38. Gerin has surpassed global leaders Korea, Mexico, and the Philippines.
Financial Roads to Social Economies
Public Banking, Monetary Authority and Social Inclusion
Kurt MettenheimMaria Fernanda Freire de Lima
Paper to be presented to the Society for the Advancement of Social Economics 23rd Meeting,
Transformations of Contemporary Capitalism: Actors, Institutions, Processes.
Research Network N, “Finance and Society”Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 24 June 2011
ArgumentsRecent developments in central banking and public banking possible to radically
increase the pace of financial and social inclusion.
Financial liberalization and bank modernization have led to the realization of competitive advantages by large public banks.
Citizenship (ATM) cards = innovation to alleviate poverty, promote social inclusion and increase access to banking.
Basic income policies / Conceptions of citizenship & social justice = alternative model to microfinance via “entrepreneurship, financial markets and private banks.”
New policies for inclusion of bankless vast majorities in large emerging countries suggest that views of fiscal dominance, structural constraints to change and zero-sum relations between central banking, politics and social inclusion need revision.
From the Macroeconomics of Populismto the Microeconomics of Social Inclusion
“Most economists would agree that, at least in the short run, monetary policy can significantly influence the course of the real economy” Bernanke & Gertler “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission.” p. 27
We ask: Can it accelerate social inclusion? (yes)
Past Keynesian and Development New Microeconomic BankingPolicies Increase Aggregate Demand. Policies Increase Aggregate
Supply
Lifetime Asset Curve IF Lifetime Asset Curve IF >IR + Inequality>IR + Inequality
Core Principles for Alternative Banking and Social Inclusion, cont.
Supporters & Networks
Institutional Supporters• Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, New York• Institute for Money, Technology and Financial Inclusion, UC, Irvine• King´s College Department of Management, London• São Paulo Business School, Getulio Vargas Foundation • Second University of Naples
Networks• Association of Emerging Market Business Schools, São Paulo Brazil• Community of European Management Schools, Brussels• Critical Political Economy Network• European Association of Co-operative Banks, Brussels• Global Public Policy Network, London• International Cooperative Banking Association, Brussels • Social Science Finance Network, Amsterdam• Society for Advancement of Social Economics, Philadelphia • World Savings Bank Institute, Brussels
Desafio: Just do it,Ciência Política
1) Forma grupos de até 5 pessoas2) Desenvolve um plano de bancarizar
a populacão brasileira3) Entrega um plano escrito.